EEOC v. R J Gallagher Co ( 1999 )

Revised August 2, 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 98-20351
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
MARY BOYLE,
Intervenor Plaintiff - Appellant,
VERSUS
R.J. GALLAGHER COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
July 15, 1999
Before WIENER, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Mary Boyle,
executrix of the Michael Boyle estate, appeal the district court’s
adverse grant of summary judgment on their claims that R.J.
Gallagher Company breached an employment contract and violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act when Michael Boyle was demoted from
his position as president and subjected to a fifty-percent
reduction in salary. Boyle also alleges that the filing of a
lawsuit against him constituted unlawful retaliation under the ADA.
We conclude that a material factual dispute precludes a
determination on summary judgment that the company did not breach
its employment contract with Boyle. We also conclude that there is
a material factual dispute concerning whether Boyle had a record of
disability or was regarded as having a disability. Finally, we
conclude that the filing of a lawsuit does not trigger the ADA’s
anti-retaliation provisions. Accordingly, we affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I.
In this appeal from summary judgment entered in favor of the
employer, we consider the facts of the case in the light most
favorable to the appellants.
Michael Boyle worked for over twenty years for R.J. Gallagher
Company (hereinafter, “Gallagher Co.”), a distributor of steel
pipe, valves, and tube. Over the course of his employment he
worked his way up from salesman to president. In February 1990,
when Boyle was executive vice president, Boyle and Gallagher Co.
entered into an employment agreement under which Boyle would earn
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an annual salary of $205,000. That agreement provided that it
would “automatically be renewed for consecutive one-year periods,
unless either party gives notice to the other that said party does
not intend to renew and extend this agreement.” The agreement was
modified in February 1991 to extend Boyle’s employment term to
three years.
In February 1993, Boyle was promoted to president. Over the
course of his tenure as an executive of Gallagher Co., Boyle was
routinely praised for the excellence of his job performance.
Robert Gallagher, Jr. (hereinafter, “Gallagher”), chief executive
officer and chairman of the board of Gallagher Co., told Boyle in
late 1993 that the company expected and desired that Boyle would
stay in office until reaching the retirement age of sixty-five.
At the same time, Boyle began to experience health problems.
Testing revealed that he had an elevated white blood cell count.
He began to wear glasses with one darkened lens because he suffered
from double vision. Coworkers commented upon Boyle’s unhealthy
appearance.
On December 15, 1993, Boyle was diagnosed with myelodysplastic
syndrome (MDS), a form of blood cancer. His doctor recommended a
month of chemotherapy treatment. The timing was favorable for
undergoing this treatment because of slow business during the
holiday season. Boyle informed Gallagher Co. of his prognosis and
made appropriate work assignments to assure smooth operations
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during his absence. He was treated over the course of thirty days,
during which time he stayed in touch with the office and continued
to make executive decisions and work assignments.
Boyle was released from the hospital on January 18, 1994,
having lost all the hair on his head, his eyelashes and eyebrows,
and twenty-five pounds. He spoke with Gallagher on January 19 and
gave an update on his condition. Gallagher asked to speak to or
meet with Boyle after a scheduled doctor’s appointment on January
21. Boyle’s treating physician, Dr. Hagop M. Kantarjian, was not
available on January 21 and Boyle saw a different doctor. The
visit with Dr. Kantarjian was rescheduled for January 25. Boyle
spoke to Gallagher after the January 21 visit and informed him that
he would return to work on January 26. Gallagher asked Boyle
several questions about whether Boyle would be able to work a full
day and how many hours he would be able to work.
On January 25, Dr. Kantarjian declared Boyle’s cancer to be in
“complete remission” and advised that he could return to work
without limitation, other than six monthly three-to-five day
chemotherapy sessions. Upon his return to work at 9:00 a.m. on
January 26, Boyle was immediately and aggressively confronted in
his office by Gallagher, who demanded to know whether Boyle would
be able to continue as president. Boyle conveyed the information
he had received from Dr. Kantarjian, but Gallagher was not
satisfied; he wanted Boyle to guarantee that he could continue
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serving as president of the company. Boyle responded that he and
his doctors had reason to be optimistic, but that there was no way
to guarantee that the cancer would not return. Gallagher expressed
doubt that Boyle could continue to work after being treated for
cancer, as well as concerns about the company’s profitability under
Boyle’s leadership. He also demanded a report from Boyle’s doctor.
