Hopkins v. Amer Tele Telegr Co ( 1998 )


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  •                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    For the Fifth Circuit
    No. 96-10668
    WILLIAM HOPKINS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    VERSUS
    AMERICAN TELEPHONE and TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    For the Northern District of Texas
    (3:95-CV-461-T)
    January 6, 1998
    Before EMILIO M. GARZA, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges
    PER CURIAM:*
    William Hopkins [“Hopkins”] appeals adverse summary judgment
    rejecting his race discrimination and retaliation claims brought
    under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. §
    1981 against American Telephone and Telegraph [“AT&T”].
    Hopkins contends the summary judgment record shows factual
    disputes on whether discriminatory or nondiscriminatory reasons
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    prompted his termination.            Particularly, Hopkins testified in a
    deposition that he was placed on a program designed to monitor an
    employee’s performance, a “work program,” within one month of
    reporting    discriminatory         racial         comments    made     by   an   account
    representative for AT&T. Hopkins alleges that Virgil Jochimsen, an
    account representative with the Network Systems division of AT&T,
    repeatedly    warned      Hopkins    to       cancel      plans    to   attend    product
    demonstrations       scheduled      for       AT&T’s       southeastern      territory.
    Hopkins Depo., p. 32-38. Jochisem told Hopkins that most of AT&T’s
    customers in that area were Ku Klux Klan members and that Hopkins’s
    presence would jeopardize sales and place Hopkins in physical
    danger.      
    Id. at 32.
           Hopkins reported Jochisem’s remarks to
    Hopkins’s supervisor Paul Casson who took no action. 
    Id. at 38-39.
    There is no evidence in the record that tends to corroborate or
    refute Hopkins’s account of this incident.                         In effect, Hopkins
    argues that his report of the racial comments landed him on a work
    program   and      that   being     on    a       work   program     precipitated     his
    termination.
    AT&T avers that it placed Hopkins on a work program and,
    ultimately, terminated Hopkins for poor job performance.                               In
    support of its position, AT&T produced written complaints from
    account     team    managers      describing             Hopkins’s      performance    as
    unsatisfactory.       AT&T also produced substantial summary judgment
    evidence of Hopkins’s unsatisfactory progress in the work program,
    including evidence of poor performance reports and of Hopkins’s
    failure to complete assigned tasks.                      Hopkins counters that the
    2
    allegations of poor performance are untrue, but produced no summary
    judgment evidence, aside from his unsupported assertions, to bear
    out his contention.
    Hopkins      points   to   timing       as   circumstantial    evidence     of
    discrimination. But, even if timing alone is sufficient to survive
    summary judgment in some cases, the timing evidence in this case
    does not create a jury issue.         See Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 
    997 F.2d 62
    , 67 (5th Cir. 1993).         Here, Hopkins’s placement on the work
    program followed more closely the receipt of complaint letters from
    account managers, than it did Hopkins’s report of discriminatory
    comments.    There is no direct evidence that the account managers
    were aware of, or influenced by, Jochisem’s statements to Hopkins
    or Jochisem’s concern that Hopkins’s presence at particular product
    demonstrations could jeopardize sales to racially bigoted potential
    customers.
    Having reviewed the summary judgment record in the light most
    favorable    to    Hopkins,     we   cannot       conclude   that   it   would   be
    reasonable, as opposed to speculative, for a jury to infer that
    AT&T engaged in discriminatory practices. See Grimes v. Texas Dept.
    of Mental Health, 
    102 F.3d 137
    , 141 (5th Cir. 1996).                     The many
    reports of Hopkins’s poor performance, countered only by Hopkins’s
    unsupported assertions, are fatal to his claims of discrimination.
    Accordingly,      the   district     court    appropriately    granted    summary
    judgment in favor of AT&T.
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
    district court.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 96-10668

Filed Date: 1/12/1998

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021