Williams v. Dretke ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT March 21, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-20303
Summary Calendar
DALTON LOYD WILLIAMS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
DOUG DRETKE, DIRECTOR,
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:04-CV-3565
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Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Dalton Loyd Williams, Texas prisoner #246571, seeks a
certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s
dismissal, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, of his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging his guilty-plea conviction of
possession of cocaine, for which he received a 180-day sentence.
Because the district court dismissed his petition on procedural
grounds without considering the merits of his claims, in order to
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-20303
-2-
obtain a COA, Williams must “show[], at least, that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a
valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district
court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Williams argues that the district court erred in dismissing
his § 2254 petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He
does not dispute the district court’s determination that the
180-day sentence imposed for possession of cocaine expired before
he filed his petition. He contends that he was convicted in 1975
of various charges including murder, and that he was paroled on
these charges in 1986. Williams argues that he is in custody
based on his conviction for possession of cocaine because this
conviction was the sole reason used by the Parole Board to revoke
his 1986 parole.
A petitioner meets the jurisdictional “in custody”
requirement if the habeas petition could be construed as
asserting a challenge to the sentence presently being served as
enhanced by the prior conviction, for which the petitioner is no
longer in custody. See Lackawanna County Dist. Att’y v. Coss,
532 U.S. 394, 401-02 (2001). “‘[I]n custody’ does not
necessarily mean ‘in custody for the offense being attacked.’
Instead, jurisdiction exists if there is a positive, demonstrable
relationship between the prior conviction and the petitioner’s
No. 05-20303
-3-
present incarceration.” Sinclair v. Blackburn, 599 F.2d 673, 676
(5th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
Williams has shown “that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial
of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find
it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. The present record
does not support the district court’s dismissal of Williams’s
§ 2254 petition on grounds that he was not “in custody” as a
result of his conviction for possession of cocaine. See Coss,
532 U.S. at 401-02; Sinclair, 599 F.2d at 676.
Accordingly, Williams’s request for a COA is granted. The
judgment of the district court is vacated, and this matter is
remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
COA GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED.