U.S. v. Williams ( 1993 )


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  •                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    __________________
    No. 92-7435
    Summary Calendar
    __________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    FRANKIE B. WILLIAMS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ______________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Mississippi
    ______________________________________________
    June 4, 1993
    (                  )
    Before GARWOOD, JONES and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
    GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
    Appellant, Frankie B. Williams (Williams), was convicted of
    one count of making false declarations before a grand jury in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623.           The district court sentenced
    Williams to a term of imprisonment of twelve months, a three-year
    term of supervised release, and imposed a $3000 fine and a $50
    assessment.   Williams now appeals her conviction.
    Facts and Proceedings Below
    During 1991, the federal grand jury for the Northern District
    of Mississippi was engaged in an investigation of a drug conspiracy
    involving the Rodgerick Williams drug organization (Organization)
    based in Greenville, Mississippi.               The grand jury heard testimony
    that the Organization supplied over sixty-five pounds of cocaine to
    Connie Green (Green) who distributed it in the Lake Village,
    Arkansas area with the assistance of Williams and her daughter
    Audrey Williams, who were both residents of Lake Village, Arkansas.
    Testimony further established that after Green was incarcerated,
    Williams    and   her    daughter     took       over     the    drug   distribution
    operation.
    Having been identified as a co-conspirator with knowledge of
    the Organization, Williams was subpoenaed to appear in Oxford,
    Mississippi before the federal grand jury.                      Williams was served
    with the subpoena on October 3, 1991, and an attachment to the
    subpoena advised Williams of her rights before the grand jury,
    including her right to counsel.                On October 18, 1991, Williams
    testified    before     the   grand   jury.          At    the    beginning    of   her
    testimony, Assistant United States Attorney Charles W. Spillers
    (Spillers)    informed        her   that       she   was    the     subject    of   an
    investigation, that she did not have to answer any questions or
    make any statements if the answer might tend to incriminate her,
    and that she could be prosecuted for perjury for knowingly making
    false statements.       Williams acknowledged that she understood her
    rights.    Spillers questioned Williams about Al Jackson (Jackson),
    a major leader in the Organization and one of the principal targets
    of the investigation.         She denied that Jackson had ever given her
    cocaine or arranged for cocaine to be delivered to her.                       She also
    2
    denied that she had ever distributed cocaine.1    At the conclusion
    1
    The specific parts of her testimony that served as the basis
    for her indictment were:
    "Q.    Have you ever sold cocaine?
    A.     No.
    Q.   Have you ever distributed or given anyone any
    cocaine?
    A.     (Witness shakes haed [sic] in the negative.)
    Q.     Ma'am?
    A.     No.
    Q.     Have you ever used cocaine?
    A.     No, sir.
    . . . .
    Q.   When you were living in a mobile home or house did
    you or anyone else sell cocaine out of that residence
    on April 21, 1990 at about 6:25 p.m., ma'am?
    A.     I didn't.
    Q.     Well, did anyone else that you know of?
    A.   Well, looking I can't say what went on.     I don't
    be home all the time.
    Q.   I am not asking you what you don't know. I am
    asking you whether you know if anybody else did?
    A.     No, no, no.
    Q.   On June 9, 1990 at about 11:40 p.m., did you or
    your daughter or anyone else sell cocaine out of your
    residence in the 400 block of Lee Street?
    A.     What for?   I don't be at home that time of night.
    Q.     Your answer is no?
    A.    No.
    . . . .
    3
    of her testimony, Williams was given an opportunity to avoid
    prosecution for perjury by amending or correcting her testimony,
    but she declined to do so.
    Prior to Williams's grand jury appearance, she and others had
    been the targets of an investigation by the Southeast Arkansas
    Regional Drug Task Force of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
    and the Arkansas State Police.    On October 2, 1991, an Arkansas
    bill of information was filed with, and a bench warrant issued by,
    the Circuit Court of Chicot, Arkansas for the arrest of Williams on
    four counts of delivery of a controlled substance contrary to
    Arkansas law. Williams was not arrested or served with the warrant
    or the information until October 24, 1991.
    Williams was indicted on December 12, 1991, for knowingly
    making a false material declaration in front of a federal grand
    jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623.       Prior to trial, the
    district court denied Williams's motions to quash the grand jury
    Q.   On or about September 25, 1990, at about 11:04
    p.m., did you or your daughter or anyone else sell
    cocaine from your residence on Lee Street?
