United States v. Kevin Prentice ( 2018 )


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  •      Case: 17-10113      Document: 00514465409         Page: 1    Date Filed: 05/09/2018
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 17-10113                            FILED
    Summary Calendar                       May 9, 2018
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    KEVIN RAY PRENTICE,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:16-CR-149-1
    Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Kevin Ray Prentice pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon
    in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and—pursuant to the Armed Career
    Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)—was sentenced to 188 months of
    imprisonment and four years of supervised release. On appeal, he argues that
    the district court (1) plainly erred by treating his conviction for possession of a
    controlled substance with intent to deliver, in violation of Texas Health and
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 17-10113     Document: 00514465409      Page: 2    Date Filed: 05/09/2018
    No. 17-10113
    Safety Code § 481.112, as a serious drug offense under the ACCA and (2) erred
    by treating his two Texas burglary convictions, in violation of Texas Penal Code
    § 30.02, as violent felonies under the ACCA.
    As Prentice correctly acknowledges, his first argument is foreclosed by
    United States v. Vickers, 
    540 F.3d 356
    (5th Cir. 2008), but he raises it to
    preserve the issue for further review. With respect to Prentice’s second issue,
    we recently concluded in United States v. Herrold, 
    883 F.3d 517
    (5th Cir. 2018)
    (en banc), that § 30.02(a) is “indivisible for the purposes of categorical analysis”
    and that § 30.02(a)(3) is “broader than the federal generic definition of burglary
    encoded in the [ACCA].” 
    Id. at 520-41
    (quotation at 520). Consequently, a
    Texas burglary conviction under § 30.02 is not a generic “burglary” under the
    ACCA. See 
    id. at 537.
    As two of Prentice’s predicate offenses were also under
    § 30.02, we VACATE and REMAND to the district court for resentencing in
    light of Herrold.
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-10113

Filed Date: 5/9/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/9/2018