League of United v. Roscoe Indep School ( 1997 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-10700
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN
CITIZENS #4552 (LULAC),
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
ROSCOE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT;
LARRY WILLIAMS, in his official capacity
as member of the Board of Trustees of the
Roscoe Independent School District, Roscoe, TX;
FREDDY FREEMAN, in his official capacity
as member of the Board of Trustees of the
Roscoe Independent School District, Roscoe, TX;
DAYLON ALTHOF, in his official capacity
as member of the Board of Trustees of the
Roscoe Independent School District, Roscoe, TX;
JAMES R WATTS, SR, in his official capacity
as member of the Board of Trustees of the
Roscoe Independent School District, Roscoe, TX;
RANDY WHROTON, in his official capacity
as member of the Board of Trustees of the
Roscoe Independent School District, Roscoe, TX;
LARRY WILLMAN, in his official capacity
as member of the Board of Trustees of the
Roscoe Independent School District, Roscoe, TX;
JOSE VILLAFRANCA, in his official capacity
as member of the Board of Trustees of the
Roscoe Independent School District, Roscoe, TX,
Defendants - Appellees.
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No. 96-10920
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN
CITIZENS #4552 (LULAC),
Plaintiff - Appellant - Cross-Appellee,
versus
ROSCOE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT;
LARRY WILLIAMS, in his official capacity
as member of the Board of Trustees of the
Roscoe Independent School District, Roscoe, TX;
FREDDY FREEMAN, in his official capacity
as member of the Board of Trustees of the
Roscoe Independent School District, Roscoe, TX;
DAYLON ALTHOF, in his official capacity
as member of the Board of Trustees of the
Roscoe Independent School District, Roscoe, TX;
JAMES R WATTS, SR, in his official capacity
as member of the Board of Trustees of the
Roscoe Independent School District, Roscoe, TX;
RANDY WHROTON, in his official capacity
as member of the Board of Trustees of the
Roscoe Independent School District, Roscoe, TX;
LARRY WILLMAN, in his official capacity
as member of the Board of Trustees of the
Roscoe Independent School District, Roscoe, TX;
JOSE VILLAFRANCA, in his official capacity
as member of the Board of Trustees of the
Roscoe Independent School District, Roscoe, TX,
Defendants - Appellees - Cross-Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
September 22, 1997
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
This case involves a challenge to the at-large election scheme
used to elect trustees for the Roscoe Independent School District.
The district court entered a final judgment declaring that the
electoral structure did not violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
42 U.S.C. § 1973. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and now AFFIRM.
I.
RISD is a small school district with limited financial
resources. It spans 147 square miles in the northwest part of
Nolan County, Texas. According to the 1990 census, RISD had
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approximately 1,786 residents with a racial makeup of 68.1% Anglo
and 31.2% Mexican-American. The voting-age population of RISD as
of the 1990 census was 1,277 with 73.6% Anglo and 25.5% Mexican-
American. Though RISD includes portions of four counties and
substantial rural territory, 81% of the population in RISD lives in
the town of Roscoe. During the 1994-95 school year, RISD had 438
students who were housed in two buildings, an elementary school and
a combined middle school and high school.
The Board of Trustees is responsible for the management and
governance of RISD. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 11.051 (West 1996).
The Board is comprised of seven members. Since 1995, voters
residing in RISD have used a non-place, at-large election scheme to
elect trustees. Under this structure, the candidates with the
highest number of votes win according to the number of vacancies to
be filled. There is no majority vote requirement. The trustees
serve staggered three year terms such that two or three trustees
are elected each year. Each voter is entitled to cast one vote for
as many candidates as there are vacancies on the Board. For
example, if two trustees are to be elected, then each voter is
allowed to place one vote for two different candidates. However,
a voter may single shot his vote and vote for fewer candidates than
the number of positions to be filled. Cumulative voting is not
allowed. There is one polling place in RISD.
The election system used from 1978 to 1994 was identical to
the one just described, except each candidate ran for a specific
numbered position. RISD changed its voting scheme in response to
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pressure from minority groups complaining of dilution in their
voting power. The Justice Department approved RISD’s change in
election structure and adoption of the current system.
Appellant LULAC filed suit on June 22, 1994, seeking a
declaratory judgment that the at-large election scheme used to
elect trustees in RISD violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and an injunction against the continued
use of this electoral system. LULAC contended that RISD’s election
system diluted Mexican-American voting strength and denied these
voters an equal opportunity to participate in the political
process. After a bench trial, the district court held that LULAC
had not proved a violation of the Voting Rights Act and entered a
take nothing judgment.
LULAC attacks the judgment on three bases. First, LULAC
argues that the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions
of law were insufficient under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) and require
the case to be remanded for more detailed findings. Second, LULAC
asserts that the district court’s findings with respect to the
Gingles preconditions and the ultimate issue of vote dilution were
clearly erroneous and merit reversal. Finally, LULAC claims that
the district court improperly applied a strict scrutiny analysis.
We reject each contention and affirm the district court’s judgment.
II.
