United States v. Wilson ( 2009 )


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  •            IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    January 15, 2009
    No. 08-30100 &                   Charles R. Fulbruge III
    No. 08-30102                            Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    RUBEN WILSON
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC Nos. 97-CR-50081 and 06-CR-50112
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Appellant Ruben Wilson (“Wilson”) appeals from two judgments, one
    judgment relating to the denial of a motion to suppress and the other revoking
    his supervised release. The appeals from the two judgments were consolidated
    in this court. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Nos. 08-30100 & 08-30102
    I.    Background
    A.    Motion to Suppress
    In June 2006, Wilson and four other individuals were indicted relating to
    possession of methamphetamine. In October 2006, Wilson filed a motion to
    suppress a recorded statement he made to Task Force agents on February 14,
    2006. Wilson contended that the statement was taken in violation of his Fifth
    and Sixth Amendment rights, because it was coerced and unduly influenced by
    threats and inducements. Wilson also argued that there was no probable cause
    to arrest or detain him and no exigent circumstances for his warrantless arrest
    and detention. Wilson subsequently filed an addendum to his motion asserting
    that his recorded statement was also taken pursuant to an illegal detention in
    violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. After a hearing, Wilson filed another
    supplemental memorandum in support of his motion to suppress.
    On March 8, 2007, the magistrate judge issued a Report and
    Recommendation (“R & R”) recommending that the district court deny Wilson’s
    motion to suppress. Wilson filed objections to the R & R, arguing inter alia that
    the magistrate judge ignored force, coercion, and subtle psychological pressures.
    The district court conducted a de novo review of the portions of the R & R to
    which objections were filed. The district court noted that during the hour and
    a half interview,
    there was an extensive and intensive line of questioning, with ready
    and willing responses from Wilson. In total, he mentioned sixteen
    names of customers, suppliers, and contacts. He identified the
    automobiles regularly driven by some of those individuals. When
    asked, he divulged the cell phone numbers of those contacts that he
    could immediately recall. He freely answered questions regarding
    quantities, types, and costs of drugs during several specific drug
    transactions. . . .
    While carefully listening to the tape recording, [the court] did
    not detect a single instance of what could be described as “subtle
    psychological persuasion.”
    2
    Nos. 08-30100 & 08-30102
    By order dated June 26, 2007, the district court adopted the R & R.
    On October 1, 2007, the Government filed a notice that Wilson’s sentence
    would be enhanced because of his prior felony drug conviction, pursuant to 21
    U.S.C. § 851. On October 3, 2007, Wilson conditionally pled guilty to Count One
    of the indictment, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
    suppress. The district court sentenced Wilson to 120 months of imprisonment
    as to Count One.
    After sentencing, Wilson timely filed a notice of appeal. Wilson contends
    that the evidence at the suppression hearing established that (1) he was
    unlawfully seized before and while giving his statement and (2) the statement
    was the product of coercion and not given freely. Because Wilson’s guilty plea
    was contingent on his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress,
    Wilson requests that this court vacate his conviction and sentence and remand
    this matter to the district court for further proceedings.
    B.      Revocation of Supervised Release
    Subsequent to the June 2006 indictment related to methamphetamine,
    Wilson was arrested and detained on July 11, 2006. The Government requested
    revocation of Wilson’s supervised release for violation of the condition requiring
    that Wilson “not commit another Federal, State, or local crime.”          Wilson
    admitted guilt to violation of conditions of the term of supervision. The court
    sentenced Wilson to 27 months of imprisonment, to run concurrently with
    Wilson’s sentence in the drug conviction case.         Wilson timely appealed,
    contending that the district court violated his procedural due process rights
    when revoking his supervised release and imposing a sentence based on the
    revocation.
    The Government filed an unopposed motion to consolidate the two appeals,
    which was granted.
    3
    Nos. 08-30100 & 08-30102
    II.   Discussion
    A.     Motion to Suppress
    1.     Standard of Review
    When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this court
    reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error and the district court’s
    conclusions regarding the sufficiency of the warrant and the constitutionality of
    law enforcement action de novo. United States v. Perez 
    484 F.3d 735
    , 739 (5th
    Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Cherna, 
    184 F.3d 403
    , 406 (5th Cir.1999)).
    Whether a seizure has occurred is a factual determination reviewed for clear
    error. United States v. Mask, 
    330 F.3d 330
    , 335 (5th Cir. 2003). “A factual
    finding is not clearly erroneous if it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.”
