Brown v. Groom ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 10, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-41306
Summary Calendar
BOBBY BROWN; ET. AL.,
Plaintiffs,
BOBBY BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JERRY GROOM; ET. AL,
Defendants,
LIEUTENANT DANIELS; SERGEANT CASTRO; MARCUS FORD;
SERGEANT GALLEOS; HERLINDA QUINONES; MARIBEL TAMEZ,
Defendants-Appellants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 2:01-CV-5
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Before SMITH, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellants appeal the district court’s finding, in its
partial denial of their second motion for summary judgment, that
they were not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the
First Amendment claim brought against them in a civil rights suit
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-41306
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by Bobby Brown, Texas prisoner #1124005. We conclude, after
considering the allegations in Brown’s verified pleadings, the
testimony by Brown at an evidentiary hearing before the district
court, and the documentary evidence submitted by the defendants
and Brown, that the district court’s ruling should be affirmed.
See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996); Colston v.
Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96, 98-99 (5th Cir. 1997); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
Summary-judgment decisions are reviewed de novo, applying
the same test as the district court. E.g., Skotak v. Tenneco
Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912 (5th Cir. 1992). According to
the defendants’ own summary judgment evidence, the defendants
were supposed to resolve any “discrepancy or question with the
[Ramadan] list” by checking with the prison chaplaincy
department. There was no evidence that the defendants contacted
the chaplaincy department either after Brown told them he was
supposed to be participating in Ramadan or after he showed them a
lay-in pass, which contrary to usual Ramadan practice, was only
for the morning Ramadan services and meals. Importantly, while
the defendants raised several questions concerning the lay-in
pass, they did not contest the authenticity or validity of the
pass. Accordingly, the district court was correct in concluding
that, based upon the summary judgment evidence, the defendants
No. 04-41306
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were not, as a matter of law, entitled to qualified immunity.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
The defendants’ arguments on appeal regarding the specific
allegations against each of them do not show that the district
court erred in finding they were not entitled to qualified
immunity. The defendants argue that Officer Tamez is qualifiedly
immune because, according to Brown, it was Lieutenant Masters,
not Officer Tamez, that would not let Brown eat and attend
services on December 19, 2000. Brown testified during the
evidentiary hearing, however, that both Lieutenant Masters and
Officer Tamez refused to let him participate in a morning meal
and service.
Their arguments regarding Sergeant Ford fail because Brown
had a lay-in pass with an effective date of November 28, 2000,
and he therefore produced at least some evidence that his name
was on a hard copy of the list during the time he was in the
transitional building. Ford, on the other hand, produced no
evidence that he attempted to check the hard copy of the Ramadan
list after Brown told him he was supposed to be participating in
Ramadan or after Brown showed him the lay-in pass.
With respect to Lieutenant Daniels, the defendants have not
explained why the lockdown in the dining room was a valid reason
for not allowing Brown to attend prayer services after he ate.
The defendants’ arguments concerning Sergeant Castro also fail.
Brown alleged in his verified response to the defendants’ summary
No. 04-41306
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judgment motion that he showed his lay-in pass to the defendants,
and he testified in the evidentiary hearing that Castro did not
allow him to get his Ramadan meal, even after he advised her that
he needed a meal because he had been fasting all day due to
Ramadan.
The district court did not err in denying Sergeant
Gallegos’s1 and Officer Quinones’s claims of qualified immunity.
The defendants rely on Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1126
(5th Cir. 1986), for the proposition that when a prisoner is
prevented by circumstances from attending an occasional religious
service, such an occasional denial of the right to attend
services does not violate the prisoner’s right to practice his
religion. Green is distinguishable from this case because it
concerned a Baptist prisoner’s desire to attend more than one
service on Sundays. Id. Here, the prison policy recognized
that, during Ramadan, Muslim prisoners would participate in two
daily prayer services and two daily meals. The defendants’
contention that Brown was precluded from services because he
refused to tuck in his shirt is unavailing. Brown testified that
he had a medical pass allowing him to keep his shirt untucked
because he had a catheter. The defendants did not produce any
evidence refuting that testimony, and they have therefore not
explained why Brown’s failure to have his shirt tucked in allowed
1
The style spells the name “Galleos.” The briefs,
however, indicate that the correct spelling is “Gallegos.”
No. 04-41306
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them to refuse him participation in Ramadan. The district
court’s partial denial of the defendants’ second summary judgment
motion is AFFIRMED.