Smart v. Applied Materials ( 2001 )


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  •                                 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 00-50696
    (Summary Calendar)
    VALERIE SMART,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    APPLIED MATERIALS, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas, Austin
    A-00-CV-159-JN
    July 3, 2001
    Before EMILIO M. GARZA, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff Valerie Smart (“Smart”) appeals from the district court’s dismissal without prejudice
    of her Title VII complaint for failure to effect service in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). For
    the following reasons, we reverse and remand.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On August 7, 1998, Smart filed a Title VII discrimination claim based on race, sex, and
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    disability against Applied Materials, Inc. (“Applied”) with the Austin Human Rights Commission and
    the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The EEOC sent Smart a letter
    informing her that it was dismissing her suit for lack of sufficient evidence and advising her that she
    could pursue a lawsuit against Applied in federal court.
    Smart filed a pro se lawsuit1 against Applied in the district court after the court denied her
    request to proceed in forma pauperis. After she filed the lawsuit, the district court also denied her
    request for appointment of counsel.
    Smart failed to serve Applied with process within 120 days of filing her complaint, in
    accordance wit h Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The district court notified Smart that if she did not effect
    service within ten days or show cause for her failure to effect service, her complaint would be
    dismissed without prejudice. The court ordered Smart to show cause within ten days why her
    complaint should not be dismissed. Smart responded to the district court’s order by writing the court
    a letter indicating that she lacked knowledge regarding legal matters and other resources. She also
    stated that she was suffering from various injuries, is a single parent, had doctor’s appointments, had
    been denied certain benefits, and was behind on her bills.
    The district court found that Smart had failed to effect service on Applied within ten days and
    that the reasons stated in the letter for the failure did not constitute good cause. The court dismissed
    her complaint without prejudice for failure to comply with the court’s order, failure to comply with
    the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and failure to prosecute. Smart now appeals the district court’s
    ruling.
    1
    Smart is represented by counsel in this appeal.
    2
    DISCUSSION
    Smart argues that the district court incorrectly applied the good cause standard of Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 4(m)2 in her case. She asserts that the court failed to make an excusable neglect inquiry and
    summarily dismissed her complaint without considering the circumstances surrounding her failure to
    effect service on Applied.
    Smart also claims that her failure to effect service within 120 days was due to misinformation
    that she received from the district court clerk’s office. Furthermore, she asserts that her failure to
    effect service on Applied within ten days of the district court’s order was due to the ambiguity of the
    order and to misinformation that she received from the district court’s clerk regarding the
    requirements of the order. She claims that she did not attempt to effect service on the defendant
    because it was unclear from the district court’s order whether she was required to attempt to effect
    service, show cause for her failure to do so, or do both. Moreover, she argues that the district court’s
    clerk informed her that the order only meant that she had to write a letter explaining to the court her
    failure to effect service. Smart also emphasizes her pro se status in arguing that the district court
    erred in dismissing her complaint and avers that the district court should have given her more latitude
    in assessing whether her claims should be dismissed.
    We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to effect timely service of
    2
    Rule 4(m) provides:
    If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120
    days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative
    after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that
    defendant or direct service be effected within a specified time; provided that if the
    plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service
    for an appropriate period.
    3
    process for abuse of discretion. Lindsey v. United States R.R. Ret. Bd., 
    101 F.3d 444
    , 445 (5th Cir.
    1996). When a plaintiff has failed to effect service within the t me required under Fed. R. Civ. P.
    i
    4(m), the district court may, on its own initiative and in its discretion, direct that service be effected
    within a specified period of time. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m); Thompson v. Brown, 
    91 F.3d 20
    , 21 (5th Cir.
    1996). The court may also choose to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m);
    
    Thompson 91 F.3d at 21
    . However, “[i]f good cause is present, the district court must extend time
    for service. If good cause does not exist, the court may, in its discretion, decide whether to dismiss
    the case without prejudice or extend time for service.” 
    Thompson 91 F.3d at 21
    .
    We find that Smart has demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing
    her complaint without prejudice.3 We agree with Smart that the court’s order is ambiguous from the
    perspective of a pro se litigant. The order stated the following:
    In accordance with FED. R. CIV. P. 4(M), the Court now notifies Plaintiff that if
    service is not effected within ten (10) days of the date of this Order, unless good
    cause is shown for the failure to effect service, this cause of action shall be dismissed
    without prejudice.
    IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff
    SHOW CAUSE within ten days (10) of the date of this Order, why this cause of
    action should not be dismissed in accordance with FED. R. CIV. P. 4(M).
    IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that failure to respond to this Order may result in the
    dismissal of this cause of action pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 41(B) for failure to
    prosecute and for failure to comply with a Court Order.
    One possible reading of the district court’s order is that the court gave Smart the option of either
    effecting service within ten days or showing cause for her failure to do so. Another other possible
    3
    We note that Smart did not present her allegation that the district court’s clerk misinformed her
    regarding the requirement that she serve Applied within 120 days of filing her complaint. Thus, we
    will not consider this argument in her appeal. Furthermore, it is unnecessary to consider t his
    argument given our disposition of her appeal.
    4
    interpretation of the above quoted language is that the district court ordered Smart to effect service
    on Applied and to show cause why her complaint should not be dismissed for having previously failed
    to effect service within the 120-day period required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The only other possible
    reading of the court’s order was that Smart was merely ordered to show cause for failing to effect
    service on Applied. This last interpretation, Smart asserts, is the one that she followed. Smart’s
    interpretation is not untenable given that the only instruction following the portion of the order
    stating, “IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED” was for Smart to show
    cause why her complaint should not be dismissed.
    If the intent of the district court was to give Smart an option, had she understood the order
    as indicating such, she may have chosen to effect service on Applied instead of attempting to show
    cause for failing to do so. Similarly, if the intent of the court was to order Smart to effect service as
    well as show cause, then she may have done both. In short, had the show cause order been clear,
    Smart may have chosen to effect service on Applied instead of or in addition to showing cause why
    her complaint should not be dismissed.
    Compounding the ambiguity of the show cause order is the district court’s order dismissing
    Smart ’s complaint. That order states that “Plaintiff has failed to effect service and failed t show
    o
    good cause for doing so as of the date of this Order. Therefore, the court finds this cause should be
    dismissed without prejudice.” Again, the court’s language could be interpreted as dismissing Smart’s
    complaint because she failed to effect service or to show good cause or because she failed to effect
    service and show good cause.
    Accordingly, we find that the court abused its discretion in dismissing Smart ’s complaint
    because its show cause order did not clearly indicate, given that the plaintiff was a pro se litigant, the
    5
    steps that Smart was required to take in order to prevent the dismissal of her complaint. Thus, we
    reverse and remand this case. On remand, the district court should give Smart another opportunity
    to effect service on Applied within ten days or whatever time period it deems appropriate.
    CONCLUSION
    Because we find that the district court’s show cause order is ambiguous, we REVERSE the
    district court’s order dismissing Smart’s complaint and REMAND this case for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 00-50696

Filed Date: 7/6/2001

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021