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We have often stressed the special need for detailed findings
of fact in vote dilution cases. Rule 52(a) requires here that the
record adequately reflects the factual and legal bases for the
trial court’s decision. Westwego Citizens For Better Gov’t v.
City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1203 (5th Cir. 1989) (Westwego I);
Velasquez v. City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1984);
Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 879 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated on
other grounds, 704 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1983). Our cases hold that
the trial court has two primary obligations in making its findings
in a vote dilution case. First, the court must specifically state
the evidence found credible and the reasons for its conclusions.
Rollins v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 89 F.3d 1205, 1221 (5th
Cir. 1996); Westwego I, 872 F.2d at 1203-04. Second, the trial
court must discuss all “substantial” evidence contrary to its
decision. Velasquez, 725 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1984).
However, “this Court does not require the district court to
expressly mention all the evidence in its opinion.” Rollins, 89
F.3d at 1221.
At the outset, it is important to note that LULAC had the
burden of proof. It was required to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that all of the Gingles preconditions were satisfied
and that based on the totality of the circumstances the at-large
election system diluted the voting strength of Mexican-Americans in
RISD. Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir.
1989). Any lack of evidence in the record regarding a violation of
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the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be attributed to LULAC, not to
the district court.
LULAC’s primary quarrel with the district court’s findings of
fact is that the court did not consider the testimony and exhibits
of its expert witnesses regarding the Gingles preconditions and
Zimmer factors. We disagree. The district court’s memorandum of
opinion expressly considered the evidence the experts submitted and
found it to be unimpressive. The trial court specifically found
RISD’s expert’s testimony to be “much more persuasive than that of
the plaintiff’s witnesses.” Rec. Vol. 7 at 1786.
Much of this trial was a familiar battle of experts. “The
credibility determination of witnesses, including experts, is
peculiarly within the province of the district court.” Orduna S.A.
v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 913 F.2d 1149, 1154 (5th Cir. 1990).
Consequently, we give deference to the findings and credibility
choices trial courts make with respect to expert testimony. I.U.
Tech. Corp. v. Research-Cottrell, Inc., 641 F.2d 298, 305 n.7 (5th
Cir. 1981). The district court found RISD’s expert to be the more
credible expert and that his testimony strongly rebutted that of
opposing experts. As a result, the district court was not
persuaded that LULAC’s experts offered substantial contrary
evidence. We see no reason to dispute the district court’s
evaluation of the experts or to remand this case because the
district court did not discuss in its order the testimony of
unpersuasive witnesses.
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LULAC asserts that our holding in Teague v. Attala County, 17
F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 1994), requires a remand for additional findings
of fact. LULAC’s reliance on Teague is misplaced. In Teague, we
remanded for a more in-depth analysis of the plaintiffs’
statistical evidence and for determinations on the credibility of
the trial witnesses. Teague, 17 F.3d at 798. No such concerns
arise here.
The main reason for remand in voting rights cases is for
explanation of the district court’s treatment of statistical data.
See, e.g., Houston v. Lafayette County, 56 F.3d 606, 611-13 (5th
Cir. 1995); Clark v. Calhoun County, 21 F.3d 92, 96 (5th Cir. 1994)
(Clark I); Teague, 17 F.3d at 798; Westwego Citizens For Better
Government v. City of Westwego, 906 F.2d 1042, 1044 (5th Cir.
1990) (Westwego II). LULAC’s able counsel was unable to generate
substantial statistical evidence as compared to many of our vote
dilution cases.1 The reality is that the database was thin, given
the manner of conducting the elections. The statistics LULAC
gathered were from an exit poll of the City of Roscoe election and
thus are entitled to less weight than if they had derived from a
Board of Trustees election in RISD. Magnolia Bar Ass’n v. Lee, 994
F.2d 1143, 1149 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 994 (1993).
Finally, unlike in Teague, the district court in this case made
1
The only statistical evidence LULAC presented at trial was
the results of an exit poll for the City of Roscoe elections. This
paucity of statistical data is dramatically less than that adduced
in the vote dilution cases we have remanded for more detailed
findings. See, e.g., Houston, 56 F.3d at 609 (noting plaintiff’s
evidence from fourteen elections); Teague, 17 F.3d at 797
(commenting on plaintiffs’ data from eight elections).
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known its credibility determinations and the evidence upon which
its conclusions of law were based.
Though this Court has instructed trial courts “to thoroughly
discuss the statistics offered by making specific references to the
evidence”, Rollins, 89 F.3d at 1221, and the district court’s
discussion of statistical data in this case was closemouthed at
best, there are no grounds to remand given the evidence at trial.
III.
LULAC objects to virtually every factual and legal conclusion
the trial court made. “We need not address all of [its]
contentions, however, because failure to establish any single
criterion of [Gingles] is fatal to [its] case.” Overton, 871 F.2d
at 538. “Failure to establish any one of the Gingles factors
precludes a section 2 violation, because ‘[t]hese circumstances are
necessary preconditions for multimember districts to operate to
impair minority voters’ ability to elect representatives of their
choice.’” Magnolia Bar Ass’n, 994 F.2d at 1146 (quoting Thornburg
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986)).
