Crawford v. Falcon Drilling Co ( 1998 )

REVISED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 96-31071
GREG E. CRAWFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
FALCON DRILLING COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Louisiana
December 18, 1997
Before DEMOSS and DENNIS, Circuit Judges, and LEE, District Judge.*
DEMOSS, Circuit Judge:
In Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir.
1997) (en banc), we signaled a sea change in our Court’s Jones Act
jurisprudence. The present appeal arises from a maritime injury
case tried under pre-Gautreaux standards of Jones Act negligence.
We must decide what effect, if any, our decision in Gautreaux has
on this direct appeal. Finding plain error with respect to the
liability, we vacate that aspect of the judgment of the district
*
Chief Judge of the Southern District of Mississippi,
sitting by designation.
court and remand for reconsideration in light of Gautreaux.
We are also asked to review the district court’s award of
damages. Because the district court’s assessment of Crawford’s
damages was not clearly erroneous, that aspect of the judgment is
affirmed.
I.
Greg Crawford suffered a back injury aboard the PHOENIX V, a
jack-up drilling vessel. He claims, and the district court found,
that the injury was caused by an accident that occurred while he
was working as a derrickman on the PHOENIX V.1 HE FILED SUIT TO RECOVER
DAMAGES UNDER THE JONES ACT AGAINST HIS EMPLOYER, FALCON DRILLING.
AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, CRAWFORD’S CREW WAS ENGAGED IN A PRACTICE KNOWN
AS “TRIPPING PIPE OUT OF THE HOLE.” THE DRILL’S BIT HAD TO BE CHANGED, AND
TRIPPING PIPE OUT OF THE HOLE INVOLVED PULLING OUT ALL OF THE PIPE BETWEEN THE
SURFACE AND THE BOTTOM OF THE HOLE IN ORDER TO REACH THE BIT. THE PROCESS INVOLVED
THE COORDINATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DRILL CREW: THE DRILLER; THE THREE DRILL
HANDS; AND THE DERRICKMAN (IN THIS CASE, CRAWFORD).
FIRST, THE DRILL HANDS ATTACH AN ELEVATOR TO THE TOP PORTION OF THE PIPE.
THE DRILLER, WHO IS IN CHARGE OF THE OPERATION, THEN ENGAGES THE DRAW WORKS. A
“STAND” OF PIPE2 IS THEN PULLED UP AND OUT OF THE HOLE, EXPOSING THE JOINT WITH THE
1
The facts surrounding the accident which the district
court determined caused Crawford’s injuries are very complicated.
For our immediate purpose, however, the summary set out in the main
text will suffice. Quoted material in this section of the opinion
is taken from the district court’s findings of fact.
2
A “stand” consists of “[t]hree joints of pipe, each
approximately 31 feet in length or a total of approximately 93
feet.”
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NEXT STAND. THE DRILL HANDS SET SLIPS AROUND THE NEXT STAND TO HOLD IT IN PLACE,
AND THEY THEN UNSCREW THE STANDS TO SEPARATE THEM AT THAT JOINT.
AT THIS POINT, THE SEPARATED STAND OF PIPE IS READY TO BE PLACED IN THE PIPE
RACK. THE DRILLER LIFTS THE STAND A FEW FEET, AND THE DRILL HANDS THEN PUSH THE
BOTTOM OF THE STAND INTO THE RACK. THE DRILLER THEN LOWERS THE STAND SO THAT THE
BOTTOM IS IN ITS PLACE IN THE RACK.
NEXT, THE DERRICKMAN DOES HIS JOB. THE DERRICKMAN IS POSITIONED ON A
MONKEYBOARD HIGH IN THE AIR ON THE DERRICK, SUCH THAT HE CAN REACH THE ELEVATORS
ATTACHED TO THE TOP OF THE STAND AS THE DRILL HANDS POSITION THE BOTTOM OF THE STAND
IN THE PIPE RACK. HE HAS A PULL-BACK ROPE WHICH HE FLIPS AROUND THE STAND, PULLING
THE TOP TOWARD HIM WITH HIS RIGHT HAND. WHEN THE BOTTOM OF THE STAND TOUCHES THE
FLOOR IN ITS POSITION IN THE PIPE RACK, THE DERRICKMAN REACHES UP AND UNLATCHES THE
ELEVATOR WITH HIS LEFT HAND. HE THEN PULLS THE TOP OF THE STAND WITH BOTH HANDS
SO THAT HE CAN PUT IT IN ITS PLACE IN THE PIPE RACK. THE ENTIRE PROCESS IS THEN
REPEATED UNTIL ALL OF THE PIPE HAS COME OUT OF THE HOLE.
THE STAND OF PIPE WHICH CAUSED CRAWFORD’S INJURY WEIGHED BETWEEN SEVEN AND
EIGHT THOUSAND POUNDS. THE SERIES OF STANDS TRIPPED OUT OF THE HOLE IMMEDIATELY
BEFORE THIS STAND HAD BEEN BOTH LIGHTER AND SHORTER. AS CRAWFORD RELEASED THE
ELEVATORS ON THE LIGHTER STANDS, EACH OF THEM FELL TOWARD HIS LEFT. CRAWFORD THUS
POSITIONED HIS BODY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE STANDS’ MOMENTUM AND GUIDE THEM INTO
THE PIPE RACK.
