Gordon v. City of Columbus MS ( 2003 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                  June 27, 2003
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 02-60980
    Summary Calendar
    LESTER GORDON; ELENCY ERBY,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    versus
    CITY OF COLUMBUS MISSISSIPPI, THOMAS KING,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 02-CV-153-D
    --------------------
    Before JOLLY, JONES and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Lester Gordon and Elency Erby appeal from the summary
    judgment dismissal of their 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     suit.     At issue is
    the validity of a release-dismissal agreement, which the district
    court held precluded the bringing of the instant suit.      We review
    the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo.       E.g.,
    Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 
    953 F.2d 909
    , 912 (5th Cir.
    1992).
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 02-60980
    -2-
    Appellants argue that a material issue of fact exists
    whether the written agreement included a requirement that the
    City of Columbus (“the City”) issue a public apology to Erby, to
    which the parties had allegedly orally agreed.    The release-
    dismissal agreement, however, was unambiguous and made no mention
    of a public apology; therefore, resort to parol evidence to
    ascertain the parties’ intent on this issue is improper.     See
    Henley v. Edlemon, 
    297 F.3d 427
    , 430 n.5 (5th Cir. 2002); United
    States, For Use of Garrett v. Midwest Constr. Co., 
    619 F.2d 349
    ,
    352 (1980).
    Appellants additionally argue, for the first time on
    appeal, that the appellees failed in their burden of proving
    that the release-dismissal agreement did not disserve the public
    interest.     A party may not raise an issue for the first time on
    appeal merely because he believes that he might succeed on a
    different theory of recovery.     See Leverette v. Louisville
    Ladder Co., 
    183 F.3d 339
    , 342 (5th Cir. 1999).    Nevertheless,
    this argument fails on the merits; the record evidences that the
    City’s handling of the matter was not “skewed unfairly toward
    the interest of its officials while disadvantaging [Erby] or the
    public.”    See Berry v. Peterson, 
    887 F.2d 635
    , 641 (5th Cir.
    1989).   Finally, we hold pursuant to the Berry factors that the
    release-dismissal agreement was voluntarily entered into.       See
    
    id. at 639-40
    .
    AFFIRMED.