Eddie Brown v. Theressia Lyons , 690 F. App'x 872 ( 2017 )


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  •      Case: 16-60538      Document: 00514036194         Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/16/2017
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 16-60538                                 FILED
    June 16, 2017
    EDDIE JOSEPH BROWN,                                                           Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    THERESSIA LYONS; DAWN STOUGH; ROBERT MCCORMICK; MITCH
    OWEN; DIANNE HERMAN-ELLIS; GEORGE HUFFMAN,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 1:16-CV-145
    Before CLEMENT, PRADO, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Eddie Joseph Brown, Mississippi prisoner # 87813, moves for leave to
    proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the dismissal of his pro se civil
    rights lawsuit filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2)-(3), and 1986.
    Applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the district court dismissed Brown’s suit
    for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. The district court
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 16-60538    Document: 00514036194     Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/16/2017
    No. 16-60538
    further denied Brown leave to proceed IFP on appeal, certifying that this
    appeal was not taken in good faith under § 1915(a)(3).
    By moving to proceed IFP in this court, Brown is challenging the district
    court’s certification that his appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v.
    Taylor, 
    117 F.3d 197
    , 202 (5th Cir. 1997). “When [a] prisoner opts to challenge
    the certification decision, the [IFP] motion must be directed solely to the trial
    court’s reasons for the certification decision.” 
    Id. In evaluating
    whether the
    appeal is taken in good faith, the relevant inquiry is “whether the appeal
    involves legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).”
    Howard v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    , 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks
    and citation omitted).    “[W]here the merits are so intertwined with the
    certification decision as to constitute the same issue,” we may deny the IFP
    motion and dismiss the appeal sua sponte if it is frivolous. 
    Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202
    & n.24; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
    In the brief supporting his IFP motion, Brown describes his suit as
    asserting that the defendants, which include his defense counsel and the
    prosecutors involved in his 2012 Mississippi state jury trial and conviction,
    conspired to deprive him of his liberty without due process by falsely entering
    an indictment when in fact no grand jury was meeting at the time the
    indictment was handed down. Brown acknowledges that the district court
    dismissed his case with prejudice because his claims, if successful, would
    necessarily imply the invalidity of his still-valid 2012 conviction. Brown fails,
    however, to assert any substantive challenge to this reasoning by the district
    court, which also serves as the basis for its lack-of-good-faith certification.
    Brown has thus failed to brief, and thereby abandoned, any challenge to the
    district court’s certification that his appeal is not taken in good faith. See
    2
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    No. 16-60538
    
    Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202
    ; Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993)
    (holding that even pro se arguments must be briefed to be preserved).
    Brown’s sole argument in support of his IFP motion is that the district
    court was precluded from dismissing his action sua sponte prior to service of
    process because he had paid a partial filing fee. However, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
    expressly provides that, “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion
    thereof, that may have been paid,” a complaint filed by a prisoner shall be
    dismissed by the district court “at any time” upon its determination that,
    among other things, the action fails to state a claim. Brown’s argument on this
    point thus clearly lacks merit and does not constitute a nonfrivolous issue for
    appeal. See 
    Howard, 707 F.2d at 220
    .
    In light of the foregoing, the district court did not err in denying Brown’s
    IFP motion, since his appeal does not involve legal points arguable on their
    merits and is thus not taken in good faith. See 
    id. at 219-20.
    Accordingly,
    Brown’s IFP motion is DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED AS
    FRIVOLOUS. See 
    Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202
    & n.24; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. The
    dismissal of the complaint by the district court for failure to state a claim and
    the dismissal of this appeal as frivolous both count as strikes for purposes of
    § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 
    103 F.3d 383
    , 388 (5th Cir. 1996).
    Brown is WARNED that, if he accumulates three strikes, he will not be allowed
    to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal while he is incarcerated or detained
    in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
    See § 1915(g).
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-60538

Citation Numbers: 690 F. App'x 872

Judges: Clement, Higginson, Per Curiam, Prado

Filed Date: 6/16/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024