United States v. Schellhaas ( 2001 )


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  •                 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _____________________
    No. 00-20601
    Summary Calendar
    _____________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    DAVID MICHAEL SCHELLHAAS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. H-99-CR-480-1
    _________________________________________________________________
    April 12, 2001
    Before JOLLY, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    David Schellhaas appeals his conviction and sentence for two
    counts of wire fraud and one count of engaging in a monetary
    transaction in criminally derived property.       See 18 U.S.C.
    §§   1343,   1957.   Schellhaas   argues   that   the   district   court
    reversibly erred, pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 608(b) and pursuant to
    the Constitution, in excluding for cross-examination of witness
    Steven King the evidence concerning the SEC complaint filed against
    King and his Internet company.      Schellhaas argues that the SEC
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    evidence was relevant to contradicting King’s testimony that he was
    not a savvy investor and that he could not afford to lose the
    amount of money at stake in the investment with Schellhaas.            He
    also contends that King could have been shading his trial testimony
    in order to avoid criminal liability for his conduct, presumably
    his conduct in the SEC matter.
    Schellhaas has not demonstrated abuse of discretion by the
    district court.    See United States v. Jensen, 
    41 F.3d 946
    , 957 95th
    Cir. 1994).     The SEC complaint was a civil matter, not criminal,
    involving allegations of fraud by King and his Internet business
    from the failure to disclose fully certain information.               The
    complaint resulted in a dismissal by the district court in Florida
    and a settlement between the parties in which King agreed to pay
    approximately    $300,000   in   disgorgement,   penalty,   and   interest
    without admitting or denying any of the allegations.          Under Rule
    608(b), the documents themselves were inadmissable.         The rule only
    permits discretionary inquiry into collateral matters concerning a
    witness’ truthfulness or untruthfulness.         See 
    Jensen, 41 F.3d at 957-58
    .   The SEC litigation resulted neither in findings of fact
    nor in admissions of fact from King about his business practices.
    Thus, the probative value of an inquiry into the collateral matter
    is marginal at best and could have resulted in distracting the
    jury’s attention from material factual matters to complicated, SEC
    2
    regulatory     matters.    The   district     court   did    not   abuse   its
    discretion.    See Thorn, 
    950 F.2d 980
    , 986 (5th Cir. 1992); see also
    United States v. Morrison, 
    98 F.3d 619
    , 628 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (no
    abuse of discretion in district court’s view that the mere filing
    of a complaint is not probative of a witness’ truthfulness).
    Schellhaas argues that the district court’s exclusion of the
    SEC   matter    violated   his   rights    under   due   process    and    the
    Confrontation Clause.      Schellhaas did not base his objections in
    the district court on constitutional grounds. Therefore, review is
    for plain error.    See United States v. Calverley, 
    37 F.3d 160
    , 162-
    64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).             No error, plain or otherwise,
    ensued.   Because the court did not abuse its discretion under the
    Federal Rules of Evidence, constitutional error was not implicated.
    See United States v. Thorn, 
    917 F.2d 170
    , 175-76 (5th Cir. 1990).
    A F F I R M E D.
    3