    A.   No.
    Q.   Ma'am?
    A.   No.
    Q.   Is it your sworn testimony under oath today that
    neither you nor your daughter sold cocaine on any of
    the dates I asked you about?
    A.   Well, I can testify for myself.
    Q.   That you didn't?
    A.   I didn't."
    4
    indictment and to suppress evidence as being obtained in violation
    of her Sixth Amendment right to counsel.                 The trial was conducted
    on March 2 and 3, 1992, during which the prosecution presented
    evidence of the materiality of Williams's statements                  through the
    testimony of, among others, the foreman of the grand jury, Charles
    Frederick (Frederick), and Spillers.              Frederick testified that the
    grand   jury    was   investigating       the   Organization     in   Greenville,
    Mississippi, that Williams had been identified as being associated
    with the Organization, and that the grand jury wanted to determine
    which members of the Organization were supplying Williams with
    cocaine.     Frederick further testified that he did not think that
    Williams's     testimonySQwhereby         she   denied    any   involvement   with
    cocaineSQinfluenced         the   grand    jury    investigation.        Spillers
    testified that other grand jury witnesses had indicated that
    Williams had associated with two major figures in the Organization,
    Danny Williams and Jackson.           Spillers explained that if Williams
    had admitted selling cocaine, then she could be asked to identify
    her drug sources and may have been able to serve as another witness
    in the criminal case against Danny Williams, Jackson, and other
    members of the Organization.
    At    trial,     the   defense   during      cross-examination      elicited
    testimony from Clarence Cunningham, a prosecution witness, that he
    had been subpoenaed by the government, had been told that he had to
    go to court, and that he was scared not to because of threats to
    his life.      On redirect, the government asked if he knew where the
    threats came from.          Cunningham responded that he was threatened
    over the telephone and that he could not identify the voice.                   The
    5
    defense moved to strike the answer as being hearsay and because
    Cunningham could not authenticate the telephone conversation.   The
    district court overruled the objection.
    Williams was found guilty of the one charge of perjury.
    Subsequently, the district court denied Williams's motions in
    arrest of judgment and for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding
    the verdict of the jury.       The district court then sentenced
    Williams to a term of imprisonment of twelve months, a three-year
    term of supervised release, and imposed a $3000 fine and a $50
    assessment.   Williams now appeals her conviction.
    Discussion
    I.   The Grand Jury's Jurisdiction
    Williams first argues that her perjury conviction must be
    reversed because the grand jury exceeded its jurisdictional and
    investigatory authority by making inquiries into her activities in
    Arkansas. This argument was raised before this Court by Williams's
    daughter and was rejected.   United States v. Williams, No. 92-7524
    (5th Cir. March 4, 1993) (unpublished).   Williams points out that
    a false statement made before a grand jury acting beyond its
    authority is not perjury.    Brown v. United States, 
    245 F.2d 549
    ,
    554-55 (8th Cir. 1957).   However, as noted by the Williams panel,
    in the Brown case the appellant was convicted in Nebraska for
    perjury before the Nebraska grand jury concerning false statements
    he made regarding activities in Missouri.   Under the facts there,
    the testimony was irrelevant to possible indictment of anyone for
    an offense committed, in whole or in part, in Nebraska.     
    Id. at 554.
      Here, "[t]he foreman of the grand jury connected Williams's
    6
    appearance in front of the grand jury to the investigation of the
    Mississippi-based Rod Williams Organization, and established that
    the scope of the grand jury's investigation included activities in
    Mississippi as well as Arkansas."           Williams, slip op. at 7.        A
    grand jury's investigation into a conspiracy is not limited to the
    district where the grand jury is located.         See Matter of Grand Jury
    Proceedings: Marc Rich & Co., A. G. v. United States, 
    707 F.2d 663
    ,
    667 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 
    103 S. Ct. 3555
    (1983); United States
    v. Antill, 
    601 F.2d 1049
    , 1050-51 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
    Phillips, 
    540 F.2d 319
    , 328 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 
    97 S. Ct. 530
    (1976); United States v. Girgenti, 
    197 F.2d 218
    , 219 (3rd Cir.
    1952).     Since the foreman had sufficiently established that the
    grand jury in its questioning of Williams was investigating a drug
    conspiracy that took place partially in Mississippi, jurisdiction
    was proper.
    II.   Materiality
    In   a   similar   vein,   Williams   argues   that   her   grand   jury
    testimony concerning her activities in Arkansas was immaterial to
    the grand jury's investigation in Mississippi and therefore her
    perjury conviction must be reversed.           To convict for perjury the
    government must prove that statements made by the defendant were
    false, material, and not believed by the defendant to be true.
    United States v. Abroms, 
    947 F.2d 1241
    , 1245 (5th Cir. 1991).
    Materiality is a legal issue that is decided by the district court
    and is reviewed on appeal de novo.             
    Id. at 1246.
      The test for
    materiality     is   "'whether   the   false    testimony   was   capable   of
    influencing the tribunal on the issue before it.'"            United States
    7
    v. Salinas, 
    923 F.2d 339
    , 341 (5th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in Salinas)
    (quoting United States v. Giarratano, 
    622 F.2d 153
    , 156 (5th Cir.
    1980)).   Materiality need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
    
    Abroms, 947 F.2d at 1246-47
    .
    Williams argues that the false statements were not material to
    the grand jury investigation because they related only to Arkansas.
    She offers as proof of this assertion the testimony of grand jury
    foreman Frederick who stated that he did not think that Williams's
    false answers influenced the grand jury's investigation.2 However,
    he also testified that Williams had been identified to the grand
    jury as   being    associated   with       the   Organization   and   that   the
    questions asked of Williams concerning whether she sold drugs were
    important because "we wanted to get to the bottom of the drug
    organization or get to the source of where the drugs were coming
    from that was being dispensed."          Frederick further testified that
    the grand jury was interested specifically in Williams's testimony
    as to whom she was receiving the cocaine from; and if she had
    admitted to sales of cocaine the grand jury would have been
    interested in her sources.
    False statements "need not be material to any particular
    issue, but   may    be   material   to     collateral   matters   that   might
    influence the court or the jury in the decision of the questions
    before the tribunal."     United States v. Damato, 
    554 F.2d 1371
    , 1373
    2
    Williams also points out that the grand jury indictment
    against her did not state why or how her false statements were
    material to the investigation. However, this Court is not
    limited to considering the grand jury's indictment in order to
    prove the scope of the investigation and thereby the materiality
    of the witness's statements. 
    Abroms, 947 F.2d at 1248
    .
    8
    (5th Cir. 1977).3    Here, if Williams had answered truthfully
    concerning whether she distributed cocaine, then the grand jury
    would have been able to ask more pertinent questions concerning
    from whom Williams (who had been identified to the grand jury as
    associated with the Organization) had received the cocaine; and if
    someone in the Organization was a source for her cocaine, her
    knowledge of the Organization itself.     This testimony had the
    legitimate potential to lead to further evidence concerning the
    known targets of the investigation and possible other persons that
    the grand jury was not yet aware of.4    In light of the lawfully
    broad scope of this investigation, Williams's testimony was capable
    of influencing the grand jury.
    3
    It is not determinative that Frederick testified that he did
    not think the grand jury was influenced by Williams's testimony.
    As this Court has recognized, "the false statement need not
    actually affect the tribunal's decision; it need only be capable
    of affecting the tribunal's decision." 
    Salinas, 923 F.2d at 341
    .
    4
    As noted by the Williams panel:
    "A transcript of Williams's statements in front of
    the grand jury and the foreman's testimony that the
    grand jury's objective was to investigate the Rod
    Williams Organization is . . . sufficient to
    demonstrate materiality. The foreman explained that
    the grand jury received information indicating that
    Williams's source was the Rod Williams Organization.
    In the context of the investigation of the Rod Williams
    Organization it is clear that truthful answers might
    have allowed the grand jury to ask more probing
    questions about Williams's knowledge of the Rod
    Williams Organization and the source of her drugs.
    Truthful answers to these questions might have enabled
    the grand jury to carry out its charge more
    efficiently, effectively, and extensively." Williams,
    slip op. at 6.
    9
    III.    Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
    Williams contends that she was questioned by the grand jury in
    violation of her Sixth Amendment right to counsel because Spillers
    did not tell her prior to her grand jury testimony of her right to
    counsel, nor did he mention the possibility of use immunity for her
    testimony.5     She argues that Spillers was required to make such
    statements because a prior bill of information charging a violation
    of Arkansas law had been filed against her, so that her Sixth
    Amendment right to counsel had attached and her interrogation by
    the grand jury was in violation of that right.
    The   right   to   counsel   attaches   upon    the   "initiation   of
    adversary judicial criminal proceedings."             Kirby v. Illinois, 
    92 S. Ct. 1877
    , 1882 (1972); Daigre v. Maggio, 
    705 F.2d 786
    , 788 (5th
    Cir. 1983).     This Court has explained that the Kirby court viewed
    the initiation of such proceedings to occur "'whether by way of
    formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
    arraignment.'" 
