United States v. Diaz , 313 F. App'x 735 ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •            IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    March 11, 2009
    No. 08-20259
    Summary Calendar                    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff–Appellee,
    v.
    JERMAINE CARLOS DIAZ,
    Defendant–Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:07-CR-488-ALL
    Before KING, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Jermaine Carlos Diaz pleaded guilty to one count of failing to register as
    a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). He was sentenced to 18
    months of imprisonment and a life term of supervised release. Diaz appeals his
    sentence. Diaz argues that the district court clearly erred in failing to apply a
    three-level adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(b)(2)(A) because he
    voluntarily corrected the failure to register and that his life term of supervised
    release is unreasonable.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR .
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 08-20259
    We review all sentences for reasonableness, using a deferential abuse-of-
    discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , 596-97 (2007). First,
    we consider whether the sentence imposed is procedurally sound. 
    Id. at 597.
    We
    then consider whether the sentence is substantively reasonable, using an
    abuse-of-discretion standard. 
    Id. This court
    still reviews a district court’s interpretation or application of the
    Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v.
    Cisneros-Gutierrez, 
    517 F.3d 751
    , 764 (5th Cir. 2008). A finding is not clearly
    erroneous if it is plausible in light of the whole record. 
    Id. Section 2A3.5(b)(2)
    provides that a defendant’s base offense level should
    be decreased by three levels, “[i]f the defendant voluntarily (A) corrected the
    failure to register; or (B) attempted to register but was prevented from
    registering by uncontrollable circumstances and the defendant did not contribute
    to the creation of those circumstances.” U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(b)(2). The application
    notes clarify that subsection (b)(2) applies only if “the defendant’s voluntary
    attempt to register or to correct the failure to register . . . occurred prior to the
    time the defendant knew or reasonably should have known a jurisdiction had
    detected the failure to register.” § 2A3.5, cmt. n.2(A).
    The record reflects that when Diaz finally corrected his failure to register
    in Houston, Texas, he had already been charged with failing to register in
    Arkansas. At that time, Diaz knew that his failure to register had been detected
    by one jurisdiction. Further, Diaz had been living in Houston for months prior
    to his apprehension; he admitted that he did not register because he was doing
    so many things at one time; and he conceded that he had the time to register but
    was promoting a show at the time and just, basically, avoided the law.
    Consequently, Diaz has failed to demonstrate that the district court clearly erred
    in denying his request for a three-level adjustment.
    Diaz also argues that the district court erred in imposing a life term of
    supervised release. Diaz contends that failing to register as a sex offender is a
    2
    No. 08-20259
    Class C felony for which, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a)(2), the term of
    supervised release is at least two years but not more than three years. See
    U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a)(2). He contends that the district court failed to consider this
    provision or provide adequate reasons for the term of supervised release and
    that the life term is therefore unreasonable.
    As Diaz concedes, because he did not object to the district court’s
    imposition of a life term of supervised release, review is for plain error only. See
    United States v. Willingham, 
    497 F.3d 541
    , 544 (5th Cir. 2007). To show plain
    error, Diaz must show an error that is clear or obvious and that affects his
    substantial rights. United States v. Baker, 
    538 F.3d 324
    , 332 (5th Cir. 2008),
    cert. denied, 
    77 U.S.L.W. 3398
    (U.S. Jan. 12, 2009) (No. 08-7559). If he makes
    such a showing, this court has the discretion to correct the error but only if it
    seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
    proceedings. 
    Id. The record
    reflects that the district court considered the nature and
    circumstances of the offense as well as Diaz’s history and characteristics in
    determining Diaz’s sentence and that even if the district court erred in failing
    to consider § 5D1.2(a)(2) in determining the term of supervised release, 18
    U.S.C. § 3583(k) authorizes a maximum statutory term of life supervised release
    for violations of § 2250. Diaz has not demonstrated plain error.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-20259

Citation Numbers: 313 F. App'x 735

Judges: King, Dennis, Owen

Filed Date: 3/11/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024