CRAWFORD WAS INJURED WHEN A STAND OF PIPE FELL TO THE RIGHT WHEN HE EXPECTED
IT TO FALL TO THE LEFT. THE DISTRICT COURT FOUND THAT THIS UNEXPECTED CHANGE
RESULTED FROM “THE FLOOR HANDS IMPROPERLY POSITIONING THE BOTTOM OF THE DRILL PIPE
ON THE PIPE RACK FLOOR AND THE DRILLER SETTING THE IMPROPERLY POSITIONED DRILL PIPE
DOWN ON THE PIPE RACK FLOOR.” THE STAND’S FALL TO THE RIGHT CAUGHT CRAWFORD OFF-
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GUARD, AND THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION WAS COMPOUNDED BY CRAWFORD’S ADVANCE
POSITIONING OF HIMSELF TO ACCOMMODATE A LEFTWARD-FALLING STAND. IN HIS ATTEMPT TO
PULL THE MASSIVE STAND OF PIPE INTO THE PIPE RACK, CRAWFORD SERIOUSLY INJURED HIS
BACK.
CRAWFORD SUED FALCON DRILLING FOR DAMAGES. THE DISTRICT COURT FOUND FALCON
DRILLING LIABLE FOR CRAWFORD’S INJURIES. IT ALSO FOUND THAT CRAWFORD WAS NOT
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT WITH RESPECT TO THE ACCIDENT. JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED IN
CRAWFORD’S FAVOR IN THE AMOUNT OF $563,190.91. FALCON DRILLING APPEALS.
II.
OUR COURT’S EN BANC DECISION IN GAUTREAUX HAD NOT BEEN ANNOUNCED AT THE TIME
OF THE BENCH TRIAL IN THIS CASE. NATURALLY, THERE WAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DISTRICT
COURT’S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING THE STANDARDS OF NEGLIGENCE TO BE APPLIED TO
THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES.
IT IS A FAMILIAR RULE THAT “[O]RDINARILY A PARTY MAY NOT PRESENT A WHOLLY NEW
ISSUE IN A REVIEWING COURT.” 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2588, at 599 (2d ed. 1995); see also Helvering
v. Wood, 309 U.S. 344, 349 (1940); United States v. Calverley, 37
F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
1196 (1995). It is equally well established, however, that an
exception to the general rule allows our Court to review an issue
of law raised for the first time on appeal in exceptional
circumstances. Most of our older precedent in this area frames the
standard for applying the exception as a question of whether there
was “a miscarriage of justice.” See, e.g., Noritake Co. v. M/V
Hellenic Champion, 627 F.2d 724, 732 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980); see
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also 9A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 2588. Our case law has drifted
from these early moorings, however, and more recently our Court has
adopted the practice of reviewing unpreserved error in a civil case
using the plain-error standard of review. See, e.g., Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1424 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
banc) (plain-error rule applies when the appellant failed to object
to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendations); Highlands Ins.
Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 27 F.3d 1027, 1032 (5th Cir.
1994) (plain-error standards govern an allegedly erroneous jury
charge), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1112 (1995).
The Supreme Court has carefully defined the requirements for
reversal for plain error:
There must be an error that is plain and that
affects substantial rights. Moreover, Rule 52(b)
leaves the decision to correct the forfeited error
within the sound discretion of the court of
appeals, and the court should not exercise that
discretion unless the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (brackets and
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internal quotations omitted); see also Johnson v. United States,
117 S. Ct. 1544, 1548-49 (1997).3
IN REVIEWING THE RESULTS OF A BENCH TRIAL, A DISTRICT COURT’S FINDINGS OF
FACT “SHALL NOT BE SET ASIDE UNLESS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.” FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
For our present purposes, however, it is important to note that
“when the court’s error goes to the heart of the legal conclusion,
the finding, though similar to one of fact, should not be
protected.” 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF
REVIEW § 2.18, at 2-125 (2d ed. 1992); see, e.g., Viator v.
Delchamps Inc., 109 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 165 (1997).
3
There has been some confusion in our cases about the
continued viability of the “miscarriage of justice” requirement for
appellate review of unpreserved error in civil cases. Some of our
cases suggest that the “miscarriage of justice” analysis sails in
tandem with an OLANO-STYLE STANDARD OF REVIEW. SEE HIGHLANDS INS. CO., 27
F.3D AT 1032 (NOTING THAT APPELLATE REVIEW OF PLAIN ERROR IN CIVIL CASES “IS NOT
A RUN-OF-THE-MILL REMEDY AND WILL OCCUR ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES TO AVOID
A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.” (INTERNAL QUOTATIONS OMITTED)). IN CERTAIN CONTEXTS,
HOWEVER, OUR EN BANC COURT HAS DISCLAIMED A SEPARATE “MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE”
REQUIREMENT FOR PLAIN-ERROR REVIEW. SEE DOUGLASS, 79 F.3D AT 1423-28 (CIVIL
APPEALS IN WHICH A PARTY FAILED TO OBJECT TO ALLEGED ERRORS IN A MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS); CALVERLEY, 37 F.3D AT 163-64 (CRIMINAL APPEALS).
THESE ARE ROUGH SEAS TO NAVIGATE, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE
APPLICABILITY OF THE “MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE” REQUIREMENT IN UNCHARTED PLAIN-ERROR
TERRITORY WAS EXPRESSLY LEFT OPEN IN A RECENT OPINION OF OUR EN BANC COURT. SEE
DOUGLASS, 79 F.3D AT 1428 N.15. RATHER THAN CHART A NEW COURSE, WE WILL SIMPLY
SAIL WITH THE FLEET IN APPLYING THE OLANO STANDARD OF PLAIN-ERROR REVIEW, CONFIDENT
THAT WHATEVER INDEPENDENT STANDARD MIGHT BE REPRESENTED BY “MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE”
RUBRIC, IT IS ADEQUATELY SATISFIED IN THIS CASE WHICH EASILY SURVIVES THE RIGORS OF
OLANO’S FOUR-PART ANALYSIS. CF. DOUGLASS, 79 F.3D AT 1425 (“[M]OST CASES,
PRE- AND POST-OLANO, IN OUR CIRCUIT AND OTHERS USE THE TERM ‘MANIFEST INJUSTICE’
TO DESCRIBE THE RESULT OF A PLAIN ERROR.”).