    Daigre, 705 F.2d at 788
    (quoting 
    Kirby, 92 S. Ct. at 1882
    ).   A bill of information was filed in Arkansas state court on
    October 2, 1991, accusing Williams of two separate counts of
    5
    An attachment to the Subpoena that Williams received stated
    that "[y]ou may consult with an attorney before testifying; you
    may have an attorney outside the jury room, and if you desire,
    you will be afforded a reasonable opportunity to step outside the
    grand jury room to consult with an attorney before answering any
    question." It also informed her that she was "a suspect in [the]
    investigation," and that "you will be expected to answer all
    questions asked of you, except to the extent that a truthful
    answer to a question would tend to incriminate you." Spillers
    also informed her at the beginning of her testimony, "you are the
    subject of an investigation, and that if you . . . are asked any
    question for which the answer may tend to incriminate you then
    you need not answer."
    10
    delivery of a controlled substance in violation of Arkansas law.6
    The filing of the bill of information in the Arkansas state court
    certainly triggered her right to counsel in the Arkansas state
    court proceedings.      
    Kirby, supra
    .    However, this filing did not
    trigger her right to counsel concerning her October 18, 1991
    appearance before the federal grand jury in Mississippi.
    The   initiation   of   adversary   criminal   proceedings   for    an
    offense causes the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to attach for
    that offense.    United States v. Carpenter, 
    963 F.2d 736
    , 739 (5th
    Cir. 1992) (noting that "the Sixth Amendment only applies to the
    specific offense with which the suspect has been charged").             Only
    under extremely narrow circumstances will the Sixth Amendment right
    to counsel also attach to other offenses.           
    Id. at 740;
    United
    States v. Cooper, 
    949 F.2d 737
    (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
    112 S. Ct. 2945
    (1992).      In Cooper, the defendant        was arrested and
    charged for the state offense of robbery, and his car seized as an
    instrument in the crime. An inventory search of the car's contents
    revealed a sawed-off shotgun in the trunk.       After counsel had been
    appointed for the defendant in the state case, a federal agent
    questioned him about both the sawed-off shotgun and the state
    offense.    He   was   subsequently   charged   under   federal   law    for
    unlawful possession of an unregistered weapon, the shotgun.             The
    defendant's statements in the interview with the federal agent
    6
    Williams was asked about the underlying facts concerning
    these two counts during her Mississippi grand jury appearance on
    October 18, 1991. Her false answers concerning these facts
    served as a partial basis for her perjury indictment. However,
    there is no evidence that the grand jury was aware of the prior
    bill of information filed in Arkansas.
    11
    concerning the shotgun, but not the state offense, were used in his
    federal trial (but not in his state trial).            The defendant argued
    that all of his statements to the federal agent should have been
    suppressed    because    the   federal    offense   was    so   "inextricably
    intertwined" with the state offense that his right to counsel for
    the state charge also attached to the federal offense.            
    Id. at 743.
    We acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel might
    well attach to a charge that "was extremely closely related to
    pending . . . charges," at least where the charges concerned "the
    same" type of crime, "victim, residence, time span, and sovereign."
    
    Id. at 744
    (emphasis added).        However, such was not the case in
    Cooper, because "the federal and state crimes concern different
    conduct,     although,    efficiently      for   the      governments,   both
    prosecutions could use much of the same evidence."              Id.7
    Here, Williams was also charged with two different offenses:
    distributing a controlled substance and perjury.                Williams was
    never charged by the federal authorities for her part in the drug
    conspiracy, but only for perjuring herself before the grand jury.
    These charges, brought by different sovereigns and concerning
    7
    We also held in Cooper that the defendant's Sixth Amendment
    right to counsel in the federal trial was not violated because
    "[e]ven assuming the federal agent erred when he questioned
    Cooper about the state offense, that error is harmless because,
    as the government points out, it never introduced the statement"
    concerning the state offense at the federal trial. 
    Id. at 743.
    The issue here is not whether Williams's grand jury testimony
    could be used in the Arkansas state case where adversary
    proceedings had commenced. And, there is no evidence that
    federal charges have ever been initiated against Williams for the
    drug transactions she was questioned about. Indeed, she made no
    damaging admissions concerning drug offenses before the grand
    jury since all of her answers denied culpability.
    12
    different conduct, are not "extremely closely related." Williams's
    Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated.
