United States v. Headrick ( 2003 )


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  •                                                         United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                  April 22, 2003
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 02-50527
    Conference Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    DENNIS WAYNE HEADRICK,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. W-01-CR-72-3
    --------------------
    Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Dennis Wayne Headrick appeals his guilty-plea conviction of
    conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, a violation of 21
    U.S.C. § 846.   Headrick contends, for the first time on appeal,
    that during his rearraignment proceeding the district court
    violated FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 in three separate instances.
    Because a guilty plea involves the waiver of several
    constitutional rights, it must be made intelligently and
    voluntarily.    Boykin v. Alabama, 
    395 U.S. 238
    , 242-44 (1969).
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 02-50527
    -2-
    Rule 11 requires the district court to follow certain procedures
    to determine whether a defendant’s guilty plea is made knowingly
    and voluntarily.   This court reviews the district court's
    compliance with Rule 11 to determine (1) whether the court varied
    from Rule 11’s procedures and, if so, (2) whether the variance
    affected the defendant’s substantial rights.    United States
    v. Johnson, 
    1 F.3d 296
    , 298 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
    When an appellant allows an error in a guilty-plea colloquy
    to pass without objection, this court reviews for plain error
    only.   United States v. Vonn, 
    535 U.S. 55
    , 
    122 S. Ct. 1043
    , 1046
    (2002).   To establish plain error, an appellant bears the burden
    to show that (1) there is an error (2) that is clear or obvious
    and (3) that affects his substantial rights.    United States
    v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 731-37 (1993)).
    Headrick contends that the district court failed to explain
    the nature of the charge to him, in violation of FED. R. CRIM. P.
    11(c)(1).   Although the district court did not explicitly explain
    the elements of the conspiracy offense to Headrick, the court
    asked him whether he had read the indictment or had it read to
    him and whether he understood the charges, directed that the
    indictment be read to him, and directed that a factual basis for
    the offense be recited.   These factors indicate that Headrick
    understood the nature of the charge.   See United States v. Reyna,
    
    130 F.3d 104
    , 111 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cuevas-
    Andrade, 
    232 F.3d 440
    , 444 (5th Cir. 2000).    Headrick has not
    No. 02-50527
    -3-
    demonstrated that any error with respect to this matter affected
    his substantial rights.
    Headrick maintains that the district court failed to inform
    him of the consequences of his plea when it did not advise him
    fully of the effect of supervised release.    The cumulative
    duration of Headrick’s 18-month prison term, his three-year
    supervised-release term, and potential two-year prison term upon
    any revocation of supervised release falls far short of the
    potential 20-year statutory maximum prison term.    Headrick cannot
    show that, under this “worst-case scenario,” any Rule 11 error
    affected his substantial rights.     See United States v. Reyes,
    
    300 F.3d 555
    , 560 & n.5.   Headrick has cited no legal authority
    suggesting that the “hypothetical of a never-ending punishment,”
    see United States v. Stiefel, 
    207 F.3d 256
    , 261 & n.6 (5th Cir.
    2000), should be considered in these circumstances.
    Headrick argues that the district court erred by failing
    to inquire whether his decision to plead guilty resulted from
    discussions between the Government’s attorneys and him or his
    attorney.   See Rule 11(d).    The district court’s questions about
    whether there was a plea agreement and whether Headrick’s plea
    was the result of coercion, threats, or promises suggest that its
    failure to inquire specifically about discussions was not a
    factor in Headrick’s decision to plead guilty.
    The conviction is AFFIRMED.