Boyle reiterated that he felt that he was able to work, that his
doctors knew of no medical impediment to his doing so. He
confirmed his intention to continue working until he reached the
age of sixty-five. Boyle also stated that he would schedule his
chemotherapy on weekends to minimize his time away from the office.
Gallagher suggested that Boyle should retire and alluded to
his knowledge that Boyle had completely paid for his home and had
over $600,000 in his retirement account. After Boyle reiterated
his intention to keep working, Gallagher ended the meeting by
demoting Boyle to the position of executive vice president and
telling Boyle that his compensation would be reduced by half.
Boyle expressed dissatisfaction with the reassignment, but said he
would think about it. The next day, Gallagher issued a memorandum
which stated that Boyle had been demoted to vice president of
sales, an even lower position than the executive vice president
position offered the previous day, and a lower position in the
corporate hierarchy than any Boyle had occupied for the past
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fifteen years. Boyle was humiliated and demoralized by this
demotion.
Boyle entered the hospital again on January 28 for a scheduled
chemotherapy treatment. He and Gallagher corresponded about
Gallagher’s decisions and Boyle’s prognosis. On February 8, Boyle
wrote to Gallagher and declined to accept the demotion and pay cut.
Gallagher responded on February 10, once again accusing Boyle of
poor performance and reiterating the importance of the president’s
position. Gallagher also claimed that he had been left in the dark
about the “full ramifications” of Boyle’s condition, and he stated
his belief that Boyle’s employment contract had expired on January
31, and that Boyle had rejected the company’s offer of continued
employment. Gallagher also noted that Boyle’s medical coverage had
been paid through the end of the month (February 1994). Boyle
replied on February 16, enclosing a copy of Dr. Kantarjian’s
written statement of Boyle’s prognosis. Boyle insisted that he had
kept Gallagher Co. fully apprised of his condition, and that the
automatic renewal provision in his contract had extended the
contract for an additional year. Boyle ended his letter with a
note of concern about his medical coverage, pointing out that he
understood his employment contract to have pledged medical coverage
for life. Gallagher replied on February 17, asserting that the
“sparse information” provided by Dr. Kantarjian did not help his
understanding of Boyle’s condition. He stated, “What your doctor
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does say is that you can return to work, but I have not seen you
here.”
Boyle never did return to the office. On April 21, 1994,
Boyle filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.
The EEOC filed this suit, seeking injunctive relief for Boyle,
based on its allegations that Gallagher Co. had violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by constructively discharging
Boyle and otherwise discriminating against him. Boyle intervened
and alleged, among other things, that Gallagher Co. had breached
his employment contract. The district court initially granted
summary judgment in Boyle’s favor. Then, in December 1994,
Gallagher Co. filed suit against Boyle and others, alleging among
other things that Boyle had breached his employment contract and
his fiduciary duties by serving on the board of directors of Burch
Biscuit Company. That action was removed to federal district court
and consolidated with the action already pending there. Boyle
added a claim of retaliation under the ADA, based on the lawsuit
filed by Gallagher Co.
In April 1997, the district court reversed course and granted
motions for summary judgment which had been filed by Gallagher Co.
The court decided that its earlier ruling -- that Gallagher Co. had
breached its employment contract with Boyle -- had been in error.
See EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. 405, 409-10 (S.D. Tex.
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1997). The district court subsequently granted summary judgment in
favor of Gallagher Co. on its counterclaims against Boyle,
disposing of all remaining issues in the case. The district court
also awarded Gallagher Co. its attorneys’ fees, to be collected
from the Boyle estate1 and the EEOC.
Both the EEOC and Boyle timely appeal from the summary
judgment awarded in favor of Gallagher Co. on their claims against
Gallagher Co., as well as the award of fees.
II.
Boyle alleges that Gallagher Co. breached its employment
contract with him when his salary was cut in half. Gallagher Co.
responds that Boyle’s employment contract had expired, and,
alternatively, that Boyle’s preceding material breach excused
Gallagher Co. from performance.
1
Michael Boyle died in January 1995, and his wife, Mary
Boyle, was substituted as a party in her capacity as executrix of
his estate. For the sake of brevity and simplicity, hereinafter
this opinion refers simply to “Boyle,” although all legal actions
after his death were obviously undertaken by Mary Boyle on behalf
of the Michael Boyle estate, not by Michael Boyle himself.
