Walker v. Scott ( 1998 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 97-11151
    Summary Calendar
    STEPHEN CLAYTON WALKER,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    WAYNE SCOTT; THOMAS BAKER;
    ELVIS HIGHTOWER; STATE OF TEXAS,
    A Municipal Corporation; RICKY NEWMAN,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ---------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:97-CV-1044-H
    ---------------------
    April 15, 1998
    Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Stephen Clayton Walker, inmate #72850-079, alleged that he
    was subjected to cruel and unusual treatment and to unhealthy and
    unsanitary conditions of confinement during the summer months
    while he was confined in the Hutchins State Jail.   Walker filed a
    civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
    State of Texas and against the above-named defendants in their
    official and individual capacities.   The district court entered
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 97-11151
    - 2 -
    an order dismissing Walker’s claims against the State of Texas
    and dismissing the official capacity claims against the other
    defendants.   Walker appeals the district court’s dismissal of
    these claims.
    The district court did not certify its order of dismissal as
    a final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).    Walker’s
    claims against appellees in their individual capacities were
    still pending.**   Nevertheless, Walker purports to appeal the
    district court’s dismissal of the State of Texas and the official
    capacity claims.
    We take up the issue of our appellate jurisdiction sua
    sponte.   See Mosley v. Cozby, 
    813 F.2d 659
    , 660 (5th Cir. 1987).
    With certain exceptions created by statute or judicial decision,
    our jurisdiction is limited to review of final decisions of the
    district courts.   28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292.   A final judgment
    “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
    court to do but execute the judgment.”     Coopers and Lybrand v.
    Livesay, 
    437 U.S. 463
    , 467 (1978) (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted).   The federal appellate courts are
    authorized to review judgments dismissing “one or more but fewer
    than all of the claims or parties,” but may do so only if the
    district court expressly certifies that its order is final as to
    those claims or parties.    See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Dardar v.
    Lafourche Realty Co., 
    849 F.2d 955
    , 957 (5th Cir. 1988).    Absent
    **
    The case has not proceeded to final judgment.
    No. 97-11151
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    a Rule 54(b) certification, the partial disposition of a multi-
    claim action does not qualify as an appealable final judgment.
    Dillon v. Mississippi Military Dep’t, 
    23 F.3d 915
    , 917 (5th Cir.
    1994).
    The district court ruling challenged by Walker did not end
    the litigation on the merits.   It is not final, nor is it an
    appealable interlocutory order.   Finally, it was not certified as
    a partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b).   It is therefore
    beyond this court’s appellate jurisdiction.
    The appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.