Ghebregziabiher v. Mukasey , 304 F. App'x 288 ( 2008 )


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  •           IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    December 23, 2008
    No. 08-60169
    Summary Calendar               Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    DAWIT GHEBREGZIABIHER
    Petitioner
    v.
    MICHAEL B MUKASEY, US ATTORNEY GENERAL
    Respondent
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    BIA No. A24 610 595
    Before SMITH, STEWART, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Dawit Ghebregziabiher has filed a petition for review of the denial of his
    motion to reconsider the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
    affirming the denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
    protection under the Convention against Torture. Because Ghebregziabiher did
    not file a timely petition for review of the BIA’s decision affirming the denial of
    relief, we do not have jurisdiction to review that decision by the BIA. See 8
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 08-60169
    U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1); see Navarro-Miranda v. Ashcroft, 
    330 F.3d 672
    , 675 (5th Cir.
    2003). However, Ghebregziabiher did file a timely petition for review of the
    BIA’s denial of his motion to reconsider. We have jurisdiction to review that
    denial. See id.; see also Guevara v. Gonzales, 
    450 F.3d 173
    , 176 (5th Cir. 2006).
    The BIA’s denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed “under a
    highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Singh v. Gonzales, 
    436 F.3d 484
    , 487 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This
    court “must affirm the” BIA’s denial of a motion for reconsideration unless this
    decision is “capricious, racially invidious, utterly without foundation in the
    evidence, or otherwise so irrational that it is arbitrary rather than the result of
    any perceptible rational approach.” 
    Id. A federal
    court does not have jurisdiction to review “‘any final order of
    removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed’
    certain designated criminal offenses, including an aggravated felony under 8
    U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).” Larin-Ulloa v. Gonzales, 
    462 F.3d 456
    , 461 (5th Cir.
    2006), quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). Section 1252 was amended in 2005 so
    as not to bar review of “‘constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a
    petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with
    this section.’” 
    Id. at 461
    (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)). Because the
    question whether Ghebregziabiher is removable based on committing an
    aggravated felony is a legal one, this court has jurisdiction to review his petition.
    See Rodriguez-Castro v. Gonzales, 
    427 F.3d 316
    , 319 (5th Cir. 2005).
    Ghebregziabiher argues that the immigration judge erred in finding that
    his prior Texas conviction for delivery of a controlled substance was an
    aggravated felony. He argues that his prior conviction could not be considered
    an aggravated felony. The record contains a copy of the state indictment and
    judgment which specify that Ghebregziabiher unlawfully and knowingly
    delivered less than one gram of cocaine by actual transfer in violation of Texas
    law. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(a). The state court deferred
    2
    No. 08-60169
    adjudication and placed him on community supervision for five years.            A
    deferred adjudication is a conviction for immigration purposes. See Madriz-
    Alvarado v. Ashcroft, 
    383 F.3d 321
    , 334-35 (5th Cir. 2004).
    A conviction for delivery of a controlled substance under Section 481.112(a)
    of the Texas Health and Safety Code is a “drug trafficking offense” under
    U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B). United States v. Garcia-Arellano, 
    522 F.3d 477
    , 481
    (5th Cir. 2008). In that case, we found that a judicial confession may be
    considered in determining the nature of the offense for purposes of the
    Sentencing Guidelines. 
    Id. We know
    that Ghebregziabiher’s prior conviction
    was for delivery of cocaine by actual transfer. This information comes from the
    indictment and judgment of deferred adjudication, documents which are
    properly viewed when determining the nature of a prior conviction. 
    Id. at 480.
    The BIA therefore did not err in finding that Ghebregziabiher’s conviction was
    an aggravated felony for immigration purposes.
    As an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, Ghebregziabiher was
    correctly found to be removable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). In addition,
    the finding that Ghebregziabiher is removable as an aggravated felon limits this
    court’s jurisdiction to review other issues. See 
    Id. § 1252(a)(2)(C).
    There has
    been no showing that the BIA’s denial of his motion for reconsideration was
    “capricious, racially invidious, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or
    otherwise so irrational that it is arbitrary rather than the result of any
    perceptible rational approach.” See 
    Singh, 436 F.3d at 487
    .
    Ghebregziabiher’s petition for review is DENIED.
    3