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III.
To resolve this appeal, we must determine (1) if there was
error, (2) if that error was plain, (3) if the error affects
substantial rights, and (4) whether allowing that error to stand
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.
A.
We turn first to the question of whether there was Gautreaux
error. As a threshold matter, we pause to note that there can be
no question but that Falcon Drilling is entitled to the benefit of
the Gautreaux rule, despite the fact that it was announced after
the conclusion of the trial in this case. The Supreme Court held
in Harper v. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993), that
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to
the parties before it, that rule is the controlling
interpretation of federal law and must be given
full retroactive effect in all cases still open on
direct review and as to all events, regardless of
whether such events predate or postdate our
announcement of the rule.
Harper, 509 U.S. at 97. In the past, our Circuit has adopted as
its own the Supreme Court’s rules on the retroactivity of legal
principles announced in civil cases. See, e.g., Sterling v. Block,
953 F.2d 198, 200 (5th Cir. 1992).4 THUS, THE GAUTREAUX RULE APPLIES IN
4
This practice comports with that in other circuits. SEE,
E.G., NATIONAL FUEL GAS SUPPLY CORP. V. FERC, 59 F.3D 1281, 1285, 1288-89
(D.C. CIR. 1995); LABORERS’ INT’L UNION, AFL-CIO V. FOSTER WHEELER CORP.,
26 F.3D 375, 386 N.8 (3D CIR.), CERT. DENIED, 513 U.S. 946 (1994);
ECKSTEIN V. BALCOR FILM INVESTORS, 8 F.3D 1121, 1128 (7TH CIR. 1993), CERT.
DENIED, 510 U.S. 1073 (1994); NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING & DRY DOCK CO. V.
GARRETT, 6 F.3D 1547, 1554 (FED. CIR. 1993); UNITED STATES V. GOODNER BROS.
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THE PRESENT CASE, WHICH APPEARS BEFORE OUR COURT ON DIRECT APPEAL.5
WE NOW CONSIDER WHETHER THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ENTERED AT TRIAL WERE
ERRONEOUS IN LIGHT OF GAUTREAUX. “ERROR IS DEFINED AS A DEVIATION FROM A LEGAL
RULE IN THE ABSENCE OF A VALID LEGAL WAIVER.” CALVERLEY, 37 F.3D AT 162 (CITING
OLANO, 507 U.S. AT 732). THE DISTRICT COURT RULED:
3. UNDER THE JONES ACT A DEFENDANT MUST BEAR RESPONSIBILITY
FOR ANY NEGLIGENCE, HOWEVER SLIGHT, THAT PLAYED A PART IN
PRODUCING THE PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES. IN RE COOPER/T. SMITH,
929 F.2D 1073, 1077 (5TH CIR. 1991) [, CERT. DENIED, 502
U.S. 865 (1991)].
4. DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO ENSURE THAT THE
LOWER END OF THE PIPE STRING WAS POSITIONED PROPERLY BEFORE
SETTING IT DOWN.
* * *
7. A SEAMAN HAS A DUTY, ALBEIT SLIGHT, TO USE REASONABLE
CARE TO PROTECT HIMSELF. SAVOIE V. OTTO CANDIES, INC., 692
F.2D 363, 371 (5TH CIR. 1982).
8. PLAINTIFF WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT IN CAUSING THE
ACCIDENT WHICH RESULTED IN HIS INJURY.
IN GAUTREAUX, WE HELD THAT “NOTHING IN THE TEXT OR STRUCTURE OF THE FELA-JONES
ACT LEGISLATION SUGGESTS THAT THE STANDARD OF CARE TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO EITHER AN
EMPLOYER OR AN EMPLOYEE IS ANYTHING DIFFERENT THAN ORDINARY PRUDENCE UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.” GAUTREAUX, 107 F.3D AT 338. WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICABLE
STANDARD FOR CONSIDERING THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF A JONES ACT SEAMAN, WE
AIRCRAFT, INC., 966 F.2D 380, 385 (8TH CIR. 1992), CERT. DENIED, 506 U.S.
1049 (1993).
5
The possible exceptions to the HARPER RULE DISCUSSED IN RYDER
V. UNITED STATES, 515 U.S. 177 (1995), AND REYNOLDSVILLE CASKET CO. V. HYDE,
514 U.S. 749 (1995), ARE INAPPLICABLE. THE APPLICABILITY OF GAUTREAUX IS
ESSENTIAL TO DETERMINING THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE. SEE HYDE, 514 U.S. AT 758-
59. MOREOVER, THE APPLICATION OF GAUTREAUX WOULD NOT CAUSE CRAWFORD “THE SORT OF
GRAVE DISRUPTION OR INEQUITY INVOLVED IN AWARDING RETROSPECTIVE RELIEF” THAT WOULD
CALL INTO THE ACTION THE DOCTRINE (OF QUESTIONABLE CONTINUED VIABILITY) OF CHEVRON
OIL CO. V. HUSON, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). SEE RYDER, 515 U.S. AT 184-85.
-8-
SPECIFICALLY HELD THAT:
A SEAMAN . . . IS OBLIGATED UNDER THE JONES ACT TO ACT
WITH ORDINARY PRUDENCE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF A SEAMAN'S EMPLOYMENT INCLUDE NOT ONLY HIS
RELIANCE ON HIS EMPLOYER TO PROVIDE A SAFE WORK ENVIRONMENT BUT
ALSO HIS OWN EXPERIENCE, TRAINING, OR EDUCATION. THE
REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD, THEREFORE, AND A JONES ACT
NEGLIGENCE ACTION BECOMES ONE OF THE REASONABLE SEAMAN IN LIKE
CIRCUMSTANCES. TO HOLD OTHERWISE WOULD UNJUSTLY REWARD
UNREASONABLE CONDUCT AND WOULD FAULT SEAMEN ONLY FOR THEIR GROSS
NEGLIGENCE, WHICH WAS NOT THE CONTEMPLATION OF CONGRESS.
