United States v. Christopher Lee ( 2017 )


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  •      Case: 16-11554       Document: 00514101917         Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/03/2017
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    No. 16-11554
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    Summary Calendar                         August 3, 2017
    Lyle W. Cayce
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                        Clerk
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    CHRISTOPHER LEE,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:16-CR-122-15
    Before BARKSDALE, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Christopher Lee pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess, with intent to
    distribute, 50 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a
    detectable amount of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846;
    841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). He was sentenced, following a downward departure, to 240
    months’ imprisonment, below the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 360
    to 480 months, to be followed by three years’ supervised release.
    * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 16-11554    Document: 00514101917     Page: 2   Date Filed: 08/03/2017
    No. 16-11554
    Lee presents two issues. He asserts errors in the colloquy, pursuant to
    Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, warrant reversal of his guilty-plea
    conviction. And, he contends the district court violated his Sixth Amendment
    right to a jury trial by finding he was responsible for approximately 4.7
    kilograms of actual methamphetamine, as recommended in his presentence
    investigation report (PSR), rather than the quantity charged in the
    superseding information:     50 grams or more of a mixture and substance
    containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine.
    At Lee’s rearraignment, the magistrate judge allowed Lee to waive the
    reading of his charging instrument and factual resume, and did not advise Lee
    regarding his maximum term of supervised release. As Lee concedes, because
    he did not object to his Rule 11 colloquy, review is only for plain error. E.g.,
    United States v. Broussard, 
    669 F.3d 537
    , 546 (5th Cir. 2012). Under that
    standard, Lee must show a forfeited plain (clear or obvious) error that affected
    his substantial rights. E.g., Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 135 (2009).
    If he does so, we have the discretion to correct the reversible plain error, but
    should do so only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
    reputation of judicial proceedings”. 
    Id. Lee has
    not made the required showing. The record demonstrates Lee
    advised the magistrate judge he had reviewed the information and factual
    resume; and he affirmed the information and factual resume had been read to
    him, agreed with the facts stated, and confirmed his signature appeared on the
    factual resume.   Lee asserts his acknowledgements could not be effective
    because he cannot read, but the magistrate judge phrased his questions to Lee
    in a manner recognizing Lee could not do so. Accordingly, the court’s variance
    from Rule 11 was, at best, harmless error.       See United States v. Cuevas-
    Andrade, 
    232 F.3d 440
    , 444 (5th Cir. 2000). Therefore, it does not rise to the
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    level of reversible plain error. See 
    Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135
    . Further, there is
    no indication in the record that Lee did not understand, or was confused by,
    the nature of the conspiracy charge or the facts underlying it, nor does he
    identify any such instances. Cf. United States v. Portillo, 
    18 F.3d 290
    , 292–93
    (5th Cir. 1994).
    Additionally, the court’s not stating the maximum term of supervised
    release was not plain error because the admonition that his supervised-release
    term would be “not less than four years” includes the possibility of a maximum
    term of life. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 
    559 F.3d 368
    , 371 (5th Cir.
    2009).
    As Lee concedes, he failed to object to the court’s findings of fact as they
    related to the relevant drug quantity; again, review is for plain error. E.g.,
    
    Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135
    . Noting he pleaded guilty to a conspiracy involving 50
    grams or more of a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine, not
    the 4.7 kilograms of actual methamphetamine recommended in the PSR, he
    asserts the court’s finding resulted in his statutory minimum imprisonment
    being erroneously increased from five to 10 years, and his statutory maximum
    from 40 years to life. But, to the extent Lee contends his Guidelines range was
    unconstitutionally increased based on the court’s factual findings, there is no
    evidence in the record, as discussed below, that Lee’s statutory minimum and
    maximum ranges were increased based on drug-quantity findings. There was
    no plain error.
    In his factual resume, Lee stipulated to being involved in a conspiracy
    involving 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, resulting in a punishment
    range of between five and 40 years’ imprisonment, and he admitted to the
    elements of the offense at rearraignment.        The PSR specifically noted a
    statutory range of five to 40 years imprisonment, and the court properly
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    limited the advisory Guideline sentencing range, reflecting a 40-year
    maximum sentence. Moreover, to the extent Lee’s contention is directed at the
    court’s factual findings related to drug quantity for purposes of applying the
    Guidelines, such findings do not violate the Sixth Amendment. See United
    States v. Romans, 
    823 F.3d 299
    , 316–17 (5th Cir. 2016).
    AFFIRMED.
    4