    United States v. Zavala, 
    541 F.3d 562
    , 574 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States
    v. Jacquinot, 
    258 F.3d 423
    , 427 (5th Cir.2001)). We view the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the district court, which is the
    Government in this case. United States v. Chavez, 
    281 F.3d 479
    , 483 (5th Cir.
    2002).
    2.     Analysis
    On February 14, 2006, Shreveport Task Force agents (collectively
    “officers”) and Wilson’s federal probation officer, Kenneth Mays, went to Wilson’s
    residence. Mays met Wilson at Wilson’s home, and they walked into Wilson’s
    driveway. In the driveway, two officers confronted Wilson and told him that he
    was the subject of an investigation involving a conspiracy. Wilson had known
    one officer, Hank Haynes, since the early 1990’s based on prior contact with law
    enforcement. Wilson previously had contacted Haynes in April 2005 to arrange
    a meeting in Texas.
    In the driveway, Haynes told Wilson that this was “serious,” and if he
    wanted to cooperate, “now is the time.” Wilson agreed to cooperate and asked
    4
    Nos. 08-30100 & 08-30102
    to get his shoes and cell phone inside the home. The officers permitted Wilson
    to retrieve the items from his home under their supervision.
    The officers then transported Wilson to a public park in one of the officer’s
    SUVs. The officers permitted Wilson to keep his cell phone, did not brandish
    any weapons during their encounter with Wilson, did not frisk or search Wilson’s
    person either in front of the residence or at any time during the interview, and
    did not handcuff Wilson. The officers showed Wilson an unsigned affidavit and
    arrest warrant to inform him how much they already knew of Wilson’s drug
    trafficking activities. The officers wanted Wilson’s assistance in prosecuting
    other members of the conspiracy, as Wilson had previously done. The officers
    then advised Wilson of his Miranda rights, and Wilson executed a Miranda
    waiver before conducting a taped interview. The officers testified that had
    Wilson refused to go with them to be interviewed, they would have left.
    Wilson contends that he was unlawfully seized before and while giving his
    recorded statement. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    Government, we find no reversible error in the district court’s denial of the
    motion to suppress the recorded statement. Wilson was not seized in violation
    of the Fourth Amendment, and Wilson voluntarily gave the recorded statement.
    A reasonable person in Wilson’s situation would have believed that he was free
    to leave. See Brendlin v. California, 
    127 S. Ct. 2400
    , 2405-06 (2007); United
    States v. Lara, 
    638 F.2d 892
    , 896 (5th Cir. 1981).
    We affirm the district court’s denial of Wilson’s motion to suppress.
    B.    Revocation of Supervised Release
    1.    Standard of Review
    In the district court, Wilson did not raise the issue that the court violated
    his procedural due process rights when revoking his supervised release. We,
    therefore, review the revocation of supervised release under the plain error
    5
    Nos. 08-30100 & 08-30102
    standard.1 United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 
    526 F.3d 804
    , 806 (5th Cir. 2008).
    Under this standard, Wilson is entitled to relief only if “(1) there is an error, (2)
    that is clear and obvious, and (3) that affects his substantial rights.” United
    States v. Marek, 
    238 F.3d 310
    , 315 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc). “If these factors are
    established, the decision to correct the forfeited error still lies within our sound
    discretion, which we will not exercise unless the error seriously affects the
    fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 
    Id. 2. Analysis
           The Supreme Court has established the minimum requirements of due
    process in parole revocation proceedings:
    (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure
    to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard
    in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d)
    the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless
    the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
    confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body such as a
    traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial
    officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as
    to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
    Morrissey v. Brewer, 
    408 U.S. 471
    , 489 (1972).
    Wilson acknowledges that it can be inferred from the hearing that Wilson
    did receive notice of the alleged violation, received some disclosure of the
    evidence against him, had an opportunity to appear, and had notice of his right
    to be represented by counsel. Wilson pled guilty to the drug conspiracy, thereby
    admitting to an offense which was in violation of his supervised release. In light
    of the foregoing, the district court did not plainly err in revoking Wilson’s
    supervised release.
    1
    Wilson concedes in his reply brief that this court should review this issue under the
    plain error standard.
    6
    Nos. 08-30100 & 08-30102
    III.   Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgments
    denying Wilson’s motion to suppress and revoking Wilson’s supervised release.
    7