Cesar Alderete-Rubio v. Loretta Lynch , 623 F. App'x 173 ( 2015 )


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  •      Case: 14-60564       Document: 00513268849         Page: 1     Date Filed: 11/12/2015
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    No. 14-60564
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    Summary Calendar                         November 12, 2015
    Lyle W. Cayce
    CESAR ALDERETE-RUBIO,                                                               Clerk
    Petitioner
    v.
    LORETTA LYNCH, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent
    Petitions for Review of Orders of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    BIA No. A076 817 126
    Before BARKSDALE, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Cesar Alderete-Rubio, a native and citizen of Mexico, presents two
    petitions for review of the decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
    Regarding those petitions, he challenges: the denial of his applications for
    cancellation of removal and voluntary departure, pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
    §§ 1229b(b)(1) and 1229c(b), respectively; and the denial of his motion to reopen
    * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-60564     Document: 00513268849      Page: 2   Date Filed: 11/12/2015
    No. 14-60564
    (despite raising it in his second petition, he does not challenge the denial of his
    motion for reconsideration.)
    Alderete conceded removability.       We lack jurisdiction to review an
    immigration court’s discretionary denial of an application for cancellation of
    removal.   Sung v. Keisler, 
    505 F.3d 372
    , 377 (5th Cir. 2007); 8 U.S.C. §
    1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Similarly, we are barred from reviewing denials of voluntary
    departure. Sattani v. Holder, 
    749 F.3d 368
    , 372–73 (5th Cir. 2014); 8 U.S.C.
    §§ 1229c(f), 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). We are not precluded, however, from “review[ing]
    constitutional claims and questions of law associated with [a] claim for
    discretionary relief”. Garcia-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 
    491 F.3d 284
    , 287 (5th
    Cir. 2007); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Therefore, the relevant inquiry is whether
    Alderete presents a constitutional claim or question of law sufficient to confer
    jurisdiction.
    Alderete’s contention the immigration judge (IJ) and BIA failed to
    consider all the factors in support of cancellation of removal is neither a
    constitutional claim nor question of law establishing jurisdiction. See 
    Sung, 505 F.3d at 377
    ; see also 
    Sattani, 749 F.3d at 372
    (claim that the IJ did not
    consider all of the hardship factors “falls squarely within the jurisdictional
    bar”). Because there is no constitutionally protected interest in obtaining
    discretionary relief in the form of cancellation of removal, denial of such relief
    cannot form the basis of a constitutional claim. See 
    Sattani, 749 F.3d at 372
    ;
    Assaad v. Ashcroft, 
    378 F.3d 471
    , 475 (5th Cir. 2004) (“the failure to receive
    relief that is purely discretionary in nature does not amount” to a violation of
    the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause).
    Along that line, Alderete fails to present any constitutional or legal
    questions concerning the denial of his application for voluntary departure.
    Alderete challenges the IJ’s determination he would not comply with an order
    2
    Case: 14-60564     Document: 00513268849     Page: 3    Date Filed: 11/12/2015
    No. 14-60564
    of voluntary departure based on his extensive history of illegal reentries, and
    contends the IJ failed to consider factors in his favor. Mere challenges to the
    IJ’s exercise of discretion, however, are not constitutional or legal questions.
    See 
    Sattani, 749 F.3d at 373
    . Furthermore, to the extent Alderete presents a
    due-process challenge, an alien has no liberty interest, protected by the Fifth
    Amendment’s due-process clause, in discretionary relief.         See 
    id. at 372;
    Assaad, 378 F.3d at 475
    .
    Alderete maintains the BIA abused its discretion by failing to grant his
    motion to reopen his proceedings to consider new evidence. “[W]here a final
    order of removal is shielded from judicial review by a provision in § 1252(a)(2),
    so, too, is [the] refusal to reopen that order.” 
    Assaad, 378 F.3d at 474
    (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Rodriguez v. Ashcroft, 
    253 F.3d 797
    , 799–800 (5th Cir. 2001) (provision prohibiting review of discretionary
    decisions also precludes review of motion to reopen on the same grounds). For
    the reasons stated, Alderete does not raise any constitutional claims or
    questions of law arising from the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen,
    therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review that decision. See 
    Assaad, 378 F.3d at 474
    . Finally, and as 
    noted supra
    , Alderete does not contest the BIA’s denial of
    his motion to reconsider; therefore, he has waived any challenge to that ruling.
    See Thuri v. Ashcroft, 
    380 F.3d 788
    , 793 (5th Cir. 2004).
    PETITIONS DISMISSED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-60564

Citation Numbers: 623 F. App'x 173

Judges: Barksdale, Dennis, Per Curiam, Southwick

Filed Date: 11/12/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024