Kenneth Koenig v. Aetna Life Insurance Comp ( 2018 )


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  •      Case: 16-20674      Document: 00514639568         Page: 1    Date Filed: 09/12/2018
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 16-20674                            September 12, 2018
    Lyle W. Cayce
    NORTH CYPRESS MEDICAL CENTER OPERATING COMPANY,      Clerk
    LIMITED; NORTH CYPRESS MEDICAL CENTER OPERATING
    COMPANY GP, L.L.C.,
    Plaintiffs–Appellees Cross-Appellants
    v.
    AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant–Appellant Cross-Appellee
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:13-CV-359
    Before SMITH, WIENER, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    We previously remanded to allow the district court to explain its denial
    of attorney fees to NCMC. See N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co., Ltd v. Aetna
    Life Ins. Co., 
    898 F.3d 461
    , 485–86 (5th Cir. 2018). This limited remand rested
    on the rule that “[a] district court must explain its decision to deny fees.”
    Leipzig v. Principle Life Ins. Co., 481 F. App’x 865, 872 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 16-20674    Document: 00514639568     Page: 2   Date Filed: 09/12/2018
    No. 16-20674
    CenterPoint Energy Hous. Elec. LLC v. Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth., 
    436 F.3d 541
    , 550–51 (5th Cir. 2006)). The district court promptly responded.
    In its order on remand, the district court correctly noted “[i]t is the
    ERISA claim that gives rise to NCMC’s claim for attorneys’ fees.” N. Cypress
    Med. Ctr. Operating Co., Ltd v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 4:13–CV–359, slip op.
    at 1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2018) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1)). It then reasoned
    that because it dismissed NCMC’s ERISA claims—and because a jury found
    against NCMC on its only remaining claims—attorney fees under § 1132(g)(1)
    “would be inappropriate.” 
    Id. We have
    generally said a district court deciding whether to award fees
    under § 1132(g)(1) should consider the five factors articulated in Iron Workers
    Local No. 272 v. Bowen, 
    624 F.2d 1255
    , 1266 (5th Cir. 1980). See, e.g., Todd v.
    AIG Life Ins. Co., 
    47 F.3d 1448
    , 1458 (5th Cir. 1995). But the Supreme Court
    requires that a claimant “show ‘some degree of success on the merits’ before a
    court may award fees.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 
    560 U.S. 242
    ,
    255 (2010) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 
    463 U.S. 680
    , 694 (1983)). “A
    claimant does not satisfy that requirement by achieving trivial success on the
    merits or a purely procedural victory.” 
    Id. (cleaned up).
    The district court
    therefore did not abuse its discretion in concluding, as explained on remand,
    that attorney fees were not available to NCMC under ERISA because its only
    claims under that statute were dismissed.
    We AFFIRM.
    2