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A.
Section 3.1 of the “Executive Employment Agreement,” as it
originally provided effective February 1, 1989, established Boyle’s
salary as follows: “During the period of Employee’s Executive
Employment, Employer shall pay to Employee an annual salary herein
called ‘Base Salary’ of $145,000.00/xx per year in approximately
equal monthly installments.” The amount of salary was hand-written
in a blank. When the Agreement was first revised and renewed
effective February 1, 1990, the original salary amount was crossed
out and revised to read “$205,000.00/xx.” Section 1.2 of the
Agreement, including its handwritten 1990 revision, reads as
follows:
Executive Employment. Employer employs
Employee as a member of the Board of Directors of
the R. J. Gallagher Company and as its Executive
Vice President, and Employee accepts such
employment, for a one year term beginning December
February 1, 1989 90. Said term is sometimes
hereinafter referred to as the term of “Executive
Employment.” However, this Agreement shall
automatically be renewed for consecutive one-year
periods, unless either party gives notice to the
other at least sixty (60) days prior to the
termination date that said party does not intend to
renew and extend this Agreement.
An “Extension and Amendment of Executive Employment Agreement” was
executed on February 12, 1991, and it provided:
Extension of agreement. Employer and Employee
hereby agree to extend the term of the Executive
Employee Agreement between Employer and Employee,
dated February 1, 1990, for an additional three (3)
years, commencing February 1, 1991, and expiring
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January 31, 1994. Employee shall continue to
receive a base salary of $205,000.00 per year.
The district court concluded that “[d]emoting Boyle did not violate
the contract because it was for a term and not a position.” 959 F.
Supp. at 409.2
Boyle contends that when Gallagher Co. failed to provide
notice of its intention not to renew the Agreement sixty days
before the expiration of the employment term on January 31, 1994,
the contract automatically renewed for one year pursuant to section
1.2 of the Agreement. Gallagher Co. responds that the 1991
Extension and Amendment negated the automatic renewal provision of
the original Agreement, replacing it with a three-year term with no
automatic renewal. The company therefore contends that the
contract expired on January 31, 1994, at which time Boyle became an
at-will employee.
Texas law requires that we read a contract and its subsequent
modifications as a whole, giving effect to new provisions and
discarding old provisions which are inconsistent with the new
terms. See, e.g., Boudreaux Civic Ass’n v. Cox, 882 S.W.2d 543,
547-48 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
Furthermore, we must interpret a contractual agreement so as to
2
We are inclined to agree that the demotion did not
constitute a breach. As the district court noted, the Agreement
“was for a term and not a position. It had been signed when Boyle
was vice-president.” 959 F. Supp. at 409. Boyle does not press
this point on appeal.
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give effect to each and every provision of the contract. See
Westwood Exploration, Inc. v. Homestate Savings Ass’n, 696 S.W.2d
378, 382 (Tex. 1985). The renewal provision was still part of the
contract after Boyle and Gallagher Co. adopted the Extension and
Amendment. The operative sentence, “However, this Agreement shall
automatically be renewed for consecutive one-year periods, unless
either party gives notice to the other at least sixty (60) days
prior to the termination date that said party does not intend to
renew and extend this Agreement,” is not inconsistent with an
initial three-year term. Whatever came before, the employment term
“shall automatically be renewed . . . unless either party gives
notice.” The Extension and Agreement does not explicitly disavow
automatic renewal, so the flaw of the interpretation suggested by
Gallagher Co. is that it fails to give meaning to the still
operative renewal terms. We therefore conclude that Gallagher’s
reduction of Boyle’s salary was a material breach -– unless Boyle
had already breached the contract, thereby excusing Gallagher Co.
from performance.
B.
Gallagher Co. alleges that Boyle breached another provision of
the Agreement –- that which required him to “[d]evote his full time
and best efforts towards furthering the interest of Employer.” If
Boyle materially breached the Agreement first, Gallagher Co. was
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excused from performance. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Gulf Group
Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex. 1994).
Gallagher Co. points to Boyle’s service on the board of
directors of Burch Biscuit Company as being inconsistent with his
duty to devote his best efforts to Gallagher Co. Gallagher Co.
also alleges that Boyle abused his executive privileges by
submitting fraudulent reimbursement requests.
