Tommy Kelley v. Angie Creasy ( 2019 )


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  •      Case: 18-50701      Document: 00515045256         Page: 1    Date Filed: 07/23/2019
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 18-50701                             FILED
    Summary Calendar                       July 23, 2019
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    TOMMY JOE KELLEY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    ANGIE CREASY; JUDGE JULIE KOCUREK,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:18-CV-143
    Before KING, SOUTHWICK, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Tommy Joe Kelley, Texas prisoner # 1768715, appeals the district court’s
    dismissal of his “Formal Complaint,” which the district court construed as a
    petition for a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, and of his
    postjudgment “Application for Novodamus.”               The district court dismissed
    Kelley’s mandamus petition and postjudgment motion without prejudice for
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 18-50701      Document: 00515045256     Page: 2   Date Filed: 07/23/2019
    No. 18-50701
    lack of jurisdiction.    We review such dismissals de novo.          See Lane v.
    Halliburton, 
    529 F.3d 548
    , 557 (5th Cir. 2008).
    With the benefit of liberal construction, we conclude that Kelley contends
    the district court erred in dismissing his mandamus petition and postjudgment
    motion because the court had jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the state
    officers’ alleged violations of the United States Constitution. To the extent
    Kelley sought to have the district court prosecute the state officers, the district
    court was correct that Kelley does not have a constitutional right to have an
    individual criminally prosecuted. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 
    410 U.S. 614
    ,
    619 (1973). To the extent Kelley sought to have the district court direct the
    state courts to investigate his prosecutorial misconduct allegations and hold a
    hearing on his applications for postconviction relief, the district court correctly
    determined that it lacked the authority to do so. See Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb
    County Super. Ct., 
    474 F.2d 1275
    , 1276 (5th Cir. 1973). To the extent Kelley
    sought to challenge the validity of his state convictions and obtain federal
    habeas relief, the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction
    to entertain an unauthorized successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application. See 28
    U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); Strickland v. Thaler, 
    701 F.3d 171
    , 174 (5th Cir. 2012).
    Finally, Kelley has abandoned any argument that the district court erred in
    failing to construe his complaint as a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
    § 1983. See Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
    Kelley’s motion for leave to file an “Application for Writ of Supervisory
    Control,” which we have construed as a supplemental appellate brief, is
    GRANTED. Because Kelley has not shown that the district court erred in
    dismissing his mandamus petition and postjudgment motion, however, the
    district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
    2