ID. AT 339.
THE DISTRICT COURT’S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING STANDARDS OF JONES ACT
NEGLIGENCE MAY HAVE BEEN DEFENSIBLE UNDER OUR PRE-GAUTREAUX CASE LAW. UNDER
GAUTREAUX, HOWEVER, THE RULE IS CLEAR, AND THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT
PRESENTS ERROR IN TWO RESPECTS. THE DISTRICT COURT CHARGED FALCON DRILLING WITH
“RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY NEGLIGENCE, HOWEVER SLIGHT,” BUT GAUTREAUX SPECIFICALLY
DISAVOWS “ATTRIBUTING TO JONES ACT EMPLOYERS A HIGHER DUTY OF CARE THAN THAT
REQUIRED UNDER ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE.” ID. FURTHERMORE, THE DISTRICT COURT RULED
THAT “[A] SEAMAN HAS A DUTY, ALBEIT SLIGHT, TO USE REASONABLE CARE TO PROTECT
HIMSELF,” WHILE GAUTREAUX REJECTS THE RULE “ASCRIBING TO SEAMEN A SLIGHT DUTY OF
CARE TO PROTECT THEMSELVES FROM THE NEGLIGENCE OF THEIR EMPLOYERS.” ID. THE
DISTRICT COURT’S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DEVIATE FROM THE LEGAL RULE ANNOUNCED IN
GAUTREAUX, AND THE “ERROR” PRONG OF THE OLANO INQUIRY IS THUS SATISFIED IN THIS
CASE.
B.
WE NEXT CONSIDER WHETHER THE ERROR COMMITTED AT TRIAL IS PLAIN. THE SUPREME
COURT HAS PROVIDED CONSIDERABLE GUIDANCE ON THIS POINT. “‘PLAIN’ IS SYNONYMOUS
WITH ‘CLEAR’ OR, EQUIVALENTLY, ‘OBVIOUS.’” OLANO, 507 U.S. AT 734. “[W]HERE
THE LAW AT THE TIME OF TRIAL WAS SETTLED AND CLEARLY CONTRARY TO THE LAW AT THE TIME
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OF APPEAL -- IT IS ENOUGH THAT AN ERROR BE ‘PLAIN’ AT THE TIME OF APPELLATE
CONSIDERATION.” JOHNSON, 117 S. CT. AT 1549.
JUST AS IN THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENTLY DECIDED JOHNSON CASE, THE LAW IN THE
PRESENT CASE HAS CHANGED BETWEEN THE TRIAL AND OUR DETERMINATION ON APPEAL.
JOHNSON DICTATES THAT WE USE HINDSIGHT TO DECIDE WHETHER THE ERROR WAS PLAIN.6 IN
LIGHT OF GAUTREAUX, THE ERROR IS PLAIN, CLEAR, AND OBVIOUS. THUS THE SECOND OLANO
FACTOR IS SATISFIED.
C.
WE NOW INQUIRE WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT’S ERROR AFFECTED FALCON DRILLING’S
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS. “OLANO COUNSELS THAT IN MOST CASES THE AFFECTING OF
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS REQUIRES THAT THE ERROR BE PREJUDICIAL; IT MUST AFFECT THE
OUTCOME OF THE PROCEEDING.” CALVERLEY, 37 F.3D AT 164 (CITING OLANO, 507 U.S.
AT 734-35). IN THIS CASE, THE PREJUDICE TO FALCON DRILLING CAN BE EASILY
DEMONSTRATED.
THE DISTRICT COURT USED ERRONEOUS STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING THE NEGLIGENCE
OF THE PARTIES. THE STANDARD APPLIED TO FALCON DRILLING WAS TOO HIGH. IT MADE
FALCON LIABLE FOR “ANY NEGLIGENCE, HOWEVER SLIGHT, THAT PLAYED A PART IN PRODUCING
THE PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES.” ALSO, THE STANDARD APPLIED TO CRAWFORD WAS TOO LOW.
IT STATED THAT CRAWFORD HAD A “DUTY, ALBEIT SLIGHT, TO USE REASONABLE CARE TO
PROTECT HIMSELF.”
6
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in JOHNSON, OUR EN BANC
OPINION IN CALVERLEY SUGGESTED THAT PLAIN ERRORS ARE “ERRORS WHICH ARE SO
CONSPICUOUS THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE AND PROSECUTOR WERE DERELICT IN COUNTENANCING THEM,
EVEN ABSENT THE DEFENDANT’S TIMELY ASSISTANCE IN DETECTING THEM.” CALVERLEY, 37
F.3D AT 163 (BRACKETS AND INTERNAL QUOTATIONS OMITTED). IN LIGHT OF JOHNSON’S
HOLDING THAT PLAINNESS IS JUDGED WITH APPELLATE HINDSIGHT TO CORRECT AN ERROR WHICH
ONLY BECAME AN ERROR IN LIGHT OF INTERVENING LAW WHICH WAS UNAVAILABLE AT THE TIME
OF TRIAL, THIS ASPECT OF CALVERLEY’S DISCUSSION OF PLAINNESS HAS BEEN ABROGATED.
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AS GAUTREAUX MAKES CLEAR, THESE STANDARDS SERIOUSLY MISSTATE THE LAW. THE
STANDARDS APPLIED BY THE DISTRICT COURT EMBODY A STRONG PRESUMPTION THAT A JONES
ACT EMPLOYER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INJURIES OF SEAMEN. FURTHERMORE, THEY
ATTRIBUTE VERY LITTLE RESPONSIBILITY TO THE SEAMAN HIMSELF. IN CONTRAST, GAUTREAUX
REQUIRES THAT BOTH THE EMPLOYER AND THE SEAMAN BE SUBJECTED TO THE “ORDINARY
PRUDENCE” STANDARD OF NEGLIGENCE UNDER THE JONES ACT. SEE GAUTREAUX, 107 F.3D
AT 338-39.
HAD THE PROPER STANDARDS BEEN APPLIED, THE DISTRICT COURT MAY VERY WELL HAVE
FOUND CRAWFORD TO HAVE BEEN CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT TO SOME DEGREE. THERE IS
AMPLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT’S CONCLUSION THAT THE
DRILLER AND THE DRILL HANDS IMPROPERLY POSITIONED THE DRILL PIPE ON THE PIPE RACK
FLOOR, THEREBY GIVING RISE TO FALCON DRILLING’S LIABILITY. BUT THERE IS ALSO
EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT CRAWFORD WAS HIMSELF NEGLIGENT.
THE DISTRICT COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACT INCLUDE A FINDING THAT “IT WAS NOT
UNREASONABLE FOR GREG CRAWFORD TO EXPECT THAT THE DRILL PIPE HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO
HANDLE WOULD FALL TO THE LEFT AS THE PREVIOUS STANDS OF PIPE HAD RATHER THAN TO THE
RIGHT AS IT DID.” THIS CONCLUSION IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT
DRILL CREWS WHO WERE EXPERIENCED AT WORKING TOGETHER, AS THIS CREW WAS, DEVELOP A
“RHYTHM” WHICH MIGHT LULL CRAWFORD INTO ASSUMING THAT EACH STAND OF PIPE WOULD FALL
IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE PREVIOUS STANDS HAD FALLEN. UNDER THE STANDARD OF
“SLIGHT” NEGLIGENCE APPLIED BY THE DISTRICT COURT, THIS FINDING ALONE MIGHT SUPPORT
A CONCLUSION THAT CRAWFORD WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT. BUT HAD A STANDARD
OF ORDINARY PRUDENCE STANDARD BEEN APPLIED, OTHER EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD MIGHT HAVE
LED THE DISTRICT COURT TO A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION. SPECIFICALLY, CRAWFORD HIMSELF,
WITNESSES FROM THE DRILL CREW, AND BOTH EXPERT WITNESSES WHO TESTIFIED ABOUT THE
OPERATIONS ON DRILLING RIGS ALL TESTIFIED THAT A DERRICKMAN MUST ALWAYS BE PREPARED
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FOR THE STAND OF PIPE TO FALL IN EITHER DIRECTION. THUS, EVEN THOUGH IT MIGHT NOT
HAVE BEEN “UNREASONABLE” FOR CRAWFORD TO EXPECT THE STAND TO FALL TO THE LEFT, THE
ORDINARY PRUDENT SEAMAN MIGHT HAVE TAKEN SOME ADDITIONAL PRECAUTIONS TO PREVENT
INJURY TO HIMSELF.
THERE IS ALSO EVIDENCE THAT CRAWFORD MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ANTICIPATE THAT
THE STAND WOULD FALL TO THE RIGHT. ON CROSS-EXAMINATION, CRAWFORD ADMITTED THAT
HE COULD HAVE SEEN THE APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF THE PLACEMENT OF THE BOTTOM OF THE
STAND IF HE HAD LOOKED. THIS TESTIMONY WAS CORROBORATED BY SEVERAL OTHER WITNESSES
AT TRIAL.7 FURTHERMORE, A MEMBER OF THE DRILL CREW AND FALCON DRILLING’S EXPERT
WITNESS BOTH TESTIFIED THAT CRAWFORD SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN AN INDICATION OF WHICH WAY
THE PIPE WAS LEANING BY OBSERVING THE ELEVATORS. IN LIGHT OF CRAWFORD’S CONCESSION
THAT HE HAD TO BE READY FOR THE PIPE TO FALL IN EITHER DIRECTION, IF THE PROPER
STANDARD WERE APPLIED, THE DISTRICT COURT MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT CRAWFORD SHOULD HAVE
BEEN MORE AWARE OF THE THINGS HAPPENING AROUND HIM WHICH MIGHT HAVE HELPED HIM TO
JUDGE WHICH WAY THE STAND OF PIPE WOULD FALL.
AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF CRAWFORD’S POTENTIALLY CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, IT IS
NOTABLE THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A “MULE LINE” WAS AVAILABLE TO
ASSIST CRAWFORD IN RACKING THE TOP OF THE STAND OF PIPE.8 THE RECORD SUGGESTS THAT
CRAWFORD KNEW BEFORE IT CAME OUT OF THE HOLE THAT THE STAND WHICH INJURED HIM WAS
A PARTICULARLY HEAVY STAND. THE DISTRICT COURT SPECIFICALLY DETERMINED THAT “[T]HE
7
The possibility that Crawford could have looked down and
seen how the stand of pipe was positioned is further corroborated
by the testimony of several witnesses from the drill crew that the
driller always stopped the process momentarily after the bottom of
the stand was racked, and also that Crawford had the ability to
stop the process by refusing to unlatch the elevators, which also
would have enabled him to look below him.
8
The “mule line” is a device used by the drill crew to
ease the task of setting pipe back in the derrick.
