United States v. Oneal ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 20-50494       Document: 00516021081           Page: 1     Date Filed: 09/20/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                              United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    ___________
    FILED
    September 20, 2021
    No. 20-50494
    ___________                         Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Irick Dron Oneal,
    Defendant—Appellant.
    ______________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 7:19-CV-96
    ______________________________
    Before Southwick, Graves, and Costa, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam: *
    Irick Dron Oneal was convicted of sex trafficking of children and
    sentenced to life in prison. The district court denied his Section 2255 petition
    and denied him a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”). He moved for a
    COA in this court, was denied, and moved for reconsideration of that denial.
    We granted that motion and now deny his motion for a COA.
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-50494      Document: 00516021081           Page: 2    Date Filed: 09/20/2021
    No. 20-50494
    Oneal seeks a COA on numerous ineffective assistance of counsel
    claims. We reduce them to three categories: (1) ineffective assistance of
    counsel at trial for choice of strategy; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel at
    sentencing because Oneal’s sentence was enhanced for various reasons; and
    (3) ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. Oneal also argues that the
    district court erred by not granting him an evidentiary hearing.
    To receive a COA, a petitioner must make “a substantial showing of
    the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a district
    court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, a petitioner “must
    demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
    assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.
    McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 484 (2000).
    To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner
    must show (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2) “the deficient
    performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984).     “Because of the difficulties inherent in making the
    evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
    falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 
    Id. at 689
    .
    Oneal first argues that his counsel was ineffective at trial. Courts will
    not second-guess counsel’s decisions of strategy “if based on informed and
    reasoned practical judgment.” Ransom v. Johnson, 
    126 F.3d 716
    , 721 (5th Cir.
    1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). At trial, counsel sought to shift
    responsibility to one of Oneal’s alleged co-conspirators.         That shifting
    required Oneal to testify and claim he had made a mistake as to the victim’s
    age because he did not have a reasonable opportunity to observe the victim.
    Trial counsel and the district court informed Oneal of his right not to testify
    and the consequences of doing so. The district court found no constitutional
    2
    Case: 20-50494      Document: 00516021081          Page: 3    Date Filed: 09/20/2021
    No. 20-50494
    ineffectiveness. Oneal has not demonstrated that reasonable jurists would
    find the district court’s conclusion to be debatable or wrong.
    Oneal next argues that his counsel was ineffective at sentencing for
    failing to request a special jury verdict and for failing to prevent various
    enhancements to Oneal’s sentence. Trial counsel, though, requested an
    unanimity instruction regarding aiding and abetting and preserved it for
    appeal. Trial counsel also timely objected and argued against enhancements
    for Obstruction, Pattern of Activity, and Leadership Role and was overruled.
    Trial counsel was not required to object to the Undue Influence enhancement
    because, given the 27-year age difference between Oneal and his victim, it
    would be a “meritless objection [that could not] be grounds for a finding of
    deficient performance.” Clark v. Thaler, 
    673 F.3d 410
    , 429 (5th Cir. 2012)
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The district court found
    there was no constitutional ineffectiveness, and Oneal has not demonstrated
    that reasonable jurists would find that assessment debatable or wrong.
    Oneal also argues for the first time that his appellate counsel on direct
    appeal was ineffective. We need not, and here do not, “address a claim raised
    for the first time in a COA motion in this court.” See Henderson v. Cockrell,
    
    333 F.3d 592
    , 605 (5th Cir. 2003).
    Finally, we hold that the district court did not err in denying an
    evidentiary hearing. A petition “challenging an evidentiary ruling may only
    be entertained as corollary to a constitutional violation.” Norman v. Stephens,
    
    817 F.3d 226
    , 234 (5th Cir. 2016). Because we have determined that no such
    violation exists, “we do not address the merits of his request for an
    evidentiary hearing.” 
    Id.
    The application for a COA and the request for an evidentiary hearing
    are DENIED.
    3