Haley v. Dretke ( 2003 )

In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 01-41389
_______________
MICHAEL WAYNE HALEY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
VERSUS
JANIE COCKRELL,
DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellant.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
_________________________
March 19, 2003
ON PETITION FOR Treating the petition for rehearing en banc
REHEARING EN BANC as a petition for panel rehearing, the petition
for panel rehearing is DENIED. The court
(Opinion September 27, 2002, having been polled at the request of one of the
306 F.3d 257) members of the court, and a majority of the
judges who are in regular active service not
Before DEMOSS, STEWART, and DENNIS, having voted in favor (FED. R. APP. P. 35 and
Circuit Judges. 5TH CIR. R. 35), the petition for rehearing
en banc is DENIED.
PER CURIAM:
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge, with whom extended the exception to non-capital
JOLLY, JONES, BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. sentences.1
GARZA, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges,
join, dissenting from the denial of This case presents a perfect opportunity for
rehearing en banc: the full court to consider whether to extend
the exception to non-capital sentences where
This exceptionally important case deserves the petitioner is not actually innocent of the
the attention of the en banc court. For the first crime. This purely legal question is unsullied
time, we extend the “actual innocence” excep- by factual disputes: Texas concedes that
tion for procedurally defaulted habeas corpus Haley was not eligible under Texas law for the
claims to non-capital sentences. The federal sentence he received, because the indictment
courts of appeals are split three ways on this wrongly alleged that Haley’s prior drug
question, and the panel opinion aligns this conviction was final before he committed his
court with one of the two positions adopted by prior robbery, a chronological order necessary
only one other circuit. Before this decision is to Haley’s sentence enhancement.2
set in stone as binding circuit precedent, the
issue should receive review and thorough con- It bears repeating that Texas concedes this
sideration by the entire court. error and argues only that the actual innocence
exception should not extend to non-capital
I. sentences. Thus, this case squarely presents a
In general, a habeas petitioner may not raise legal question of exceptional importance in an
a procedurally defaulted claim, i.e., a claim not unusually pristine form.
presented to the state court, unless he demon-
strates cause for the default and prejudice from II.
the alleged constitutional violation. Wain- A.
wright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). A peti- In various procedural settings, three circuits
tioner may, however, obtain a hearing on a have held that the actual innocence exception
procedurally defaulted claim if he demon-
strates his actual innocence of the underlying
offense, even if he cannot satisfy the general
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cause-and-prejudice test. Murray v. Carrier, We have assumed twice, without deciding,
477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). “Actual that the exception extends to non-capital sentences.
innocence” in that context means the petitioner See Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir.
did not commit the crime. 1995); Smith v. Collins, 977 F.2d 951, 959 (5th
Cir. 1992).
The Supreme Court has extended the actual 2
The panel suggests a second error in the in-
innocence exception for the cause-and-
dictment, namely, an erroneous allegation that Hal-
prejudice test to the context of capital sen- ey’s prior robbery offense involved a deadly
tencing, meaning a petitioner who has com- weapon. Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257, 261 &
mitted the crime may, nonetheless, be “actually n. 7, 262, 263 & n.10, 264, 267 (5th Cir. 2002).
innocent” of the penalty of death. Sawyer v. In his response to the petition for rehearing en
Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992). Neither the banc, Haley concedes that any such error is
Supreme Court nor this court, however, has irrelevant, because his enhancement rested solely
on the chronological order of his convictions.
2
does not extend to any non-capital sentences.3 permission to file a second § 2255 motion
In a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 case, the Eighth Circuit based solely on an improper sentencing
held that the actual innocence exception does enhancement. Id. at 120. The court reasoned
not apply to non-capital sentences. Embrey v. that AEDPA allows second petitions only if no
Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 1997) (en reasonable factfinder would have convicted the
banc). The court carefully reviewed Supreme prisoner of the “offense.” Id. Thus, the
Court precedent, in particular Sawyer, and Seventh Circuit, concluding that AEDPA
concluded that “Sawyer, in terms, applies only eliminated the exception, overruled its caselaw
to the sentencing phase of death cases.” Em- extending the exception to non-capital
brey, 131 F.3d at 740. sentences. Id. (citing Mills v. Jordan, 979
F.2d 1273, 1278 (7th Cir. 1992)).
The Eighth Circuit also relied on the Tenth
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Richards, On the second side of the three-way split,
5 F.3d 1369, 1371 (10th Cir. 1993), which the Second Circuit alone has held that the ac-
refused to extend the exception. In Richards, tual innocence exception extends to all non-
the court upheld the government’s objection to capital sentences. Spence v. Superintendent,
a second § 2255 motion, based on the abuse of Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162
writ doctrine. Id. at 1370. The petitioner had (2d Cir. 2000). In Spence, the prisoner’s pro-
argued that he should be allowed to file a bation was rescinded and replaced with a sen-
second motion based on a showing of actual tence of up to twenty-five years’ imprisonment
innocence of his non-capital sentence. Id. at for which he was not legally eligible. Id. at
1371. The Tenth Circuit rejected this 165. The Second Circuit, however, did not
argument out of hand: “A person cannot be equivocate or rest on the severity of the
actually innocent of a noncapital sentence[.]” wrongly-imposed sentence. The court held
Id. The Tenth Circuit has reaffirmed this that the actual innocence exception applies ac-
holding, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 case, after the ross the board “to the sentencing phase of a
enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective noncapital trial.” Id. at 171.