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DERRICKMAN CAN STOP THE OPERATION AND REQUEST A MULE LINE IF HE DOES NOT THINK HE
COULD HANDLE A PARTICULAR STAND THAT IS TO BE REMOVED FROM THE HOLE.” CRAWFORD’S
OWN EXPERT WITNESS CHARACTERIZED THE ATTEMPT TO MANUALLY HANDLE THE SEVEN-TO-EIGHT-
THOUSAND-POUND STAND OF PIPE AS AN UNSAFE PRACTICE. SO AGAIN, HAD THE COURT NOT
CHARACTERIZED CRAWFORD’S DUTY TO PROTECT HIMSELF AS A “SLIGHT” ONE, THE COURT MIGHT
HAVE DETERMINED CRAWFORD’S FAILURE TO REQUEST A MULE LINE TO BE CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE WHICH WOULD HAVE REDUCED FALCON DRILLING’S LIABILITY FOR THE ACCIDENT.
FINALLY, THERE IS EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT CRAWFORD’S OWN ACTIONS
UNNECESSARILY ENDANGERED HIMSELF. IN PARTICULAR, THERE WAS TESTIMONY AT TRIAL THAT
IN LIGHT OF A DERRICKMAN’S DUTY TO BE PREPARED FOR THE STAND TO FALL IN EITHER
DIRECTION, IT WAS UNSAFE FOR CRAWFORD TO HAVE POSITIONED HIS BODY IN RELIANCE ON
HIS ASSUMPTION THAT ALL OF THE STANDS WOULD FALL TO THE LEFT. ALSO, THERE WAS
TESTIMONY THAT INSTEAD OF RISKING INJURY BY TRYING TO COMPENSATE FOR HIS MISJUDGMENT
ABOUT THE DIRECTION IN WHICH THE PIPE WOULD FALL, CRAWFORD SHOULD HAVE SIMPLY LET
THE STAND FALL AGAINST THE DERRICK. WE, OF COURSE, CANNOT KNOW HOW THIS EVIDENCE
MIGHT HAVE AFFECTED THE DISTRICT COURT’S RESOLUTION OF THE CASE HAD THE PROPER
JONES ACT STANDARDS BEEN APPLIED.
THE DISTRICT COURT INCLUDED IN HIS FINDINGS OF FACT HIS ASSESSMENT THAT:
GREG CRAWFORD DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TO HIS OWN INJURY IN ATTEMPTING
TO CATCH THE DRILL PIPE WHEN IT WENT TO THE RIGHT RATHER THAN
RELEASING THE PIPE AND LETTING IT FALL AGAINST THE DERRICK, IN
FAILING TO SEE THAT THE DRILL PIPE HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY RACKED ON
THE DRILL PIPE FLOOR BY THE FLOORHANDS BEFORE THE DRILLER SET
THE DRILL PIPE, OR IN FAILING TO STOP THE TRIPPING OPERATION TO
ASK FOR THE USE OF A MULE LINE ON THE STAND OF PIPE THAT THE
CREW WAS HANDLING WHEN HE WAS INJURED.
HOWEVER, FROM THE STATE OF THE RECORD, IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THE DISTRICT COURT WAS
MAKING A SPECIFIC FACTUAL FINDING THAT CRAWFORD’S SUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO RACK THE
PIPE, HIS FAILURE TO OBSERVE THE FAULTY PLACEMENT OF THE BOTTOM OF THE STAND IN THE
PIPE RACK, AND HIS FAILURE TO REQUEST A MULE LINE TO ASSIST THE MOVEMENT OF A
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PARTICULARLY HEAVY STAND OF PIPE DID NOT “CONTRIBUTE” TO HIS INJURY. QUITE TO THE
CONTRARY, IT IS MUCH MORE LIKELY THAT THE ABOVE-QUOTED PASSAGE FROM THE DISTRICT
COURT’S OPINION REFLECTS THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT THAT DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF THE
ABOVE-LISTED FACTORS (WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN, AT THE VERY LEAST, CAUSES-IN-FACT
OF THE ACCIDENT), THESE FACTS DID NOT OR WOULD NOT AMOUNT TO A BREACH OF CRAWFORD’S
“SLIGHT” DUTY TO PROTECT HIMSELF. ACCORDINGLY, THIS ASSESSMENT IS NOT A MERE
“FINDING OF FACT,” BUT RATHER AN APPLICATION OF LAW TO THE FACTS FOUND BY THE
DISTRICT COURT. IT IS THEREFORE NOT SUBJECT TO THE CLEAR-ERROR ANALYSIS OF RULE
52(A), BUT IS, RATHER, SUBJECT TO OUR RULES FOR REVIEWING ERRORS OF LAW.
THE DISTRICT COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT “[T]HE WORK OF THE
DRILLER, THE FLOORHANDS AND THE DERRICKMAN ARE INTERRELATED.” THE FINDINGS ALSO
NOTE THAT “THE DERRICKMAN CAN STOP THE OPERATION BY REFUSING TO UNLATCH THE
ELEVATORS.” THESE FINDINGS SUGGEST THAT THE DISTRICT COURT BELIEVED THAT CRAWFORD
WAS JUST AS INVOLVED IN (AND RESPONSIBLE FOR) THE PROCESS OF TRIPPING THE PIPE AS
WERE THE WORKERS ON THE DRILL FLOOR. IN LIGHT OF THE SUBSTANTIAL POSSIBILITY THAT
THE APPLICATION OF ERRONEOUS JONES ACT NEGLIGENCE STANDARDS AFFECTED THE DISTRICT
COURT’S DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUE OF CRAWFORD’S POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE,
WE FIND THAT FALCON DRILLING’S DEFENSE WAS MATERIALLY PREJUDICED. WHETHER OR NOT
A RECONSIDERATION UNDER THE PROPER STANDARDS WILL ULTIMATELY RESULT IN A FINDING OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, THE PRESENCE OF EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD SUGGESTING THAT
CRAWFORD’S OWN NEGLECT COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS ACCIDENT PERSUADES US THAT
FALCON DRILLING’S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN AFFECTED FOR THE PURPOSES OF PLAIN-
ERROR ANALYSIS.
