Guevara v. City of Haltom City , 106 F. App'x 903 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
August 10, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-10646
CHRISTINE GARCIA GUEVARA
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
CITY OF HALTOM CITY
Defendant - Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
No. 4:02-CV-1047-A
Before KING, Chief Judge, and DeMOSS and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Christine Guevara appeals the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the City of
Haltom City for wrongful incarceration, invasion of privacy, and
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. In addition, Guevara
appeals the district court’s denial of her motion for leave to
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
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file a second amended complaint.1
A plaintiff asserting a claim under § 1983 must “(1) allege
a violation of rights secured by the Constitution of the United
States or laws of the United States; and (2) demonstrate that the
alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color
of state law.” Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 420
(5th Cir. 2004). In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a municipality
could be held liable for an injury under § 1983 if the injury was
caused by a custom or policy of the municipality.
Guevara alleges that she was confined in the Haltom City
jail in connection with various misdemeanors without being
afforded an indigency hearing, without being informed of her
right to counsel, and without the benefit of appointed counsel.
According to Guevara, the City is liable under § 1983 for these
alleged constitutional violations because it had a policy of
jailing inmates, such as her, without providing counsel or
determining whether they had the ability to pay their misdemeanor
fines. Assuming that Guevara has alleged violations of her
constitutional rights, we conclude that Guevara’s theory of
liability is flawed. The relevant decisions were made, not by a
City policymaker, but by a municipal judge acting in his judicial
1
For purposes of oral argument, this case was
consolidated with twelve similar cases and heard under the name
Drake v. City of Haltom City, No. 03-10594.
2
capacity. As the Ninth Circuit reasoned in Eggar v. City of
Livingston,:
Because [the judge] was functioning as a state judicial
officer, his acts and omissions were not part of a city
policy or custom. A municipality cannot be liable for
judicial conduct it lacks the power to require, control,
or remedy, even if that conduct parallels or appears
entangled with the desires of the municipality.
40 F.3d 312, 316 (9th Cir. 1994) (footnote omitted); see also
Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992).
In the alternative, Guevara alleges that the City is liable
because it ratified the municipal judge’s conduct. Because the
municipality did not have the power to control the municipal
judge’s actions, however, it also did not have the power to
ratify them. We, therefore, conclude that the district court
correctly dismissed Guevara’s wrongful-incarceration claim.2
Guevara’s remaining claims require no extended discussion.
Even if Guevara has alleged a constitutional violation arising
out of the video system’s misuse, she has presented no basis for
holding the City liable because she has not alleged that the
misuse arose out of a City custom or policy. Cf. Monell, 436
U.S. at 690-91. Even if the jail had a policy of staffing a lone
male jailer, as Guevara alleges, we held in Scott v. Moore, 114
2
On appeal, Guevara presents a number of other grounds
for holding the City liable for her alleged wrongful
incarceration, which she did not assert in the district court.
We will not address Guevara’s new arguments on appeal because we
conclude that no miscarriage of justice will occur by our failure
to consider them. See McDonald’s Corp. v. Watson, 69 F.3d 36, 44
(5th Cir. 1995).
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F.3d 51, 52 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc), that the Constitution does
not require jails that house female detainees either to staff
more than one jailer at a time or to staff a female jailer.
Finally, the City is not liable under § 1983 for the jail’s
policies regarding clothing, diet, and exercise because Guevara’s
averments do not demonstrate that her constitutional rights were
violated by these policies. Cf. Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99,
106-07 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding no Fourteenth or Eighth
Amendment violation when a detained parolee “was denied
visitation, telephone access, recreation, mail, legal materials,
sheets, and showers for a three-day period”). Consequently, the
district court did not err by dismissing these claims.
We also conclude that, under the facts of this case, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Guevara’s
motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. Guevara was
permitted to file an amended complaint, but failed to remedy her
pleading deficiencies. Furthermore, she did not seek leave to
file her second amended complaint in a timely manner. See Foman
v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of
Guevara’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) and the district court’s
denial of Guevara’s motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint.
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