Kibrom Beraki v. Jefferson Sessions, III ( 2018 )


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  •      Case: 17-60040      Document: 00514350157         Page: 1    Date Filed: 02/16/2018
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 17-60040
    Summary Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    February 16, 2018
    KIBROM BERAKI,
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Petitioner
    v.
    JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    BIA No. A088 789 732
    Before WIENER, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Kibrom Beraki, a native and citizen of Eritrea, applied for asylum,
    withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
    (CAT). He asserted that, if he returned to Eritrea, he would be subject to
    persecution on account of his religion, his political opinion, and his desertion
    of the military.      The immigration judge (IJ) denied relief, and the BIA
    dismissed Beraki’s appeal. Beraki petitioned this court to review the BIA’s
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 17-60040      Document: 00514350157   Page: 2   Date Filed: 02/16/2018
    No. 17-60040
    order, but the matter was remanded to the agency, on the respondent’s motion,
    to address the omission of a transcript from the administrative record.
    On remand, the IJ determined that the administrative record was
    complete and accurate. The BIA dismissed Beraki’s appeal, addressing both
    the IJ’s decision regarding the administrative record as well as the IJ’s denial
    of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT. Beraki now
    petitions for review of the BIA’s decision.
    Administrative record
    Beraki argues that the agency’s finding that the administrative record is
    complete and accurate is not supported by substantial evidence. He seeks a
    remand to the agency, contending that deficiencies in the administrative
    record violate his right to due process.
    We have authority to review only the BIA’s decision, but we “may
    consider the IJ’s decision to the extent that it influenced the BIA.” Cabral
    v. Holder, 
    632 F.3d 886
    , 889 (5th Cir. 2011). The factual findings of the BIA
    and the IJ are reviewed for substantial evidence, while questions of law are
    reviewed de novo. Zhu v. Gonzales, 
    493 F.3d 588
    , 594 (5th Cir. 2007). The
    substantial evidence test requires that the decision be based on the evidence
    presented and that the decision be substantially reasonable.          Carbajal-
    Gonzalez v. INS, 
    78 F.3d 194
    , 197 (5th Cir. 1996). “The [petitioner] has the
    burden of showing that the evidence is so compelling that no reasonable
    factfinder could reach a contrary conclusion.” Chen v. Gonzales, 
    470 F.3d 1131
    ,
    1134 (5th Cir. 2006).
    Beraki asserts that the administrative record is incomplete because it
    does not include a transcript of a hearing held on March 5, 2009. The record,
    however, provides substantial support for the agency’s determination that,
    although a hearing was scheduled, no hearing was actually held on the date in
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    question; accordingly, the agency’s factual finding will not be disturbed. See
    
    Zhu, 493 F.3d at 593
    .
    In addition to the contention that a transcript is missing, Beraki asserts
    that there are several other problems with the administrative record, including
    an undated transcript, the transcriber’s frequent use of the “undiscernible” in
    place of testimony, the unreliability of the transcriber’s certification, excessive
    duplication, and the omission of his previous petition for review and the brief
    he submitted to this court in connection with that petition.          In order to
    establish his claim of a due process violation based on alleged deficiencies in
    the administrative record, Beraki must make a showing of prejudice; he has
    failed to make the requisite showing. See Bolvito v. Mukasey, 
    527 F.3d 428
    ,
    438 (5th Cir. 2008); Gonzales-Buitrago v. I.N.S., 
    1993 WL 391512
    , 4 (5th Cir.
    Sept. 24, 1993) (unpublished).
    Denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT
    The IJ determined that Beraki’s claims for asylum, withholding of
    removal, and protection under the CAT failed because he was not a credible
    witness and because he failed to provide reasonably available corroborating
    evidence to support his claims of persecution in Eritrea. The BIA agreed with
    the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, noting that Beraki had not provided
    other evidence to independently establish his claims. Beraki challenges the
    adverse credibility determination, as well as the determination that he did not
    provide corroborating evidence.
    Credibility determinations are factual findings that are reviewed for
    substantial evidence. See Vidal v. Gonzales, 
    491 F.3d 250
    , 254 (5th Cir. 2007).
    The IJ and BIA “may rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an
    adverse credibility determination as long as the totality of the circumstances
    establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible.” Wang v. Holder, 
    569 F.3d 3
          Case: 17-60040      Document: 00514350157          Page: 4        Date Filed: 02/16/2018
    No. 17-60040
    531, 538 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
    (emphasis in original). This court will defer to a “credibility determination
    unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable
    fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”                       
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).
    Beraki first asserts that the IJ erred in determining that there were
    inconsistencies between his testimony and that of his witness, Mr. Solomon.
    However, as the IJ noted, Beraki testified that he was detained in 2007 during
    the months of June, July, and August; that is inconsistent with Mr. Solomon’s
    testimony, deemed credible by the IJ, that Beraki worked at his home up until
    Mr. Solomon’s departure from Eritrea, which, as shown by Mr. Solomon’s
    passport, occurred on July 21, 2007.              Beraki also contends that the IJ
    incorrectly determined that he gave internally inconsistent testimony. The IJ
    noted, however, that at a hearing held on October 21, 2008, Beraki testified
    that he worked for Mr. Solomon in March, April, and May of 2007. At a later
    hearing, Beraki testified that Mr. Solomon asked him in late April of 2007 to
    improve a design for his house and that he completed the task in one day and
    gave the new design to Mr. Solomon on May 3, 2007. Beraki also testified that
    the design job was the only work he did for Mr. Solomon. ROA.461. In view of
    the    inconsistencies     discussed     above,     as   well      as     other    testimonial
    inconsistencies discussed by the BIA that Beraki does not challenge, we
    conclude that the agency’s adverse credibility determination as to Beraki is
    supported by substantial evidence. See 
    Vidal, 491 F.3d at 254
    . 1
    1 Beraki also contends that the IJ erred in determining that he changed his story;
    however, in his brief he does not specify the testimony at issue, or provide a record citation
    to the relevant testimony. Beraki’s argument on this point is inadequately briefed, and it is
    therefore considered abandoned. See Yang v. Holder, 
    664 F.3d 580
    , 589 (5th Cir. 2011).
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    Beraki asserts that the IJ and the BIA erred in concluding that he should
    have provided corroborating evidence from family members and friends to
    support his claims. He argues that he was unable to provide such evidence due
    to his long journey from Eritrea to the United States, which took him through
    several countries.
    “[A]pplicants can be required to provide reasonably obtainable
    corroborating evidence even when their testimony is credible.” Yang v. Holder,
    