D.
FINALLY, WE TURN TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE ERROR IN THIS CASE SERIOUSLY
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AFFECTS THE FAIRNESS, INTEGRITY, OR PUBLIC REPUTATION OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. SEE
OLANO, 507 U.S. AT 732. THIS PART OF THE OLANO TEST ESSENTIALLY ENTRUSTS US TO
EXERCISE OUR JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THIS IS THE KIND OF
EXCEPTIONAL CASE THAT MERITS REVERSAL ON THE BASIS OF PLAIN ERROR. SEE ID. AT
735-37; JOHNSON, 117 S. CT. AT 1550; CALVERLEY, 37 F.3D AT 164. AN ARRAY
OF FACTORS CONVINCE US THAT THIS STANDARD IS MET IN THE PRESENT CASE.
FIRST, THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE PROCEDURAL SETTING OF THIS CASE AND THAT
OF HORMEL V. HELVERING, 312 U.S. 552 (1941), IS COMPELLING. IN HORMEL, THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ASSESSED A DEFICIENCY AGAINST MR. HORMEL FOR
FAILURE TO REPORT ON HIS INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS THE INCOME FROM SEVERAL
TRUSTS WHICH THE COMMISSIONER DEEMED TO BE REVOCABLE (THE INCOME FROM SUCH TRUSTS
THEREFORE BEING ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE DEFENDANT). THE COMMISSIONER DEFENDED HIS
POSITION BY RELYING ON SECTIONS 166 AND 167 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE. THE
BOARD OF TAX APPEALS RULED IN FAVOR OF MR. HORMEL ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER HE
WAS LIABLE FOR TAXES ON THE TRUST INCOME. ON APPEAL TO THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, THE
COMMISSIONER ABANDONED HIS RELIANCE ON SECTION 166, AND RELIED ON SECTIONS 22(A)
AND 167 TO SUPPORT THE FINDING OF DEFICIENCY. THE DEFENDANT OBJECTED TO THE
COMMISSIONER’S USE OF A NEW ARGUMENT, THAT BASED ON SECTION 22(A), ON APPEAL.
STILL, THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT REVERSED THE JUDGMENT OF THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS,
HOLDING THAT SECTION 22(A) GOVERNED THE MATTER AND DICTATED THE RESULT ADVOCATED
BY THE COMMISSIONER. SEE HORMEL, 312 U.S. AT 553-55.
THE SUPREME COURT GRANTED CERTIORARI, AND DIRECTLY CONFRONTED THE PROPRIETY
OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S CONSIDERATION OF A NEW LEGAL ARGUMENT ON APPEAL. THE
COURT NOTED THAT “[O]RDINARILY AN APPELLATE COURT DOES NOT GIVE CONSIDERATION TO
ISSUES NOT RAISED BELOW,” BUT ALSO THAT “[T]HERE MAY ALWAYS BE EXCEPTIONAL CASES
OR PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WILL PROMPT A REVIEWING OR APPELLATE COURT, WHERE
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INJUSTICE MIGHT OTHERWISE RESULT, TO CONSIDER QUESTIONS OF LAW WHICH WERE NEITHER
PRESSED NOR PASSED UPON BY THE COURT OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY BELOW.” ID. AT 556,
557. THE COURT THEN DISCUSSED THE PECULIAR SETTING OF THE CASE BEFORE IT:
[W]E ARE OF OPINION THAT THE COURT BELOW SHOULD HAVE GIVEN AND
PROPERLY DID GIVE CONSIDERATION TO SECTION 22(A) IN DETERMINING
PETITIONER’S TAX LIABILITY. THE COMMISSIONER URGED THIS POINT
BEFORE THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND HAS STRONGLY PRESENTED
IT HERE. AT THE TIME THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS MADE ITS
DECISION IN THIS CASE, WE HAD NOT YET HANDED DOWN OUR OPINION IN
HELVERING V. CLIFFORD, 309 U.S. 331 [(1940)], IN WHICH WE
HELD THAT UNDER SECTION 22(A) THE INCOME OF CERTAIN TRUSTS WAS
TAXABLE TO RESPONDENT. . . . AS THE RECORD NOW STANDS WE THINK
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE TRUST INCOME WAS
TAXABLE TO PETITIONER UNDER THE PRINCIPLES ANNOUNCED IN THE
CLIFFORD CASE. THEREFORE TO APPLY HERE THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE
OF APPELLATE PRACTICE FOR WHICH PETITIONER CONTENDS WOULD RESULT
IN PERMITTING HIM WHOLLY TO ESCAPE PAYMENT OF A TAX WHICH UNDER
THE RECORD BEFORE US HE CLEARLY OWES. THUS VIEWED, THIS IS
EXACTLY THE TYPE OF CASE WHERE APPLICATION OF THE GENERAL
PRACTICE WOULD DEFEAT RATHER THAN PROMOTE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE,
AND THE COURT BELOW WAS RIGHT IN SO HOLDING.