    IV.   Hearsay Objection
    Finally, Williams argues that the district court erred when it
    overruled    her   objection    to   prosecution-witness     Cunningham's
    testimony that an unidentified voice he heard over the telephone
    threatened to kill him if he testified.       Williams alleges that the
    testimony was highly prejudicial hearsay and was not authenticated
    in violation of the "voice identification" rule. In resolving this
    point of error, we are mindful that our review of a trial court's
    evidentiary rulings is "highly deferential," and this Court will
    generally reverse such rulings only for an abuse of discretion.
    United States v. Anderson, 
    933 F.2d 1261
    , 1267-68 (5th Cir. 1991).
    The complained of testimony was elicited in response to a
    matter opened up by defense counsel.           On cross-examination of
    Cunningham, Williams's counsel attempted to impeach his credibility
    by showing that the government had subpoenaed him, and had told him
    that he had to testify.         Cunningham also testified on cross-
    examination that he was scared because his life was threatened.
    Cunningham's testimony on cross-examination at least arguably left
    the   impression   that   the   government   was   the   entity   that   had
    threatened him.8    On redirect, the prosecutor elicited testimony
    8
    Specifically, when asked by defense counsel about the
    federal official who brought him the subpoena, Cunningham
    testified:
    "Q.   What did he tell you about the subpoena?
    A.    He said I had to come to court.
    13
    from Cunningham that he had been threatened over the phone and that
    he could not identify who was making the threats.     Cunningham also
    testified that the person said "I would be killed one way or
    another, whether they had to burn my mother's house to get me out,
    one way or another I would be terminated."
    Williams claims that Cunningham's statements describing the
    caller's   threats   were   hearsay.   Hearsay   is   an   out-of-court
    statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.       FED.
    R. EVID. 801(c).     Here, the government was not seeking to prove
    whether the threats were true, but rather to show why Cunningham
    feared for his life.     See United States v. Garza, 
    754 F.2d 1202
    ,
    1206 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that "[t]he evidence was offered as
    the fact of an assertion and not as assertion of a fact and was
    therefore not hearsay").     Since the defense counsel had arguably
    implied that Cunningham's testimony was unreliable because he had
    been coerced by the government and was fearful, the government's
    questioning had at least some relevance as rebutting the defense
    counsel's implication by showing that Cunningham's state of mind
    was not the result of government threats.9       Statements regarding
    Q.    You had to come to court?
    A.    Come to court because I am scared.
    Q.    You are scared?
    A.    Yes.
    Q.    Why you are scared?
    A.   Because I have been threatened. My life has been
    threatened and my family's life has been threatened."
    9
    Williams did not object below on the ground that the
    14
    existing state of mind are exceptions to the hearsay rule.       See
    FED. R. EVID. 803(3); United States v. Taglione, 
    546 F.2d 194
    , 200-01
    (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that a defendant's telephone conversation
    with a third person was admissible under Rule 803(3) to establish
    the defendant's state of mind concerning alleged threats made by
    the defendant).
    Williams also claims that the statements of the caller should
    have been excluded because they were not authenticated.      Federal
    Rule of Evidence 901(a) does require that evidence of telephone
    conversations be authenticated as a condition precedent to their
    admission.   See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5); United States v. Scott, 
    678 F.2d 606
    , 611-12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    103 S. Ct. 304
    (1982).
    The Scott court noted that the government had "offered nothing to
    identify the parties to the overheard [radio] communications." 
    Id. at 612.
      However, "the radio communication evidence came in not to
    prove the truth of the matter asserted . . . but to explain why the
    Coast Guard undertook its investigation."      
    Id. Similarly, the
    telephone threats made to Cunningham came in not to prove the truth
    of the threats (or as any kind of admission) but to explain why the
    witness was fearful.     Therefore we conclude, as did the Scott
    court, that "in view of the strength of the evidence against
    [Williams] whose conviction we affirm, any error in admitting these
    evidence should be excluded under FED. R. EVID. 403 because its
    legitimate probative value was substantially outweighed by the
    danger of unfair prejudice. Nor has that contention been raised
    on appeal. The objection below was made solely in terms of
    hearsay and authentication; there was no mention of prejudice or
    Rule 403. See United States v. Martinez, 
    962 F.2d 1161
    , 1168 &
    n.8 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Vitale, 
    596 F.2d 688
    , 689
    (5th Cir. 1979).
    15
    rather ambiguous transmissions was harmless."   
    Id. Conclusion Williams
    has failed to show any reversible error was committed
    by the district court below.   Accordingly her conviction is
    AFFIRMED.
    16