Joseph Metzler v. Kenner City , 695 F. App'x 79 ( 2017 )


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  •      Case: 16-31157      Document: 00514115214         Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/14/2017
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    No. 16-31157
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    Summary Calendar                           August 14, 2017
    Lyle W. Cayce
    JOSEPH METZLER,                                                                    Clerk
    Plaintiff–Appellant,
    v.
    KENNER CITY, Louisiana; MIKE YENNI, Individually,
    Defendants–Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:15-CV-910
    Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    We affirm the district court’s judgment. Joseph Metzler worked as an
    electrical inspector for the City of Kenner’s Department of Inspections and
    Code Enforcement.           After he was terminated from employment and
    subsequently reinstated, he brought suit under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     against Aimee
    Vallot, Director of Inspections and Code Enforcement; Richard Walther,
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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    No. 16-31157
    Assistant Director of Inspections and Code Enforcement; Mike Yenni, former
    Mayor of the City of Kenner; and the City of Kenner. Metzler claims he was
    wrongfully terminated in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights
    and that his termination violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth
    Amendment.
    The district court dismissed Metzler’s claims for punitive damages
    against the City of Kenner and granted Metzler’s request to amend his
    complaint. The district court also dismissed with prejudice Metzler’s claims
    against Yenni, Vallot, and Walther in their official capacities as well as
    Metzler’s vicarious liability claims against the City of Kenner based on the
    actions of Yenni, Vallot, and Walther.             Metzler does not appeal those
    dismissals. The only claims remaining are Metzler’s § 1983 claims against
    Yenni in his individual capacity and the City of Kenner (the Defendants). The
    Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the
    alternative, a motion for summary judgment.               The district court granted
    summary judgment for the defendants. Metzler appealed.
    “To state a section 1983 claim, ‘a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a
    right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2)
    demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting
    under color of state law.” 1 With regard to Metzler’s claim against Yenni in his
    individual capacity, Metzler “must establish that [Yenni] was either personally
    involved in the deprivation or that his wrongful actions were causally
    connected to the deprivation.” 2
    Metzler alleges that Yenni instructed Vallot to conduct a “sham”
    investigation into citizen complaints filed against Metzler for his operation of
    1   James v. Tex. Collin County, 
    535 F.3d 365
    , 373 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Moore v.
    Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    233 F.3d 871
    , 874 (5th Cir. 2000)).
    2 
    Id.
    2
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    No. 16-31157
    city vehicles and, subsequently, to terminate him. The district court concluded
    that the Defendants presented sufficient evidence on summary judgment to
    negate an essential element of Metzler’s claim, namely that Yenni’s conduct
    deprived Metzler of his constitutional rights or that Yenni’s conduct was
    causally connected to the alleged constitutional violations. We agree. Yenni
    testified at Metzler’s hearing before the Kenner Civil Service Board that he did
    not have any conversations with Vallot or Walther about terminating Metzler.
    Walther testified that he did not discuss Metzler’s termination with Yenni.
    Vallot testified that no one from the city administration pressured her to
    terminate Metzler and that the decision was “[hers] and [hers] alone.” She
    explained that Metzler’s history of complaints about his driving and his
    unwillingness to accept responsibility for his actions contributed to her
    decision to terminate him.
    The Defendants also offered Metzler’s own testimony confirming he had
    no admissible evidence that Vallot was instructed by another person to
    terminate him. Metzler presented the affidavit of former city council member
    Kent Denapolis, in which Denapolis states that when he asked Vallot why
    Metzler was terminated, she answered “I like Joey. This is not my decision. It
    is out of my hands.” We agree with the district court that this evidence is
    inadmissible hearsay and therefore not competent summary judgment
    evidence. 3   Even if admissible, the affidavit does little to suggest that a
    disputed fact exists as to Yenni’s conduct. Nor does any of the other evidence
    presented by Metzler.        Metzler has failed to respond to the Defendants’
    showing with competent summary judgment evidence demonstrating disputed
    issues of fact as to Yenni’s conduct.
    3See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); FED. R. EVID. 802; see also Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Hous.
    Health Sci. Ctr., 
    245 F.3d 507
    , 510 n.5 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Because these statements are
    hearsay, they are not competent summary judgment evidence.”).
    3
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    No. 16-31157
    We also affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
    defendants on Metzler’s claims against the City of Kenner. “If the defendant
    is a municipality or other body of local government, the alleged deprivation
    must be connected to ‘a government custom,’ ‘policy statement, ordinance,
    regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the body’s
    officers.’” 4 Although “municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision
    by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances,” 5 such as the
    termination decision here, 6 that action must nonetheless be “taken by an
    official with ‘final policymaking authority’ in that area.” 7 Whether a person
    has such authority is a question of state and local law. 8 Assuming, as the
    district court did, that Yenni instructed that Metzler be terminated, Yenni is
    not the final policymaker, as evidenced by the Kenner Civil Service Board’s
    subsequent reinstatement of Metzler. 9 Thus, Metzler’s claim must fail.
    *        *         *
    We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court for the reasons
    articulated in its opinion.
    4  Jones v. Lowndes County, 
    678 F.3d 344
    , 349 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t
    of Soc. Servs., 
    436 U.S. 658
    , 690-91 (1978)).
    5 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 
    475 U.S. 469
    , 480 (1986).
    6 See Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    798 F.2d 748
    , 759 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Neubauer
    v. City of McAllen, 
    766 F.2d 1567
    , 1573-74 (5th Cir. 1985)).
    
    7 Jones, 678
     F.3d at 349-50 (quoting Pembaur, 
    475 U.S. at 483
    ).
    8 Pembaur, 
    475 U.S. at 483
    ; Valle v. City of Houston, 
    613 F.3d 536
    , 542 (5th Cir. 2010).
    9 See Advanced Tech. Bldg. Sols., L.L.C. v. City of Jackson, 
    817 F.3d 163
    , 167 (5th Cir.
    2016) (“Because the council has the right of final review, it is the final policymaker. This
    conclusion is consistent with cases in which we have found reviewability by another political
    body ‘relevant to showing that an official is not a final policymaker.’” (quoting Bolton v. City
    of Dallas, 
    541 F.3d 545
    , 550 n.4 (5th Cir. 2008))).
    4