W v. NW Indep Sch Dist ( 2002 )


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  •                    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 02-10621
    Summary Calendar
    SAMUEL TYLER W, on behalf of Debbie M,
    on behalf of Harvey W,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    NORTHWEST INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for
    the Northern District of Texas
    (USDC No. 4:01-CV-285-A)
    _______________________________________________________
    December 16, 2002
    Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    The judgment is affirmed. We essentially agree with the district court’s reasoning
    and add the following:
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should
    not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in
    5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    1. Appellate review of the district court’s decision is a mixed question of law and
    fact that we review de novo, but the underlying fact findings of the district court are
    reviewed only for clear error. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 
    200 F.3d 341
    , 347
    (5th Cir. 2000).
    2. Insofar as appellants Samuel Tyler W (Samuel) and his parents complain that
    appellee Northwest Independent School District (the school district) failed to comply
    with the procedural requirement that a regular education teacher be present at 1998-1999
    ARD meetings under 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(ii), we have held that a failure to comply
    with a procedural requirement of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA
    or Act), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487, may warrant a judicial finding that the district has
    failed to provide the student with a free appropriate public education, but that “adequate
    compliance” with the Act’s procedural requirements will ordinarily suffice. See Buser by
    Buser v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch., 
    51 F.3d 490
    , 493-94 (5th Cir. 1995). We have not
    held that a procedural failure necessarily warrants judicial relief. Moreover, in the
    pending case, the record indicates that (1) the parents elected to severely limit Samuel’s
    attendance at school and instead chose to school him at home during the relevant period,
    (2) the school program for three-year-olds like Samuel in 1998-1999 was in any event a
    program for children with disabilities (PPCD) only available to disabled children and
    therefore not in our view a “regular education” program, and (3) the PPCD which
    Samuel sporadically attended during the 1998-1999 school year consisted of less than
    three hours per week in a general education setting where Samuel’s class interacted with
    2
    other students who were not disabled. The IDEA requires the participation of a “regular
    education teacher of such child” only if the child “is, or may be, participating in the
    regular education environment.” Only by the furthest stretching of the statutory language
    did a “regular education teacher of such child” in a “regular education environment” even
    exist.
    3. Most assuredly Samuel had no regular or general education teacher who had
    spent sufficient time with him to compel us to hold that the ARD meetings were not
    “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” See Bobby
    
    R., 200 F.3d at 346
    (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Indeed, his parents
    would be hard pressed to argue otherwise. Their main dispute with the school district as
    to the substance of Samuel’s education was that they believed Samuel should receive
    vastly more in-home training than the school district was willing to provide. In other
    words, they did not want Samuel “mainstreamed” in the general student population,
    despite the Act’s stated preference for mainstreaming disabled students whenever
    possible. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (requiring participating states to establish
    policies and procedures ensuring that “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate, children
    with disabilities . . . are educated with children who are not disabled”). Yet they now
    complain that the IEPs were fatally flawed because a mainstream teacher did not
    participate in certain meetings.
    4. As to the parents’ complaint that the district denied them access to assessment
    reports prior to the ARD meetings, the Act does not specifically require that such reports
    3
    be made available to the parents prior to meetings called to develop the IEP. The Act
    only requires “an opportunity for the parents . . . to examine all records relating to such
    child and to participate in meetings with respect to the identification, evaluation, and
    educational placement of the child, and the provision of a free appropriate public
    education of such child . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1). Appellants do not persuade us
    that the district court clearly erred in finding that “plaintiff’s parents very vocally
    participated in every ARD committee meeting and . . . were not hindered by any alleged
    withholding of documents,” and we have no quarrel with the district court’s ultimate
    conclusion that “the IEPs developed through the Act’s procedures were reasonably
    calculated to enable plaintiff to receive educational benefits.”
    5. Appellants argue that the district court clearly erred in ignoring a level of
    hostility between the district and the parents that resulted in a denial of a free appropriate
    public education for Tyler. Appellants fail to persuade us that hostility between the
    parents and school district personnel resulted in IEPs that were not reasonably calculated
    to enable Samuel to receive educational benefits, or that the school district was unable or
    unwilling to provide him with a free appropriate public education. On the contrary, the
    district court did not clearly err in finding that school district personnel “selflessly
    devoted themselves to serving plaintiff’s best interest despite their discomfort with
    plaintiff’s parents.”
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-10621

Filed Date: 12/17/2002

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021