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Reid
v. Oklahoma, 101 F.3d 628, 630 (10th Cir. Alone on the third side of the splitSSalone,
1996). that is, until joined by the panel in the instant
caseSSthe Fourth Circuit has held that the ac-
Similarly, if more dramatically, the Seventh tual innocence exception extends only to those
Circuit has held that the exception does not non-capital sentences imposed under habitual
survive AEDPA. Hope v. United States, 108 offender statutes. Like the Second Circuit, the
F.3d 119 (7th Cir. 1997). The prisoner sought Fourth Circuit originally had held that the ac-
tual innocence exception extends to all non-
capital sentences. United States v. Maybeck,
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See Haley, 306 F.3d at 265 (collecting cases).
23 F.3d 888, 893 (4th Cir. 1994).
Neither the cause-and-prejudice test nor the actual
innocence exception to that test varies based on the Five years later, the Fourth Circuit, perhaps
posture of the case. Indeed, Sawyer, which first recognizing that this holding was untenable,
applied the actual innocence exception to capital limited the scope of Maybeck. United States
sentences, was a successive-writ case, not an or- v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490 (4th Cir. 1999).
dinary procedural-default case.
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Citing the frightening practical results of May- person of the crime.” Id. This example
beck and its tension with Supreme Court case- indicates why, “[i]n the context of a
law, the court held that the actual innocence noncapital case, the concept of ‘actual
exception “applies in noncapital sentencing innocence’ is easy to grasp.” Id. at 341
only in the context of eligibility for application (emphases added). Finally, the Court
of a career offender or other habitual offender described its task in Sawyer as “striv[ing] to
guideline provision.” Id. at 495. This holding construct an analog to the simpler situation
provoked a vigorous dissent arguing that the represented by the case of a noncapital
distinction was unprincipled and unsustainable. defendant.” Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 497-502 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
This court’s panel has chosen to adopt the The Tenth and Eighth Circuits inferred
reasoning used in Mikalajunas. from this reasoning that the Supreme Court
never intended the lower courts to extend the
B. actual innocence exception to non-capital sen-
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not tencing cases. Otherwise, why is the concept
addressed this question. Indeed, the limited of actual innocence so “easy to grasp” in the
implications of its caselaw can be read to point non-capital context? And why is a non-capital
in opposite directions. Given the exceptional case a “simpler situation”? In the Tenth
importance of the question and the lack of Circuit’s view, it is “because it simply means
guidance from above, the full court should the person didn’t commit the crime.”
have reheard this case. Richards, 5 F.3d at 1371. The Eighth Circuit
concluded that “the most natural inference to
The panel finds support in Sawyer and Her- draw from these observations on the Court’s
rera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). The part is that” the actual innocence exception
panel observes that “[t]he Court did not should not extend to non-capital sentencing.
foreclose [in Sawyer] the application of the Embrey, 131 F.3d at 741.
actual innocence exception to noncapital
sentencing cases.” Haley, 306 F.3d at 265. At the same time, other language in Sawyer
This is correct, but Sawyer did not present the suggests the Court’s openness to applying the
question. Moreover, some language in Sawyer actual innocence exception to non-capital sen-
indicates that the Court did not intend the tences. For example, the Court stated that
lower courts to extend the act ual innocence “[i]n Smith, [it] found no miscarriage of justice
exception to non-capital sentencing cases. in the failure to examine the merits of pro-
cedurally defaulted claims in the capital sen-
The Court “acknowledged that actual inno- tencing context.” Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 339
cence ‘does not translate easily into the (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The
context of an alleged error at the sentencing Court also stated that “[t]he present case re-
phase of a trial on a capital offense.’” Sawyer, quires us to further amplify the meaning of ‘ac-
505 U.S. at 340 (quoting Smith v. Murray, tual innocence’ in the setting of capital pun-
477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986)). The Court then ishment.” Id. at 340 (emphasis added).
observed that “[a] prototypical example of
‘actual innocence’ in a colloquial sense is the The meanings of these passages are
case where the State has convicted the wrong debatable. One might argue, though, that the
4
Court would not have added the qualifying
phrases “in the capital sentencing context” or
“in the setting of capital punishment” if it
intended to extend the exception only to
capital sentences.
But “[m]ore importantly,” according to the
panel, “the Court has noted that the purpose of
the [actual innocence] rule ‘is grounded in the
equitable discretion of habeas courts to see
that federal constitutional errors do not result
in the incarceration of innocent persons.’”
Haley, 306 F.3d at 265 (quoting Herrera, 506
U.S. at 404). Herrera, however, is not
especially helpful to the question before this
court.
In Herrera, the petitioner claimed to be in-
nocent of the murder of which he was
convicted. Haley, on the other hand, is not
innocent, nor does he claim to be; he is a re-
cidivist offender duly convicted after a full and
fair trial and whose conviction the state courts
repeatedly upheld on appeal and collateral re-
view. Further, the Supreme Court denied re-
lief in Herrera. Even if we were to conclude
that the actual innocence exception extends to
non-capital sentences, therefore, Herrera
would not support the extension.
In light of the limited guidance from the
Supreme Court, and ambiguity in what
guidance there is, the en banc court should
have reheard this case to determine whether
and, if so, how the actual innocence exception
applies to non-capital sentences. Accordingly,
I respectfully dissent from the denial of
rehearing en banc.
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