United States v. Curtis Roller ( 2018 )


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  •      Case: 17-30138       Document: 00514295903         Page: 1     Date Filed: 01/05/2018
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 17-30138                                  FILED
    Summary Calendar                          January 5, 2018
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    CURTIS ROLLER,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 5:13-CR-37-1
    Before BARKSDALE, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Curtis Roller pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud, in violation of 18
    U.S.C. § 1343, as a result of his submission of materially false applications to
    the Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) program of the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency (FEMA). Based in part on an evidentiary hearing at
    sentencing, Roller was sentenced to a below-Guidelines sentencing range of 24
    months’ imprisonment based on, inter alia, attributable losses of $403,355
    * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.
    R. 47.5.4.
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    No. 17-30138
    across five charged wire-fraud counts.      U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1.     The court also
    ordered restitution in that amount to FEMA. Roller challenges the court’s
    finding he abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill to
    facilitate the fraud; the attributable-loss finding; and the restitution award.
    U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.
    Although Guideline § 3B1.3 is disjunctive, the court found Roller
    satisfied both bases for enhancement. In challenging the court’s findings,
    however, Roller addresses at length only the finding that he used a special skill
    or talent to commit the offense. Therefore, his purely conclusory challenge to
    the court’s alternative “abuse of a position of trust” finding is deemed
    abandoned.    United States v. Charles, 
    469 F.3d 402
    , 408 (5th Cir. 2006).
    Accordingly, that finding stands, and permits the enhancement.
    Next, the court did not clearly err in finding Roller acted with specific
    intent to defraud FEMA by submitting AFG applications containing falsified
    demographic, service, and budget data, including data from areas not
    primarily served by the fire departments in question. E.g., United States v.
    Coleman, 
    609 F.3d 699
    , 708 (5th Cir. 2010). At the evidentiary hearing at
    sentencing, at which Roller testified, Government witnesses, whom the court
    found credible, testified:   the extraterritorial data was prohibited by the
    application’s own terms; and Roller’s use of such data increased the likelihood
    certain applications would be approved. The evidence also established clear
    financial motive, in that companies affiliated with Roller could bid to equip the
    recipient fire departments in exchange for grant funds. Roller admitted he
    profited from such sales.
    Roller relies heavily on his own testimony that he acted in good faith in
    the light of the ambiguous application language as well as industry practice.
    Nonetheless, the court did not find this testimony credible; a decision we will
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    not second guess. E.g., United States v. Garza, 
    118 F.3d 278
    , 283 (5th Cir.
    1997). In any event, the defense testimony established, at most, that “there
    are two permissible views of the evidence” of fraudulent intent, in which case
    “the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous”. United
    States v. Hebert, 
    813 F.3d 551
    , 560 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal citation omitted).
    In addition, a FEMA subject-matter expert testified the falsified data
    was essential to the application-review process and weighed in favor of grant
    approval. From these facts, the court could plausibly infer Roller’s fraudulent
    conduct likely caused actual loss to FEMA. E.g., United States v. Bernegger,
    
    661 F.3d 232
    , 242 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Caldwell, 
    448 F.3d 287
    , 290
    (5th Cir. 2006).
    For the first time in his reply brief, Roller challenges the court’s finding
    as to the existence of a common scheme or plan. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). We
    need not consider such belated assertions but may do so in our discretion.
    United States v. Davis, 
    602 F.3d 643
    , 648 n.7 (5th Cir. 2010). There is no clear
    error. The court found the relevant counts shared three common factors, and
    Roller challenges its finding only as to common purpose. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt.
    n.5 (B)(i). Therefore, he has waived any challenge to the court’s other findings,
    either of which sufficed to support its commonality determination. Guideline
    § 1B1.3 cmt. n.5 (B)(i); United States v. Reagan, 
    596 F.3d 251
    , 254 (5th Cir.
    2010).   And, to the extent Roller asserts he was entitled to a downward
    departure because the attributable loss amount overstates the seriousness of
    his offense, we lack jurisdiction to review this issue as he does not show “the
    district court’s denial resulted from a mistaken belief that the Guidelines do
    not give it authority to depart”. United States v. Tuma, 
    738 F.3d 681
    , 691 (5th
    Cir. 2013).
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    Roller also fails to show the court abused its discretion in ordering full
    restitution to FEMA in the amount of $403,355. United States v. Adams, 
    363 F.3d 363
    , 365 (5th Cir. 2004). If a restitution award is permitted by law, our
    court reviews the propriety of a particular award for abuse of discretion. 
    Id. at 365.
       In this case, restitution was required under the Mandatory Victims
    Restitution Act, which directs district courts to order restitution for victims of,
    inter alia, “any offense committed by fraud or deceit”. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1),
    (c)(1)(A)(ii).
    The plea agreement reflects the parties’ accord that restitution may be
    ordered for losses beyond “the amounts or victims” in the count of conviction.
    
    Adams, 363 F.3d at 366
    . And, because “a fraudulent scheme is an element of
    the conviction”, the court could award restitution “for actions pursuant to that
    scheme”, which included the conduct alleged in each of the five relevant counts.
    Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). Roller’s narrow and contrary reading of the plea
    documents and our precedents fails. 
    Adams, 363 F.3d at 366
    .
    AFFIRMED.
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