Crawford v. Cockrell ( 2002 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 02-20320
_____________________
HILTON CRAWFORD
Petitioner - Appellant
v.
JANIE COCKRELL, DIRECTOR,
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION
Respondent - Appellee
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
No. H-00-3385
_________________________________________________________________
December 17, 2002
Before KING, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Petitioner-Appellant Hilton Crawford appeals the decision by
the District Court for the Southern District of Texas denying his
request for a writ of habeas corpus on any of the sixteen grounds
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
he raised before that court. As the district court denied his
request for a certificate of appealability (COA), Crawford has
applied to this court for a COA on four of those issues. After
reviewing the district court’s thorough and reasoned treatment of
the case, as well as the briefs of the parties and the records of
earlier proceedings, we find Crawford’s application for a COA to
be without merit. As a result, we reject his application on all
grounds.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 12, 1995, twelve-year-old Samuel McKay Everett
was abducted from his home while his parents attended an Amway
meeting. When his father returned home, he found the door to the
house open. Soon thereafter, a woman called demanding $500,000
ransom. Mr. Everett called 911, his wife, and Crawford, who was
a friend of the family who had previously served as the county’s
deputy sheriff.
Neighbors reported that, during the meeting, a vehicle
matching the description of Crawford’s car was parked in the
driveway to the Everett’s house. The FBI, upon inspecting
Crawford’s car, noted that it had recently been cleaned; a
further examination revealed blood stains in the trunk and on the
driver’s side. The investigation also uncovered a friend who had
unwittingly helped Crawford clean Samuel’s blood from the trunk,
as well as the woman who made the ransom demand. She implicated
Crawford as the killer.
2
Crawford was arrested. Although he was able to provide
police with a detailed map to the place in Louisiana where the
body was buried, he maintained his innocence as to the murder.
Crawford claimed that an individual named “R. L. Remmington” had
planned and committed the kidnapping and murder. The police were
unable to verify Remmington’s existence. Crawford confessed to
the crime, twice, on videotape. Each time, he admitted to having
participated in the kidnapping and murder but blamed the actual
killing on Remmington. An investigation into Crawford’s
financial status uncovered both financial difficulties and
Crawford’s knowledge that any ransom paid for Samuel would be
covered by the Everett’s insurance policy.
On September 20, 1995, Crawford was indicted for capital
murder for shooting Samuel during the course of a kidnapping.
Because, when the police discovered the body, the extent of
decomposition made it impossible to determine whether the boy had
died from the gunshot or from multiple severe head traumas, the
indictment was later amended to include death by striking the
victim in the head. On July 19, 1996, a jury convicted Crawford
of capital murder. During the punishment phase, the jury
returned answers to the special verdicts that mandated a sentence
of death.
In 1999, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
Crawford’s conviction. Crawford v. State, No. 72,611 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999) (unpublished op.). The United States Supreme Court
3
denied his petition for writ of certiorari. Crawford v. Texas,
528 U.S. 835 (1999).
As required by Texas law, Crawford filed his petition for
state collateral review while his direct appeal was pending. On
July 17, 1998, John Quinn, Crawford’s habeas attorney, filed a
petition for habeas relief in state court; he raised thirteen
issues, each of which he had also raised on direct appeal. While
this petition was pending, Roy Greenwood, one of Crawford’s
current attorneys, filed a motion to be appointed as co-counsel
and to strike all of the habeas pleadings that had been filed by
Mr. Quinn. Mr. Greenwood argued that the new pleadings were
required because Mr. Quinn failed to present any claims that were
not already being considered on direct appeal.
On November 20, 1998, the state habeas court entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that
Crawford’s original petition for habeas relief (the one filed by
Mr. Quinn) be denied. On March 19, 1999, the Court of Criminal
Appeals found that recommendation supported by the record and
denied the application. Ex parte Crawford, No. 40,439-01 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999). The Court of Criminal Appeals later dismissed
Mr. Greenwood’s supplemental application, finding it to be a
subsequent habeas petition that did not satisfy the requirements
for acceptance. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11.071(5) (Vernon
2002) (stating that a subsequent petition for habeas relief will
4
be considered only where the petitioner overcomes three stringent
procedural and substantive hurdles).
Crawford timely filed a petition for habeas relief in the
district court on September 27, 2000; he filed an amended
petition two months later. The State moved for summary judgment
on all of Crawford’s claims. In a thorough, careful opinion, the
district court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment
and declined Crawford’s application for a COA on any of the
issues presented.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
Crawford comes to this court seeking a COA on four of the
issues considered and rejected by the district court. As he
filed his habeas petition in 2000, the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) governs our review of this
case. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997) (stating
that the AEDPA applies to all cases pending as of April 24,
1996). Under the AEDPA, Crawford must obtain a COA before he may
receive full appellate review of the lower court’s denial of
habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2000) (“Unless a
circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability,
an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final
order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention
complained of arises out of process issued by a State court.”).
We may grant the petitioner’s request for a COA only if he
has made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
5
right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, Crawford must
demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,
for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Dowthitt
v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 740 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532
U.S. 915 (2001) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84
(2000)). Where the district court has denied the petitioner’s
claim on procedural grounds, to obtain a COA the petitioner must
demonstrate both that “jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
Our review of whether Crawford has made a “substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right” is also
constrained by the applicable AEDPA standards of review. Moore
v. Johnson, 225 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532
U.S. 949 (2001). On questions of law, the state court’s
conclusions will not be disturbed unless they were “contrary to,
or an unreasonable application of, clearly established” Supreme
Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000). Furthermore,
the state court’s findings of fact are presumed correct unless
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 2254(e)(1).
III. CRAWFORD’S CLAIMS ON APPEAL
6
Crawford raises four claims rejected by the district court
as potential grounds for a COA: (1) ineffective assistance of
counsel during the state habeas proceeding in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) “fraud” by
his state habeas counsel permitting review of the court’s rulings
under FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b); (3) an Eighth Amendment violation
arising out of the trial court’s decision not to instruct the
jury on parole eligibility; and (4) an equal protection claim on
the same grounds as (3).
A. Ineffective Assistance of Habeas Counsel
Crawford argues that his original habeas counsel, Mr. Quinn,
was constitutionally ineffective because he filed a petition
containing only issues that were already being considered on
direct appeal. Crawford identifies several potential issues that
Mr. Quinn should have argued on collateral review, including
trial counsel’s lack of qualifications as a criminal attorney and
trial counsel’s ineffective assistance during the voir dire,
guilt/innocence, and punishment stages of the trial. Crawford
also notes that trial counsel should have, but failed to,
challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court; he
reasons that, because the body was discovered in Louisiana and no
proof was ever had that the murder was committed in Texas, only a
Louisiana state court could properly have had jurisdiction over
his case.
7
The district court considered the questions of habeas
counsel’s competency – except for the jurisdictional question,
which Crawford raises in this appeal for the first time – and
found them to be procedurally barred. Alternatively, the
district court found that Crawford’s claims about the competency
of habeas counsel are not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i).
Crawford presents no new argument as to why the Court of
Criminal Appeals erred in rejecting his successive habeas
petition as procedurally barred or why the district court erred
in finding that his claims about the competency of habeas counsel
are not cognizable under § 2254(i). As for the jurisdictional
issue, Crawford may not raise it for the first time in this
court. See, e.g., Johnson v. Puckett, 176 F.3d 809, 814 (5th
Cir. 1999) (“[A] contention not raised by a habeas petitioner in
the district court cannot be considered for the first time on
appeal from that court’s denial of habeas relief.”).
Crawford has failed to demonstrate that jurists of reason
would find the district court’s resolution of either issue
debatable. Therefore, he has not made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right, and we decline to grant a
COA.
B. “Fraud on the Court”
As his second ground, Crawford argues that the district
court should have set aside the decision by the Court of Criminal
8
Appeals that denied relief on his original writ application. He
asserts that a federal court can set aside a fraudulently induced
state court judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) if the fraud
amounted to the denial of a federal right. Crawford contends
that a “fraud on the court” was committed when Mr. Quinn filed,
as his original habeas application, what amounted to nothing more
than a carbon copy of Crawford’s petition for direct appeal.
While noting that the claim was potentially unexhausted, the
district court nevertheless denied it on the merits. See
§ 2254(b)(2) (2000) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus
may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the
applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the
State.”). The court remarked that Crawford failed to demonstrate
that Mr. Quinn’s actions constituted a “fraud on the court,” let
alone that his actions amounted to the denial of a federal right.
Further, the court noted that granting relief on the basis of
Rule 60(b) would “transgress the principles of comity and
federalism entrenched in the AEDPA.” The court concluded that
Crawford’s attacks ultimately amounted to a challenge to the
state habeas proceeding itself, a challenge foreclosed by Fifth
Circuit precedent. See Rudd v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 317, 319-20
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 477 (2001) (noting that “[a]
long line of cases from our circuit dictates that infirmities in
state habeas proceedings do not constitute grounds for relief in
federal court”) (internal quotation omitted).
9
Crawford raises no new arguments on this appeal that call
into question the district court’s analysis of this issue.
Because he has failed to demonstrate that reasonable jurists
might find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable, we decline to issue a COA on this issue.
C. Lack of Parole Instruction at Sentencing
Crawford next claims that the trial court’s refusal to
instruct the jury regarding the implications of deciding against
the death penalty constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. He
contends that, because he would not have been eligible for parole
until he was ninety-six years old, a decision not to choose the
death sentence would effectively constitute a sentence of life
without the possibility of parole, thereby entitling him to a
parole ineligibility jury instruction. See Simmons v. South
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (holding that, in states where the
alternative sentence to death is life without parole, the jury
must be informed of that fact as a potential mitigating factor).
He also argues that, because the trial judge had discretion over
whether to instruct the jury on the parole issue, similarly
situated defendants were not treated alike; according to
Crawford, this unequal treatment violated the Equal Protection
Clause.
The district court rejected this claim as having been raised
and correctly disposed of on the merits by the Court of Criminal
10
Appeals. Crawford fails to show that the state court’s denial of
relief on this claim involved an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Rudd, 256 F.3d at 321 (finding Texas
sentencing scheme, where life without parole is not the
alternative to a death sentence, not to fall within the scope of
Simmons). As to the equal protection challenge, Crawford again
fails to show that the state court’s denial of relief involved an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Green v. Johnson,
160 F.3d 1029, 1044 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that, because
capital defendants are not a suspect class, the Texas sentencing
scheme is constitutional because a “state may rationally conclude
that its capital sentencing scheme would be better served by not
requiring that courts inform juries of parole considerations”).
Once again, Crawford fails to demonstrate any errors of law
or logic in the district court’s analysis of either the Eighth
Amendment or equal protection challenges to the Texas system.
Because he has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right, we decline to issue a COA on either of
these two grounds.
IV. CONCLUSION
Crawford’s request for a COA on each of the issues he has
raised is DENIED.
11