ID. AT 559-60. THE SUPREME COURT THUS AFFIRMED THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT AND DIRECTED
THAT THE CASE BE REMANDED TO THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS FOR FURTHER FACT FINDING AND
PROCEEDINGS IN LIGHT OF THE INTERVENING CLIFFORD OPINION. SEE ID. AT 560. IT IS
HARD TO IMAGINE A CASE CLOSER TO THE POINT THAN THIS. THE COURT’S HOLDING IN
HORMEL STRONGLY SUPPORTS -- IF NOT COMPELS -- OUR DETERMINATION THAT A TRIAL ERROR
THAT BECOMES PLAIN ON DIRECT APPEAL IN LIGHT OF AN INTERVENING JUDICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT
OF A CONTROLLING RULE IMPLICATES THE SORT OF SERIOUS EFFECT ON THE “FAIRNESS,
INTEGRITY, OR PUBLIC REPUTATION OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ” ENVISIONED BY OLANO.
EVEN IF THE RESULT IN HORMEL WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUGGESTIVE, WE WOULD BE
PERSUADED TO EXERCISE OUR DISCRETION BY THE PRESENCE OF OTHER FACTORS. FOR
EXAMPLE, THE VERY FACT THAT WE GRANTED EN BANC REVIEW IN GAUTREAUX SUGGESTS THAT
THE CONFUSION AND CONFLICT THAT CHARACTERIZED OUR PRIOR PRECEDENTS IN THIS AREA OF
LAW COMPROMISED THE FAIRNESS, INTEGRITY, OR PUBLIC REPUTATION OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS. WE REMEDIED THAT PROBLEM BY ANNOUNCING A NEW RULE AND GRANTING RELIEF
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TO THE GAUTREAUX DEFENDANT. THE REASONS THAT PROMPTED OUR COURT TO PAUSE AND TAKE
STOCK OF OUR JONES ACT JURISPRUDENCE ALSO SUPPORT GRANTING RELIEF IN THIS CASE.
THE CASE BEFORE US IS A DIRECT APPEAL; CRAWFORD SHOULD NOT GET THE ADVANTAGE OF
PRE-GAUTREAUX RULES MERELY BECAUSE OF THE FORTUITY OF THE TIMING OF THE RELEVANT
DECISIONS.
FURTHERMORE, OUR DISCRETION IS INFORMED BY THE FACT THAT THIS CASE WAS TRIED
TO THE COURT. A CHIEF JUSTIFICATION FOR OUR GENERAL RULE AGAINST PERMITTING NEW
ISSUES TO BE RAISED ON APPEAL IS THE CONCERN “OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST” FOR
PROTECTING THE FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS. UNITED STATES V. ATKINSON, 297 U.S. 157,
159 (1936); SEE ALSO CALVERLEY, 37 F.3D AT 162. THE PARTIES’ INTEREST IN
FINALITY IS SELF-EVIDENT; THE “PUBLIC CONCERN” FOR FINALITY IS BASED ON THE NEED
TO CONSERVE LIMITED JUDICIAL RESOURCES. IN THIS CASE, ACKNOWLEDGING THE PRESENCE
OF PLAIN ERROR AND REMANDING THE CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS WILL NOT UNNECESSARILY
BURDEN OUR FEDERAL COURTS’ TREMENDOUS CASELOAD. A SITUATION WHICH WOULD REQUIRE
REPEATING A LENGTHY JURY TRIAL MIGHT PRESENT A DIFFERENT CASE. HERE, HOWEVER, THE
DISTRICT COURT ABLY CONDUCTED THE BENCH TRIAL BELOW AND IS ALREADY INTIMATELY
FAMILIAR WITH THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. ALL THAT IS REQUIRED ON REMAND IS A
RECONSIDERATION OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S PRIOR CONCLUSIONS IN LIGHT OF GAUTREAUX.
WE CONFIDENTLY LEAVE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THIS PROCESS WILL REQUIRE FURTHER
SUBMISSIONS OR ARGUMENTS FROM THE PARTIES TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE DISTRICT
COURT.
IN SUM, THEN, THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN HORMEL, OUR RECOGNITION OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF THE CHANGE IN OUR CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF JONES ACT
NEGLIGENCE STANDARDS EFFECTED BY GAUTREAUX, AND THE FACT THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH
THE AFTERMATH OF A BENCH TRIAL CONDUCTED ON THE EVE OF GAUTREAUX’S SEA CHANGE, ALL
CONVINCE US THAT THE PRESENT APPEAL IS AN APPROPRIATE CASE FOR RECOGNIZING PLAIN
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ERROR. WE THEREFORE CONCLUDE THAT THE ERROR’S SERIOUS EFFECT ON THE FAIRNESS,
INTEGRITY, OR PUBLIC REPUTATION OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS REQUIRES US TO VACATE THE
DISTRICT COURT’S JUDGMENT AS TO THE RESPECTIVE LIABILITY OF THE PARTIES.
IV.
FALCON DRILLING ALSO APPEALS THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED TO CRAWFORD. WE
REVIEW FOR CLEAR ERROR. SEE FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); Nichols v. Petroleum
Helicopters, Inc., 17 F.3d 119, 121 (5th Cir. 1994). We have
considered the arguments on appeal and the evidence presented to
the district court. The award entered by the district court was
based on a finding of Crawford’s future earnings that fell within
the range of earnings suggested by the evidence at trial. We
conclude that the district court’s findings with respect to the
amount of Crawford’s damages were not clearly erroneous.
V.
In light of our Court’s holding in Gautreaux, the district
court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the
liability of the parties are plainly erroneous. We emphasize that
we cast no aspersion on the district court’s application of the law
as it stood under our Circuit’s governing precedents at the time
this case was tried. But we will not close our eyes to the plain
error committed below, even though that error is apparent only with
the benefit of appellate hindsight.
We affirm the district court’s valuation of Crawford’s
damages. Of course, any reallocation of liability that may result
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from the proceedings on remand will require an appropriate
allocation of responsibility among the parties for Crawford’s
damages, and we therefore vacate the damages award.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and
VACATED in part, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with the holdings of this Court in Gautreaux v. Scurlock
Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
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