Crary v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board ( 2009 )


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  •            IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    August 6, 2009
    No. 08-30980                    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    SHARON M CRARY
    Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD
    Defendant - Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Louisiana
    No. 3:04-CV-588
    Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    In 2003, Sharon Crary, a 63-year-old white female, was demoted from her
    position as Director of Special Education Services in the East Baton Rouge
    Parish School Board and subsequently retired. She alleged in federal district
    court that she was constructively discharged from her position and that the
    school board discriminated against her on the basis of race and sex in violation
    of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq., and on the
    basis of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR .
    R. 47.5.4.
    
    29 U.S.C. §621
    , et seq. She also asserted a state law claim under Louisiana
    Revised Statutes Annotated § 17:444(B). The district court granted summary
    judgment in favor of the school board. Although it gave reasons in remarks from
    the bench, those remarks never explicitly addressed her state law claim.
    We assume, without deciding, that Crary was constructively discharged,
    and that she was replaced by a younger, black male. We conclude, however,
    that there is insufficient evidence in the summary judgment record that the
    school board’s stated reason for the discharge (that she mishandled the reporting
    of special education students to Louisiana’s Department of Education, with
    disastrous consequences) was a pretext for discrimination on the basis of race,
    sex or age. The only evidence of age discrimination to which Crary could point
    was testimony by Annette Mire, head of the school board’s Human Resources
    department.    Mire stated that it was important to Clayton Wilcox, the
    Superintendent, that the school board project the image of youth and vitality
    when recruiting new teachers “so that there would be more of an identity with
    the younger graduates.” That evidence does not support Crary’s claim of age
    discrimination in connection with her position and responsibilities as Director
    of Special Education. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment on Crary’s race,
    sex and age discrimination claims is affirmed.
    Crary’s state law claim is based on §17:444(B)(4)(c)(iii) of the Louisiana
    Revised Statutes, which states:
    The employee shall be retained during the term of a contract unless
    the employee is found incompetent or inefficient or is found to have
    failed to fulfill the terms and performance objectives of his contract.
    However, before an employee can be removed during the contract
    period, he shall have the right to written charges and a fair hearing
    before the board after reasonable written notice.
    Crary asserts, inter alia, that the school board did not follow this procedure as
    there was no notice provided (let alone in a reasonable amount of time), no
    hearing was held, and no hearing could have been held in such a short period of
    2
    time. We are unsure of the district court’s basis for dismissing this claim. We
    thus vacate that portion of the judgment and remand for further consideration.
    Additionally, since this state law claim is the only remaining claim, we urge the
    district court to consider declining to address the state law claim as permitted
    by 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (c). The decision of the district court on this point, however,
    is entirely within its discretion. The attention of all parties is specifically
    directed to § 1367(d).
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment on
    the discrimination claims and VACATE and REMAND the judgment on the
    state law claim. Costs shall be borne by Crary.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-30980

Judges: King, Higginbotham, Clement

Filed Date: 8/6/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024