Boudreaux v. Dolphin Press Inc ( 1999 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _________________
    No. 99-60253
    Summary Calendar
    _________________
    In The Matter of: DOLPHIN PRESS INC,
    Debtor.
    -----------------------------
    ROBERT BOUDREAUX,
    Appellant,
    versus
    DOLPHIN PRESS INC,
    Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    (1:98-CV-41-GR)
    September 17, 1999
    Before JOLLY, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Robert Boudreaux appeals from a final decision of the district court affirming the bankruptcy
    court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Dolphin Press Inc. (“Dolphin”). The district court
    found that Dolphin could avoid Boudreaux’s security interest pursuant to 
    11 U.S.C. § 544
    .
    Boudreaux argues that the district court erred because the statute of limitations barred Dolphin from
    avoiding his secured interest, and because he has a perfected security interest in the solnar press. We
    review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. See In re
    Locklin, 
    101 F.3d 435
    , 437-38 (5th Cir. 1996). We review determinations of state law de novo. See
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
    published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    
    id.
     We affirm.
    Boudreaux argues that Dolphin’s action is barred by the two-year statute of limitations in §
    546(a). See 
    11 U.S.C. § 546
    (a) (providing a two-year limitations period for an action pursuant to
    § 544). He argues that the two-year limitations period runs from the date that the Chapter 11 petition
    is filed. If this date is used, then Dolphin’s action is barred by the limitations period, because it was
    filed one day late. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006, however, specifies that the day of
    a triggering event for a deadline shall not be included in the computation of time under the
    Bankruptcy Code. See FED. R. OF BANKR. P. 9006. If the date on which Dolphin filed its Chapter
    11 petition is excluded from the limitations period, then Dolphin’s action was timely. Thus, we are
    unpersuaded that the limitations period bars Dolphin’s action.
    Boudreaux argues that Dolphin cannot avoid his secured interest, because he had a
    perfected security interest. Boudreaux admits that the financial statement was not filed with the
    office of the Secretary of the State. Boudreaux asserts, nonetheless, that the filing in the office of
    the Chancery Clerk of Harrison County, Mississippi, perfected his interest in the Solnar press.
    Under Mississippi Code § 97-9-401, the failure to file the statement with the Secretary of State
    means that his security interest was unperfected. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-9-401 (1998).
    According to Boudreaux, he had a perfected secured interest in the press because Dolphin
    had actual knowledge of the contents of the financial statement. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-9-
    401(1)(d); ITT Industrial Credit Co. v. Robinson, 
    350 So.2d 48
     (Miss. 1997); Chrysler Credit
    Corp. v. Bank of Wiggins, 
    358 So.2d 714
     (Miss. 1977). Title 
    11 U.S.C. § 544
    (a) provides that a
    trustee has “strong arm powers” that allow the trustee to avoid an encumbrance that would be
    voidable by a bona fide purchaser “without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any
    creditor.” 
    11 U.S.C. § 544
    (a). This Section eliminates the “actual knowledge” defense that might
    otherwise exist under state law. See id.; In re Sandy Ridge Oil Co., Inc., 
    807 F.2d 1332
    , 1336
    (7th Cir. 1986) (concluding that Congress did not intend the debtor-in-possession’s knowledge of
    the mortgage to prevent it from asserting the strong arm clause, “because actual knowledge is
    -2-
    irrelevant under § 544(a)”). Thus, Dolphin’s actual knowledge of the financial statement does not
    prevent it from invoking § 544(a).
    Boudreaux argues alternatively that, because the press is an office fixture, the fixture filing
    needed to be filed only in the Chancery Clerk’s office to perfect the interest. See MISS. CODE
    ANN. § 75-9-401(1)(b). Even if the press were a fixture, the fixture filing was recorded in the
    Uniform Commercial Code records, and not in the land records where a mortgage of the Dolphin
    real estate would be recorded. See MISS. COD. ANN. § 75-9-313(9)(b) (specifying that a security
    interest in fixtures is perfected against the real estate only when the filing or recording of an
    instrument constitutes constructive notice of such interest under the state laws that are applicable
    to the filing of real estate mortgages and deeds of trust). Thus, under Mississippi Code § 75-9-
    313(1)(b), the security interest is unperfected. See In re 20th Century Enters., Inc., 
    152 B.R. 119
    ,
    123 (N.D. Miss. 1992) (concluding that recording an agreement in the real property records is not
    a recordation in the Uniform Commercial Code records). Because Boudreaux’s interest is
    unperfected, the trustee may void the interest.
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court correctly applied the law,
    and we AFFIRM the final decision of the district court.
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 99-60253

Filed Date: 9/29/1999

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2014