With respect to Boyle’s involvement with Burch Biscuit, the
evidence offered by Gallagher Co. shows that Boyle spent “some of
his time” attending meetings, and received $10,000 in annual
salary. Gallagher Co. asserts that if Boyle spent some time, i.e.,
any time at all, working for Burch Biscuit, that work is
inconsistent with devotion of “full time and best efforts” to
Gallagher Co. and therefore constitutes a breach. We disagree.
The evidence shows that Boyle’s duties and actual performance were
limited to attendance at one annual board meeting. “Full time and
best efforts” obviously does not mean that Boyle had to devote
twenty-four hours a day, or even every waking hour, to advancing
the interests of Gallagher Co.3 A weekend family vacation would
3
See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Frost Nat’l Bank, 501 S.W.2d
418, 423-24 (Tex. Civ. App.--Beaumont 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.)
(quoting with approval Long v. Forbes, 136 P.2d 242, 246 (Wyo.
1943) (“The cases seem to hold that full-time employment does not
mean that the employee may not have some time that he may use in
his personal affairs, or in other business, without breach of the
employment contract.”)).
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not be inconsistent with working “full time” for Gallagher Co., and
neither was attending one Burch Biscuit board meeting a year. “Best
efforts” means “such efforts as are reasonable in the light of that
party’s ability and the means at its disposal and of the other
party’s justifiable expectations.”4 Burch Biscuit does not compete
with Gallagher Co., and therefore Boyle’s assistance to Burch
Biscuit was not inconsistent with providing “best efforts” on
behalf of Gallagher Co. We thus conclude that the mere fact of
Boyle’s status as a director of Burch Biscuit did not constitute
breach of a “full time and best efforts” clause.
With respect to Gallagher Co.’s allegations that Boyle
misappropriated its funds by submitting improper reimbursement
requests, Gallagher Co. relies on evidence that Boyle requested
reimbursement for business meals and entertainment that either
never took place or that Boyle did not pay for. These charges are
supported by the statements of individuals listed on Boyle’s
reports as those whom he had entertained. Gallagher Co. contends
that the filing of false expense reports was inconsistent with the
fiduciary duties owed to it by Boyle. In response, Boyle swore
that he did not submit false reports, specifically denying each of
the charges of Gallagher Co. This is a swearing match -- a factual
4
E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 553 (2d ed.
1990).
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dispute which must be resolved by the ultimate fact finder, not by
the judge on summary judgment.
In sum, by submitting false expense reports Boyle may have
breached his employment contract before Gallagher Co. did. For the
time being, however, that is a question of disputed material fact.
The question of whether Gallagher Co. committed an actionable
breach depends on the resolution of this dispute, and that question
therefore cannot be resolved on summary judgment.
III.
The district court concluded that Boyle was not covered by the
ADA because he did not have a “disability” as that term is
understood under the statute. For the purposes of the ADA, an
individual has a “disability” if he has “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual,” if he has “a record of such an
impairment,” or if he is “being regarded as having such an
impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
We review the district court’s determination on summary
judgment de novo, applying the same standards as does the district
court. See, e.g., Chaney v. New Orleans Pub. Facility Management,
Inc., No. 98-30063, 1999 WL 402551, at *2 (5th Cir. June 17, 1999).
We shall consider each category of ADA “disability” in turn.
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A.
The district determined that Boyle was not disabled by
employing the following analysis:
The analysis under the act poses these
questions:
• Can you walk, see, hear, speak, breathe, lift,
learn, etc? (objective function)
• Despite the combination of these inabilities,
are you substantially unrestricted in your
ability to work and take care of yourself?
(abstract function)
• Is the objective function essential to the
job? (qualification)
• Is more than a reasonable accommodation needed
for you to be able to be at work to do the
job? (accommodation)
• Is there a plausible explanation for the job
action? (contradiction of inference of
irrational reaction--“reactive distaste”)
An answer of “yes” to any one of these
questions defeats a claim. For Boyle, no matter
which questions are assumed to be “no,” the record
shows a “yes” answer to another one.
959 F. Supp. at 405.
The EEOC and Boyle contend that this test is not grounded in
statutory or common-law authority, and it fails to consider the
effect of Boyle’s cancer in its unmitigated state.