We review the district court’s findings on the Gingles
threshold requirements for clear error. Magnolia Bar Ass’n, 994
F.2d at 1147. Since the district court’s ruling with respect to
Gingles III was not clearly erroneous, we affirm its entry of
judgment against LULAC.
The third Gingles precondition requires the plaintiff to show
that the Anglo majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it,
absent special circumstances, usually to defeat the minority’s
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preferred candidate. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. By establishing
this circumstance, “the minority group demonstrates that
submergence in a white multimember district impedes its ability to
elect its chosen representatives.” Id. A white majority bloc
voting pattern is ordinarily established through evidence of
racially polarized voting. Westwego I, 872 F.2d at 1207.
Since RISD only has one polling place, LULAC could not use
commonly employed statistical analyses like ecological regression
analysis or extreme case analysis to prove the existence of
racially polarized voting in the district. Instead, LULAC had to
reach for other evidence in an attempt to satisfy the third Gingles
requirement. In particular, LULAC noted that only one Mexican-
American had ever been elected to the Board, that in the 1995
school board election the sole Mexican-American candidate garnered
only 14% of the Anglo vote, and that an exit poll of the 1995 City
of Roscoe election revealed that 78% of the Anglo voters surveyed
did not cast any of their five votes for the sole Mexican-American
candidate, who was victorious.2 In addition, LULAC highlighted the
fact that since 1978 95.3% of the winning candidates in the school
board elections have been Anglo and 4.7% have been Mexican-
American.
This was not, however, the only evidence bearing on the third
Gingles precondition. RISD showed that a Mexican-American, Jose
Villafranca, had been elected to the Board in 1991 and re-elected
2
Cumulative voting was used in 1995 for the City of Roscoe
elections.
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in 1993. LULAC contends that Villafranca won in 1991 because two
Anglo candidates split the white vote and that Villafranca was not
the preferred candidate of Mexican-Americans. The district court
did not find either assertion to be true.
In the 1991 election, Villafranca received 153 votes, while
the two Anglo candidates received 143 votes and 60 votes,
respectively. LULAC adduced no evidence at trial showing that
Villafranca would have lost if there had only been one Anglo
competitor. In fact, Villafranca defeated the only Anglo candidate
to oppose him in the 1993 school board election. We do not think
the district court’s finding that Villafranca’s success in 1991 was
not due to “special circumstances” was clearly erroneous.
We reach the same conclusion regarding the district court’s
determination that Villafranca was the preferred candidate of the
Mexican-American community. Mexican-American residents in RISD
testified to that effect. The trial court found LULAC’s witnesses
who testified to the contrary to be unreliable. Since we give
deference to the trial court’s credibility assessments, we cannot
say its finding on this matter was clearly erroneous.
As for the 1993 school board election, Villafranca received a
majority of the votes in defeating his Anglo and Mexican-American
competitors.3 Villafranca had also twice won election to the
Roscoe City Council. Moreover, a Mexican-American was elected to
3
In 1993, there were one Anglo candidate and one Mexican-
American candidate running against Villafranca.
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the Roscoe City Council in 1995, which according to LULAC’s expert
would not have occurred but for the Anglo cross-over vote.
Though minority electoral success alone cannot act to defeat
a vote dilution claim, Gingles, 478 U.S. at 75, we have
consistently recognized that such success and racially polarized
voting are the two most probative factors in evaluating the merits
of such an allegation. Clark v. Calhoun Co., 88 F.3d 1393, 1397
(5th Cir. 1996) (Clark II). Given the degree of minority success
in this case and the failure of LULAC to produce sufficient
evidence showing that Anglo and Mexican-American voters in RISD
vote along strict racial lines, we are not left with the definite
and firm conviction that the district court made a mistake in
finding that LULAC failed to meet the third Gingles precondition.
Because “‘the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible
in light of the record viewed in its entirety,’ its findings will
not be reversed.” Magnolia Bar Ass’n, 994 F.2d at 1147 (quoting
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)).
IV.
LULAC urges that the district court improperly evaluated its
case under a strict scrutiny analysis. LULAC bases its argument on
the last paragraph of the trial court’s order.
Applying a strict scrutiny test, this court finds that
the plaintiff has failed to prove that under the totality
of the circumstances, its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect serious, preferred
candidates of the Hispanic community to the board of
trustees of RISD. Rec. Vol. 7 at 1788.
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The use of the strict scrutiny language is puzzling, but the
district court did not apply strict scrutiny to the voting claim.
It used the legal analysis announced in Gingles and explicated in
our precedent. This stranger to the case wandered in but made no
impression. We are pointed to no prejudice and have found none.
V.
RISD appeals the denial of its motion for attorneys’ fees. A
prevailing defendant in a Voting Rights Act case is entitled to an
award of attorneys’ fees if the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless. 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e); see
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978). This
is not such a case. Nor do we find that the district court abused
its discretion in taxing $6,965.95 in costs against LULAC. These
costs are for exemplification and copies necessarily obtained for
use in the case and for expenses incident to taking depositions.
They are high but are within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and
within the discretion of the district court.
VI.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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