Calton v. Dallas County , 307 F. App'x 809 ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •            IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    January 16, 2009
    No. 07-11284
    Summary Calendar                   Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    ALLEN FITZGERALD CALTON
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    NFN JOHNSON, #6445; OFFICER NFN WILLIAMS, #5112; OFFICER NFN
    TERRY; OFFICER NFN WALLS; OFFICER NFN MITCHELL
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:05-CV-2022
    Before SMITH, STEWART, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Allen Fitzgerald Calton, Texas prisoner # 1123880, filed a civil rights
    complaint alleging, among other things, that he had been denied access to the
    prison law library. After prescreening Calton’s case, the district court dismissed
    that claim and the defendants against whom the claim had been brought.
    Calton’s complaint also alleged that in April 2005, Officers Johnson and Wilson
    were deliberately indifferent to his serious risk of suicide due to his mental
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 07-11284
    illness. The officers had given Calton a shaving razor and, when he was left
    unsupervised, Calton used the razor to slice his wrists. Calton alleged the same
    claim against Officers Terry, Walls, and Mitchell stemming from an identical
    incident in July 2005. The district court considered the merits of Calton’s claims
    and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and against Calton.
    On appeal, Calton argues that, after his case had been prescreened, the
    district court should have on its own initiative appointed counsel for him. The
    justification would have been Calton’s history of mental illness and the fact that
    he was taking medication for that illness. He also argues that the district court
    erred in denying his motion, filed after the summary judgment motions had been
    submitted to the district court, expressly seeking the appointment of counsel.
    In that motion, Calton stated that due to the confusion and inability to
    concentrate caused by his medication regimen, he would need counsel to
    represent him at the trial of this matter.
    Despite Calton’s suicidal history, his mental illness, and the effect of his
    medications, Calton consistently filed coherent pleadings that demonstrated his
    ability to articulate the factual and legal issues of this case. Accordingly, the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to appoint counsel. See Cupit
    v. Jones, 
    835 F.2d 82
    , 86 (5th Cir. 1987); Ulmer v. Chancellor, 
    691 F.2d 209
    , 213
    (5th Cir. 1982). Calton proved himself capable of litigating his own case, and the
    case never proceeded to trial. The record demonstrates the district court’s
    reasons for the denial of Calton’s motion for the appointment of counsel. A
    remand to have the court explain its reasoning is unnecessary. See Jackson v.
    Dallas Police Dep’t, 
    811 F.2d 260
    , 262 (5th Cir. 1986).
    Calton filed motions pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e)
    and 60(b) challenging the district court’s judgment. Calton sought to submit
    evidence that he considered crucial to the success of his claims and of which he
    had always been aware. Calton asserted, however, that he had failed to notice
    the omission of that evidence when copying his summary judgment declaration
    2
    No. 07-11284
    from a draft prepared for Calton by a fellow inmate. Calton contended that his
    fellow inmate’s omission was responsible for his own omission.               He now
    challenges the district court’s denial of his postjudgment motions. Calton has
    not shown the extraordinary circumstances that would warrant relief under Rule
    59(e) due to his negligent failure to present all of the available facts crucial to his
    case in his summary judgment declaration. See ICEE Distribs., Inc. v. J & J
    Snack Foods Corp., 
    445 F.3d 841
    , 847-48 (5th Cir. 2006); Templet v. HydroChem,
    Inc., 
    367 F.3d 473
    , 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (“An unexcused failure to present evidence
    available at the time of summary judgment provides a valid basis for denying a
    subsequent motion for reconsideration.”). For that same reason, Calton has not
    shown that the district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 60(b)
    motion. See Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 
    635 F.2d 396
    , 402 (5th Cir. 1981).
    Calton has also asked that we appoint counsel for him here. In an appeal
    in a civil rights case, “exceptional circumstances” are usually needed for
    appointment of counsel. Akasike v. Fitzpatrick, 
    26 F.3d 510
    , 512 (5th Cir. 1994).
    The issues presented are “neither peculiar nor complex,” and this “record is
    sufficient, without further development or argument of counsel to support our
    decision in this matter.” Wendell v. Asher, 
    162 F.3d 887
    , 892 (5th Cir. 1998),
    abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 
    549 U.S. 199
    (2007). There are no
    exceptional circumstances justifying the appointment of appellate counsel.
    We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Calton’s motion for the
    appointment of counsel is DENIED.
    3