We reject the five-part test employed by the district court,
mainly because it unnecessarily complicates matters. The plain
text of the ADA prescribes three marks of a “disability” under
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§ 12102(2)(A): (1) impairment (2) affecting a major life activity
and (3) resulting in substantial limitation of that major life
activity. The Supreme Court demonstrated the application of this
test in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998),
and we follow that example.
1.
We do not doubt that Boyle’s affliction with MDS qualifies as
a physical impairment under § 12102(2). The affidavit of Boyle’s
treating physician, Dr. Kantarjian, describes MDS as “a disorder or
condition of the blood and bone marrow that primarily effects [sic]
the hematopietic system, and may infiltrate other body systems,
such as the neurologic system.” Without treatment, Boyle’s
condition would have resulted in “severe anemia, systemic
infection, internal bleeding” and would “infiltrate other organs or
body systems.” As Gallagher Co. concedes that MDS is a qualifying
impairment, we need not further explore whether MDS is an
impairment.
2.
Next, we consider whether Boyle’s MDS affected a major life
activity. As a threshold matter, the EEOC and Boyle have argued
that Boyle’s condition should be analyzed without consideration of
the mitigating influence of medical treatment. Thus, we would
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assume that Boyle was suffering from “severe anemia, systemic
infection, internal bleeding” and that his MDS would “infiltrate
other organs or body systems.” As a result, in Dr. Kantarjian’s
words, Boyle would be “bed ridden and unable to perform the
ordinary activities of his life, such as caring for himself,
walking, seeing, working, or other major life activities.”
We do not doubt that Boyle’s condition, if left untreated,
would affect the full panorama of life activities, and indeed would
likely result in an untimely death. Use of the predicted effects
of the impairment in its untreated state for the purposes of
considering whether a major life activity has been affected by a
physical or mental impairment has, however, been foreclosed by the
recent opinion of the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 67 U.S.L.W. 4537 (U.S. June 22, 1999). The Court made clear
that § 12102(2)(A) requires “that a person be presently -- not
potentially or hypothetically -- substantially limited.” Sutton,
67 U.S.L.W. at 4540; see also HCA Health Servs. v. Washington, 67
U.S.L.W. 3783 (U.S. June 24, 1999), vacating 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir.
1998); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 67 U.S.L.W. 4549, 4550
(U.S. June 22, 1999); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 67 U.S.L.W.
4560, 4563 (U.S. June 22, 1999). “A person whose physical or
mental impairment is corrected by medication or other measures does
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not have an impairment that presently ‘substantially limits’ a
major life activity.” Sutton, 67 U.S.L.W. at 4540.
We must consider the actual effects of Boyle’s impairment and
the side effects of his treatment. That being the case, the only
major life activity which the EEOC and Boyle have alleged to have
been affected by that impairment was Boyle’s ability to work.
Although Boyle could carry out the duties of his job, the fact that
he had to receive monthly chemotherapy treatments lasting three to
five days meant that he would have to be away from the job for one
to three days of an ordinary work week each month.
Just as the Bragdon Court did with respect to reproduction, we
conclude based on the plain text of the ADA that working is a
covered “major life activity.”5 The Court in Bragdon explained
5
Our Court has routinely echoed the guidance of the EEOC’s
interpretive guidelines concerning which activities constitute
“major life activities.” The EEOC’s list includes “functions such
as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(i), cited in Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176
F.3d 847, ___ n.8 (5th Cir. 1999); Gonzales v. City of New
Braunfels, Tex. ex rel. New Braunfels Police Dep’t, 176 F.3d 834,
___ (5th Cir. 1999); Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 1021,
1024-25 (5th Cir. 1999) (summary calendar); Pryor v. Trane Co., 138
F.3d 1024, 1026 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1998) (summary calendar); Hamilton
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1050 n.8 (5th Cir.
1998); Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1119 (5th
Cir. 1998); Still v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 120 F.3d 50, 52 (5th
Cir. 1997); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 36
(5th Cir. 1996); Riel v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678,
682 (5th Cir. 1996); Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 332
(5th Cir. 1996); Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc., 87
F.3d 755, 758 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996); Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227,
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that “‘[t]he plain meaning of the word “major” denotes comparative
importance’ and ‘suggest[s] that the touchstone for determining an
activity’s inclusion under the statutory rubric is its
significance.’” Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205 (quoting Abbott v.
Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939, 940 (1st Cir. 1997), aff’d, 524 U.S.
624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), alterations in original). Working
falls well within the phrase “major life activity.” For many,
working is necessary for self-sustenance or to support an entire
family. The choice of an occupation often provides the opportunity
for self-expression and for contribution to productive society.
Importantly, most jobs involve some degree of social interaction,
both with coworkers and with the public at large, providing
opportunities for collegial collaboration and friendship. For
those of us who are able to work and choose to work, our jobs are
an important element of how we define ourselves and how we are
perceived by others. The inability to access the many
229 (5th Cir. 1996) (summary calendar); Ellison v. Software
Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1996); Dutcher v.
Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1995) (summary
calendar).
The Supreme Court’s recent observance that “[n]o agency . . .
has been given authority to issue regulations implementing the
generally applicable provisions of the ADA” now casts a shadow of
doubt over the validity and authority of the EEOC’s regulations.
Sutton, 67 U.S.L.W. at 4539. However, because we conclude, based
on the plain text of the ADA, that working is indeed a major life
activity, we need not decide whether the EEOC’s regulations are due
any deference, or whether we are bound by our own precedent to
respect them.
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opportunities afforded by working constitutes exclusion from many
of the significant experiences of life. Without doubt, then,
working is a major life activity.
3.
Finally, we consider whether Boyle’s MDS impairment resulted
in a substantial limitation of his major life activity of working.
We conclude that it did not. At the time Boyle returned to the
office and was confronted by Gallagher, his cancer had gone into
complete remission and his doctors had cleared him for an
unqualified return to work. This necessarily implies that the
doctors believed that Boyle’s major life activities were largely
unaffected by the physical impairment of MDS. The district court
observed that the only actual present limitation claimed by Boyle
was his need to return to the hospital for six monthly chemotherapy
treatments. Boyle insisted to his former employer, and both the
EEOC and Boyle have argued on appeal, that he could follow this
treatment schedule and still maintain his full workload. We have
no doubt that this is so, especially given the flexibility most
executives have in scheduling professional obligations. He could
still access his job and all of its accoutrements: salary and
benefits; personal and professional opportunities; and social
interaction with his colleagues. As a result, Boyle did not suffer
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from a substantial limitation necessary to invoke “disability”
status under § 12102(2)(A).
B.
The second possible way of establishing “disability” is to
prove a record of impairment which substantially limited a major
life activity. The differences between the present effect of
Boyle’s impairment at the time he left Gallagher Co. (for
§ 12102(2)(A)) and the record of that impairment’s effect (for
§ 12102(2)(B)) are: a pre-diagnosis effect on Boyle’s vision due to
cancer-related nerve palsy; a thirty-day hospitalization to
complete his initial round of treatment, which prevented Boyle from
caring for himself; and isolation from other persons due to Boyle’s
weakened immune system, which affected his ability to work.
The EEOC relies on its interpretative regulation, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2, for its position that the ADA “protects former cancer
patients from discrimination on the basis of their prior medical
history.” This broad position obviously cannot be the rule in the
wake of Sutton, which emphasizes both the ADA’s requirement of
individualized inquiry and a focus on the actual effects of the
impairment. In other words, it is not enough for an ADA plaintiff
to simply show that he has a record of a cancer diagnosis; in order
to establish the existence of a “disability” under § 12102(2)(B),
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there must be a record of an impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the ADA plaintiff’s major life activities.
The EEOC and Boyle also contend that Boyle had a record of
substantial limitation on major life activities beginning around
the time he was diagnosed with MDS and lasting until he completed
his initial course of treatment and the cancer went into remission.
The district court did not specifically confront this allegation;
it merely asserted that Boyle could not satisfy the five-part test
posed by the court. See 959 F. Supp. at 409. This assertion by
the district court does not support summary judgment in favor of
the employer. Consider, for example, the first question posed by
the district court: “Can you walk, see, hear, speak, breathe, lift,
learn, etc?” The district court believed that a “yes” answer to
this question would defeat any claim under the ADA. See id. But
an affirmative response simply does not preclude the possibility
that a major life activity was substantially affected. It is
possible that during his thirty-day stay at the hospital, Boyle
could walk, see, hear, speak, breathe, lift, and learn, and yet his
ability to work might still have been substantially affected.