    664 F.3d 580
    , 587 (5th Cir. 2011). We may not reverse the trier of fact’s
    determination that corroborating evidence was available unless a reasonable
    trier of fact would be compelled to conclude otherwise. 
    Id. The record
    reflects that Beraki reached the United States in April 2008,
    and he was represented by counsel during his proceedings before the
    immigration court, stretching back to June 4, 2008. He was able to obtain a
    letter, dated May 30, 2008, supporting his contention that he was a member of
    a Pentecostal church in Eritrea. Because the evidence does not compel a
    contrary conclusion, we will not disturb the agency’s determination that Beraki
    failed to provide reasonably available corroborating evidence. See 
    id. Finally, Beraki
    contends that he established an entitlement to asylum,
    withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT. In addition to his testimony,
    which, as discussed above, was determined to lack credibility, he relies on
    reports as to the conditions in Eritrea. The agency’s determination that Beraki
    is not entitled to asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT is
    reviewed for substantial evidence. Zhang v. Gonzales, 
    432 F.3d 339
    , 344 (5th
    Cir. 2005).
    A grant of asylum is discretionary, and to be eligible an applicant must
    be unable or unwilling to return to his home country because of “persecution
    or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
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    membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”         8 U.S.C.
    § 1101(a)(42)(A).      An applicant demonstrates a well-founded fear of
    persecution by showing “a subjective fear of persecution” that is “objectively
    reasonable.” Lopez-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 
    263 F.3d 442
    , 445 (5th Cir. 2001). If
    past persecution is established, then the alien is entitled to a rebuttable
    presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.               8 C.F.R.
    § 208.13(b)(1).
    A claim for withholding of removal does not require proof of subjective
    fear. See 
    Zhang, 432 F.3d at 344
    . However, “[w]ithholding of removal is a
    higher standard than asylum.” Efe v. Ashcroft, 
    293 F.3d 899
    , 906 (5th Cir.
    2002). An applicant for withholding of removal has the burden of showing that
    it is “more likely than not” that his life or freedom would be threatened by
    persecution on account of one of the five categories mentioned under asylum.
    
    Id. Because Beraki
    provided no corroborating evidence to support his claims
    of past persecution, he failed to establish past persecution given the agency’s
    adverse credibility determination. See Dayo v. Holder, 
    687 F.3d 653
    , 657 (5th
    Cir. 2012). As to Beraki’s claims of feared future persecution on grounds of
    religion, political opinion, and military desertion, only Beraki’s assertion that
    he was a member of the Pentecostal church has any record support aside from
    his testimony. However, the country reports on which Beraki relies establish
    nothing more than a speculative fear of persecution based on religion; the
    record does not compel a conclusion that Beraki has shown “a subjective fear
    of persecution” that is “objectively reasonable,” so as to be eligible for asylum.
    
    Lopez-Gomez, 263 F.3d at 445
    . Because he has not shown an entitlement to
    asylum, Beraki cannot establish an entitlement to withholding of removal. See
    
    Dayo, 687 F.3d at 658-59
    .      In view of the foregoing, substantial evidence
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    supports the agency’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal. See 
    Zhang, 432 F.3d at 344
    .
    In order to receive protection under the CAT, an applicant must show
    that it is “more likely than not” that he would be tortured if removed to his
    home country by, or with the acquiescence of, government officials acting under
    the color of law. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); Hakim v. Holder, 
    628 F.3d 151
    ,
    155 (5th Cir. 2010). Beraki relies on his testimony and the Department of
    State’s country report in an attempt to establish his CAT claim, but he fails to
    make the necessary showing. See 
    Hakim, 628 F.3d at 155-57
    . We conclude
    that substantial evidence supports the denial of Beraki’s claim for protection
    under the CAT. See 
    Zhang, 432 F.3d at 344
    .
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
    7