United States v. Montoya-Cerda ( 2002 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 01-41020
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    ISMAEL MONTOYA-CERDA, also known as Miguel Angel Ramirez
    Ramirez
    Defendant - Appellant
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. B-01-CR-206-3
    --------------------
    June 27, 2002
    Before KING, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Ismael Montoya-Cerda contends that the district court did
    not provide him with adequate notice that it was considering an
    upward departure from the sentencing guidelines under the rule in
    Burns v. United States, 
    501 U.S. 129
    (1991).   Because Montoya
    objected to the upward departure and indicated adequately that
    the lack of notice was the basis for his objection, we review
    this issue de novo.   See United States v. Knight, 
    76 F.3d 86
    , 87
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 01-41020
    -2-
    (5th Cir. 1996); cf. United States v. Milton, 
    147 F.3d 414
    , 419
    (5th Cir. 1998) (reviewing for plain error because the defendant
    “did not object, move for a continuance, or in any way indicate
    that the lack of notice of the basis for the upward departure had
    prejudiced him at the sentencing hearing”).
    Burns requires that the defendant be provided with
    reasonable notice that the district court is considering an
    upward departure.   
    See 501 U.S. at 138-39
    .   “The holding in Burns
    was based upon the concern that ‘parties will address possible
    sua sponte departure in a random and wasteful way by trying to
    anticipate and negate every conceivable ground on which the
    district court might choose to depart on its own initiative.’”
    
    Milton, 147 F.3d at 418
    (quoting 
    Burns, 501 U.S. at 137
    ).
    The Government contends that the district court did provide
    reasonable notice by stating at the sentencing hearing that it
    was considering an upward departure and by giving the reasons for
    the departure: that Montoya had created a hazardous situation by
    transporting the aliens in an unventilated container with
    hazardous materials and by threatening the mother of a three-
    year-old child which was crying at the time the container was
    passing through a border checkpoint.   The Government’s argument
    is without merit.   Although these facts were reported in the
    presentence report, the defense was not advised prior to the
    sentencing hearing that they would be considered as a basis for
    an upward departure.   The district court’s notice was not
    No. 01-41020
    -3-
    reasonable because it required Montoya to anticipate and prepare
    to address all possible bases for departure.    See 
    Milton, 147 F.3d at 418
    ; see also United States v. Brooks, No. 00-10072, slip
    op. at 7-8 (5th Cir. Dec. 13, 2000) (unpublished) (vacating and
    remanding sentence because district court did not notify defense
    prior to sentencing hearing that it was considering upward
    departure and basis for departure).    The sentence is vacated and
    the case is remanded to the district court for further
    proceedings.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-41020

Filed Date: 7/1/2002

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2014