Boyle’s limited vision might have caused a substantial limitation
of major life activities. His long hospital stay and his isolation
from others, results of the treatment Boyle undertook to treat his
impairment, may also be considered as the cause of such
limitations. See Sutton, 67 U.S.L.W. at 4540 (suggesting that
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“negative side effects suffered by an individual resulting from the
use of mitigating measures” are an appropriate component of the
individualized approach mandated by the ADA). We need not
speculate as to what major life activities may have been affected;
that is an issue ripe for fresh consideration before the district
court. All we decide is that the district court’s analysis does
not resolve the matter. On remand, the district court should
follow the example of Bragdon v. Abbott to determine whether the
record of Boyle’s impairment includes a substantial effect on a
major life activity.
C.
The final possible basis for ADA liability is Boyle’s
allegation that Gallagher Co. discriminated against Boyle based on
a perception of disability. The district court resolved this issue
by reasoning as follows:
Assuming that Gallagher perceived Boyle as ill,
that is not a perception of disability. The “or
perceived” language is in the law to protect people
who have some obvious specific handicap that
employers might generalize into a disability.
Boyle did not have a condition -- a defect -- that
Gallagher, based on erroneous social stereotypes,
could generalize into an inability to function on
the job.
959 F. Supp. at 409. At the summary judgment hearing, the district
court elaborated on this novel view by stating that the application
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of the “regarded as” prong is exemplified by cases involving
“people with one arm” or those who “show up wearing an eye patch.”
This analysis is off the mark. The text of the ADA could not
be clearer on this point. The protection for individuals “regarded
as” being disabled is for individuals who are “regarded as” having
“such an impairment,” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). “Such” an
impairment means the same kind of impairment as would give rise to
protection if it actually existed, that is, one that “substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual,” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). See Sutton, 67 U.S.L.W. at
4541. One does not have to have “some obvious specific handicap”
in order to fall into this category. As the Supreme Court
explained,
There are two apparent ways in which individuals
may fall within this statutory definition: (1) a
covered entity mistakenly believes that a person
has a physical impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered
entity mistakenly believes that an actual,
nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or
more major life activities. In both cases, it is
necessary that a covered entity entertain
misperceptions about the individual--it must
believe either that one has a substantially
limiting impairment that one does not have or that
one has a substantially limiting impairment when,
in fact, the impairment is not so limiting.
Sutton, 67 U.S.L.W. at 4541-42; see also Murphy, 67 U.S.L.W. at
4550-51.
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Not surprisingly, Gallagher Co. takes a different tack and
relies on the fact that Boyle was offered the position of vice
president of sales as evidence that he was not regarded as being
unable to perform. Our precedents do suggest that the employer’s
offer of another position in the same class of occupations may
disprove an allegation of discrimination based on perception of
disability. See, e.g., Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329,
334-36 (5th Cir. 1996). Boyle’s claims are distinguishable from
that line of cases; a jury could conclude, based upon the summary
judgment evidence, that Boyle was constructively discharged when
Gallagher Co. reduced his salary by half. If that is the case, it
makes no difference that Gallagher Co. has a legal fig leaf to hide
behind. If the offer of the vice president for sales position,
tied to a fifty-percent reduction in salary, was designed to force
Boyle to resign because Gallagher regarded Boyle as disabled and
incapable of performing his job, the presumption that Boyle was not
regarded as disabled dissolves. Such a pretextual offer cannot
shield the employer from ADA liability for its discriminatory
actions.
Based on Boyle’s factual allegations about Gallagher’s
conduct, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Boyle was regarded as disabled, and therefore summary
judgment was inappropriate.
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IV.
Boyle also appeals the summary judgment entered in favor of
Gallagher Co. on his retaliation claims under the ADA. The
district court correctly ruled that the filing of a lawsuit cannot
be an “adverse employment action” such as required to trigger the
ADA’s protection against retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 12203,
because it is not an employment action at all. See 959 F. Supp. at
410. We affirm this aspect of the judgment below.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED in part, and VACATED in part, and we REMAND for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.6
6
Because of our disposition on the merits of the case, we
also must vacate the district court’s fee award. We express no
opinion regarding whether fees were properly assessed based on the
district court’s judgment on the merits.
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