Esaw Lampkin v. Bobby Dean ( 2018 )


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  •      Case: 17-40107      Document: 00514431076         Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/16/2018
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 17-40107                              FILED
    April 16, 2018
    Lyle W. Cayce
    ESAW LAMPKIN,                                                                   Clerk
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    BOBBY DEAN; JOE CASSIN; DON LEACH; BRANDON T. WINN; KAREN
    REAM,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    USDC No. 6:15-CV-496
    Before DENNIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Esaw Lampkin, Texas prisoner # 1912325, moves for leave to proceed in
    forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the judgment dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     claims against the defendants. The district court denied IFP status
    upon certifying that Lampkin’s appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v.
    Taylor, 
    117 F.3d 197
    , 202 (5th Cir. 1997). We deny the motion to proceed IFP
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 17-40107    Document: 00514431076     Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/16/2018
    No. 17-40107
    and dismiss Lampkin’s appeal as frivolous. See Howard v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    ,
    220 (5th Cir. 1983); Baugh, 
    117 F.3d at
    202 & n.24.
    By moving in this court to proceed IFP, Lampkin challenges the district
    court’s certification that his appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh, 
    117 F.3d at 202
    . A good faith appeal is one that “involves legal points arguable on
    their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” Howard v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    , 220
    (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Lampkin’s cursory IFP motion fails to make the requisite showing. In
    fact, aside from flatly declaring that his claims are not frivolous, he offers no
    actual argument to that end. Lampkin’s failure to brief the IFP issue is the
    same as if he had not appealed the judgment at all. See Brinkmann v. Dallas
    County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 
    813 F.2d 744
    , 748 (5th Cir. 1987). As a result,
    he has waived any challenge to the district court’s IFP ruling and, thus, cannot
    show that the court’s certification was an abuse of its discretion. See Hughes
    v. Johnson, 
    191 F.3d 607
    , 612-13 (5th Cir. 1999); Carson v. Polley, 
    689 F.2d 562
    , 586 (5th Cir. 1982). And because Lampkin, by failing to brief the issue,
    does not rebut the finding that his appeal lacks arguable merit, we conclude
    that it is frivolous. See Baugh, 
    117 F.3d at
    202 & n.24; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
    The dismissal of this appeal as frivolous counts as a strike against
    Lampkin under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 
    103 F.3d 383
    ,
    385-87 (5th Cir. 1996). Lampkin has previously filed at least one other civil
    action that was also dismissed as frivolous, which counts as a second strike for
    purposes of § 1915(g). Lampkin is WARNED that if he accumulates three
    strikes, he will not be able to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed
    while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent
    danger of serious physical injury. See § 1915(g).
    2
    Case: 17-40107   Document: 00514431076   Page: 3   Date Filed: 04/16/2018
    No. 17-40107
    IFP MOTION DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS;
    APPELLANT WARNED.
    3