Smith v. Becker ( 2001 )


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  •                  IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 00-40642
    Summary Calendar
    RODNEY WAYNE SMITH,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    FRED BECKER; ET AL.,
    Defendants,
    NORMAN E. MCCLURE; CURTIS B. MCKNIGHT;
    NORA SYLVESTOR; WILLIAM VAN HOOK; JOE MOYA,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. G-92-CV-515
    --------------------
    July 9, 2001
    Before EMILIO M. GARZA, STEWART and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Rodney Wayne Smith, Texas prisoner # 330699, appeals the
    jury’s verdict and the conduct of his trial by the magistrate
    judge in this 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     civil rights action.      Smith argues
    that the magistrate judge refused him adequate pretrial
    discovery.     Smith has not shown what specific discovery was
    denied or how he was harmed in presenting his case at trial.       The
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 00-40642
    -2-
    record shows that he requested certain documents which the
    magistrate judge ordered the defendants to produce, and those
    documents were produced.    The record reflects that the magistrate
    judge did not abuse his discretion in his discovery rulings.
    Richardson v. Henry, 
    902 F.2d 414
    , 417 (5th Cir. 1990).
    Smith argues that the magistrate judge erred in not
    appointing him counsel.    He has also filed a motion for
    appointment of counsel on appeal in this court.    There are no
    exceptional circumstances in this case.    The facts of this case
    are not complex.    The defendants denied Smith’s claims that he
    was searched as Smith described and denied that the disciplinary
    charges brought against him were false.    Smith demonstrated the
    ability to prosecute the case himself through his numerous
    clearly-written pleadings in the district court.    There is
    nothing in the record which suggests that Smith was unable to
    inform the jury of his version of events.    He offered and had
    admitted 18 of his 21 exhibits and cross-examined all witnesses.
    The magistrate judge did not abuse its discretion in denying
    Smith’s motion   for appointment of counsel, and his motion on
    appeal IS DENIED.    Ulmer v. Chancellor, 
    691 F.2d 209
    , 213 (5th
    Cir. 1982).
    Smith argues that the district court was required to issue
    an order clarifying what amount Smith owed, since he was the
    prevailing party on the initial appeal of this matter.      He argues
    that he should not be taxed costs for pursuing a non-frivolous
    appeal.   The alleged failure of the magistrate judge to issue
    such an order regarding Smith’s IFP status in his previous appeal
    No. 00-40642
    -3-
    is not a matter for consideration by this court now in this
    appeal involving the subsequent trial and jury verdict.
    Smith argues that the magistrate judge made comments on the
    weight of the evidence by suggesting to the jury that he needed
    little if any monetary compensation.    Smith contends that the
    magistrate judge gave the jury the appearance of partiality with
    disruptions of Smith’s cross-examination and “suggestions” that
    Smith illegally obtained material to make African Medallions.
    Smith states that the magistrate judge refused to admit relevant
    evidence regarding his institutional grievances and testimony by
    another inmate, James Stephens, concerning his stay in transit
    status with Smith.
    Review of the trial errors alleged by Smith depends on a
    trial transcript.    Smith has failed to provide a transcript.
    Fed. R. App. P. 10(b); Powell v. Estelle, 
    959 F.2d 22
    , 26 (5th
    Cir. 1992).   The record as it stands shows that Smith was
    afforded all the opportunities at trial as required under due
    process.
    As for Smith’s contention that the magistrate judge should
    have entered a jury charge regarding malicious prosecution,
    malicious prosecution was not a part of the trial.    This court,
    in remanding this matter, specifically held that the matters left
    for consideration were retaliation and the appropriateness of
    strip and body-cavity searches.
    The nature of Smith’s motion for recusal was a simple
    misunderstanding concerning the magistrate judge’s possession of
    some documents filed by Smith.    This discrepancy was immediately
    No. 00-40642
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    corrected by the magistrate judge, and Smith was not prejudiced
    at trial.   There is no evidence in the record that suggests
    partiality by the magistrate judge in this matter.    Although
    Smith argues that the magistrate judge showed partiality at the
    trial, he never alleges that he moved for recusal during the
    trial.
    Smith argues that the magistrate judge erred in denying his
    motion for partial summary judgment on his claims regarding the
    strip-body-cavity search and malicious prosecution, which the
    defendants did not oppose.    Smith’s motion was based on his
    contention that he was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
    on the issues of the alleged unconstitutional search and
    malicious prosecution.   Malicious prosecution was not an issue
    before the magistrate judge after this court’s opinion remanding
    for further proceedings.    As Smith states in his brief, the
    defendants’ position was that Smith had never been subjected to a
    body cavity search by any of the defendants.    Whether the search
    occurred at all is a material factual issue requiring a trial.
    Smith argues that the credible evidence was insufficient to
    support the jury verdict.    The jury found that the defendants did
    not retaliate against Smith.    Smith’s assertions are in the
    nature of an attempt to challenge the credibility decisions made
    by the jury.   This court will not disturb credibility
    determinations on appeal.    See Williams v. Fab-Con, Inc., 
    990 F.2d 228
    , 230 (5th Cir. 1993) (this court defers to the trier of
    fact if factual determinations are based upon credibility
    determinations).   "An appellate court is in no position to weigh
    No. 00-40642
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    conflicting evidence and inferences or to determine the
    credibility of witnesses; that function is within the province of
    the finder of fact."   Martin v. Thomas, 
    973 F.2d 449
    , 453 n.3
    (5th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
    AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED.