In re: Deepwater Horizon ( 2015 )


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  •      Case: 14-31402   Document: 00513301016   Page: 1   Date Filed: 12/09/2015
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 14-31402                 December 9, 2015
    c/w No. 15-30023
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    IN RE: DEEPWATER HORIZON
    ______________________________________
    LAKE EUGENIE LAND & DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED; ET AL
    Plaintiffs
    v.
    BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INCORPORATED; BP AMERICA
    PRODUCTION COMPANY; BP, P.L.C.,
    Defendants - Appellees
    v.
    KEVIN S. SMITH; SOLOMON J. FLEISCHMAN,
    Claimants - Appellants
    IN RE: DEEPWATER HORIZON
    ______________________________________
    LAKE EUGENIE LAND & DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED; et al,
    Plaintiffs
    v.
    BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INCORPORATED; BP AMERICA
    PRODUCTION COMPANY; BP, P.L.C.,
    Defendants - Appellees
    Case: 14-31402      Document: 00513301016         Page: 2    Date Filed: 12/09/2015
    No. 14-31402 cons/w No. 15-30023
    v.
    JOHN C. KELLY,
    Claimant - Appellant
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:10-MD-2179
    USDC No. 2:12-CV-970
    Before JOLLY, HAYNES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    These parallel appeals, consolidated for the purpose of oral argument,
    and now for disposition, arise from the class-action settlement program for civil
    claims arising from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Claimants-Appellants
    Kevin S. Smith, Solomon J. Fleischman, and John C. Kelly (collectively,
    “Claimants”) are all co-owners of Fleischman & Garcia Architects (“Fleischman
    & Garcia”).      We conclude that the district court should have granted
    discretionary review of the issue here and therefore VACATE the contrary
    orders and REMAND these cases to the district court.
    I. Background
    This is the most recent case in a series of decisions considering the
    Economic and Property Damages Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”)
    between Defendants-Appellees BP Exploration & Production, Inc., BP America
    Production Co., and BP, PLC (collectively, “BP”), and Plaintiffs, the certified
    Economic and Property Damages Class, in connection with the Deepwater
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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    Horizon oil spill of April 20, 2010. The district court approved the Agreement
    on December 21, 2012, and the Court Supervised Settlement Program (the
    “Settlement Program”) was set up to administer the Agreement and
    compensate parties with economic losses caused by the oil spill. The Economic
    Loss and Property Damages Class consists of individuals and entities defined
    by geographic bounds and the nature of their loss or damage. To satisfy the
    loss or damage requirements, a claimant must have a claim that falls within
    one of the damage categories set out in the Agreement and is not subject to any
    of the exclusions set out in Section 2 of the Agreement. The damage categories
    include, inter alia, an Economic Damage Category, which encompasses both
    individual and business claims for “[l]oss of income, earnings or profits suffered
    by Natural Persons or Entities as a result of the Deepwater Horizon Incident.”
    The claims process includes the ability to seek discretionary review by the
    district court.
    Claimants are each officers and part owners of Fleischman & Garcia, an
    architectural firm. In January 2013, Claimants each submitted individual
    economic loss (“IEL”) claims to the Settlement Program.          The Agreement
    defines an Individual Claimant who may assert an IEL claim as:
    [A] Natural Person who is an Economic Class Member
    alleging Economic Damage arising out of, due to,
    resulting from, or relating in any way to, directly or
    indirectly, the Deepwater Horizon Incident with a
    Claim in addition to or other than a Claim for
    Economic Damage related to such Natural Person’s
    sole proprietorship business or other self-employment
    as reflected on Schedule C, D or E of a federal income
    tax return.
    Fleischman, as the authorized representative of Fleischman & Garcia,
    also submitted a business economic loss (“BEL”) claim for the corporation’s
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    damages resulting from the oil spill.       The Agreement defines a Business
    Claimant who may assert a BEL claim as:
    [A]n Entity, or a self-employed Natural Person who
    filed a Form 1040 Schedule C, E or F, which or who is
    an Economic Class Member claiming Economic
    Damage allegedly arising out of, due to, resulting
    from, or relating in any way to, directly or indirectly,
    the Deepwater Horizon Incident.
    The Settlement Program generated Accountants’ Worksheets for each of
    the Claimant’s IEL claims, and although the worksheets concluded that
    Claimants passed the applicable causation and compensation tests under the
    IEL Framework, the worksheets indicated that each of the claims would be
    denied. Each Claimant thereafter received a denial notice stating:
    Our records reflect that you submitted an Economic
    Loss claim for your business in addition to this
    Individual Economic Loss claim. You cannot recover
    employment losses from a job at a business for which
    you have submitted an Economic Loss Claim.
    After exhausting preliminary steps, the Claimants appealed to an Appeal
    Panel established by the Agreement, which denied relief. Claimants then
    requested discretionary review of the Appeal Panels’ decisions by the district
    court, which the district court denied. Claimants now appeal the district
    court’s denial of their requests for discretionary review.
    II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
    The district court had admiralty and maritime jurisdiction over the
    underlying class action and the Agreement, see U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2; 28
    U.S.C. § 1333; 33 U.S.C. § 2717(b); 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b); 46 U.S.C. § 30101, and
    expressly retained jurisdiction over the implementation of the Agreement, see
    Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    511 U.S. 375
    , 381–82 (1994).
    This court has jurisdiction over these appeals under the collateral-order
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    doctrine. 1   In re Deepwater Horizon, 
    785 F.3d 1003
    , 1009 (5th Cir. 2015)
    (“Deepwater Horizon IV”) (quoting Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C.,
    
    566 F.3d 164
    , 171 (5th Cir. 2009)). The district court’s refusal to review the
    Appeal Panels’ denials of Claimants’ IEL claims under the Agreement had the
    effect of conclusively determining that each Claimant was not entitled to any
    recovery; this question is separate from the merits of BP’s liability for the oil
    spill; and the district court’s denial of discretionary review is final and there is
    no provision for further review under the Agreement. Therefore, the district
    court’s orders denying discretionary review meet the requirements of the
    collateral order doctrine. We review the district court’s denial of discretionary
    review for abuse of discretion. Deepwater Horizon 
    IV, 785 F.3d at 1011
    (citing
    Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 
    515 U.S. 277
    , 289–90 (1995)).
    III. Discussion
    Claimants allege that the Agreement unambiguously mandates that
    Claimants’ lost earnings for their work as officers of Fleischman & Garcia be
    compensated under the IEL Framework, and that nothing in the Agreement
    bars owners or officers of BEL claimants from the IEL claims process. 2 In the
    alternative, assuming arguendo that they are not permitted to receive funds
    that would constitute a “double recovery,” Claimants argue that permitting
    1 Just over one week after Claimants filed their briefs in these cases, a panel of this
    court settled the question whether this court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the district
    court’s denials of discretionary review over claims made under the Agreement. See In re
    Deepwater Horizon, 
    785 F.3d 1003
    (5th Cir. 2015) (“Deepwater Horizon IV”); In re Deepwater
    Horizon, 
    785 F.3d 986
    (5th Cir. 2015) (“Deepwater Horizon V”).
    2  BP argues that Claimants waived this argument by failing to raise it before the
    district court in their requests for discretionary review. Because we conclude that the district
    abused its discretion in denying Claimants’ requests for discretionary review and remand
    these cases for the district court’s consideration of Claimants’ IEL claims, we decline to
    address BP’s waiver argument.
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    them to recover at least a portion of their IEL claims here would not result in
    a double recovery.
    The Agreement itself does not provide guidance on the factors to consider
    in determining whether to grant discretionary review. Analogizing to other
    discretionary review situations, we conclude that the exercise of discretion
    should be guided by its purpose. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Midland Credit Mgmt.,
    
    585 F.3d 890
    , 894 (5th Cir. 2009) (although Class Action Fairness Act does not
    provide guidance on exercise of discretion, court concluded purpose of
    interlocutory appeal was to develop law in this area). The Agreement was
    drafted against a backdrop of anticipated numerous claims presenting
    potentially recurring issues. We conclude that the issues in this case have and
    will come up repeatedly, and the district court has not previously ruled on
    whether owners/officers of a business that has successfully made a claim under
    the Agreement’s BEL framework can also recover their lost W-2 wages under
    the IEL framework. The Appeal Panels are split on this question.
    The Appeal Panels that reviewed Claimants’ IEL claims each concluded
    that because the Agreement treats owner/officer compensation as a fixed cost
    under the BEL framework, IEL claims by the owners or officers of a business
    that has received compensation under the BEL framework are barred. But the
    record indicates that at the time the district court denied Claimants’ requests
    for discretionary review, other Appeal Panels had also reached the opposite
    conclusion. Claimants have included in the record at least four decisions by
    other Appeal Panels concluding that the Settlement Agreement draws no
    distinction between owners or officers of a business and other employees who
    earn wages reported on a Form W-2, and that no provision in the Agreement
    precludes officers/owners from pursuing an IEL claim if they otherwise qualify
    as a class member. One of these Appeal Panel decisions acknowledges the
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    many conflicting decisions generated by this question. 3 The presence of this
    “split” among the Appeal Panels indicates that this issue has arisen in a
    number of claims and the resolution of the question will substantially impact
    the administration of the Agreement. See, e.g., In re Deepwater Horizon, 
    793 F.3d 479
    , 490–91 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that prior cases considering
    accounting methods used to make profit calculations or the right to appeal
    under the Agreement’s Final Rules involved issues that “would unquestionably
    and substantially impact the judicially-managed administrative framework”).
    Further, as evidenced by the Appeal Panels’ decisions reaching varying
    conclusions about the proper interpretation of the Agreement, it is apparent
    that there is substantial ground for difference of opinion with respect to this
    question. Accordingly, we conclude that the question of contract interpretation
    presented in these appeals would be best addressed first by the district court
    charged with administering the Agreement. We thus conclude that the district
    court should have granted discretionary review to address this question.
    IV. Conclusion
    We find that the district court abused its discretion in declining to grant
    discretionary review in these cases. We therefore VACATE the district court’s
    order denying discretionary review and REMAND these cases to the district
    court for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of the court.
    3In fact, during oral argument, Claimants’ counsel represented to the court that over
    thirty Appeal Panels have heard appeals on this issue, and that discretionary review is
    pending in some of those cases awaiting this court’s decision.
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