Dawn Polk v. Jefferson County, Texas , 714 F. App'x 457 ( 2018 )


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  •      Case: 16-41521      Document: 00514386020         Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/14/2018
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    No. 16-41521
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    March 14, 2018
    DAWN POLK,                                                               Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    MICHAEL SINEGAL,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:15-CV-153
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    This case occasions review of the district court’s denial of a motion for
    summary judgment predicated on qualified immunity. Finding no error in the
    district court’s analysis, we AFFIRM.
    BACKGROUND
    In 2009, Michael Sinegal, a county commissioner in Jefferson County,
    Texas, hired Dawn Polk as an administrative assistant.
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 16-41521    Document: 00514386020       Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/14/2018
    No. 16-41521
    Three years later, in 2012, Polk informed Sinegal that she planned to
    run in the Democratic Primary for Justice of the Peace. One of Polk’s opponents
    was the incumbent, Tom Gillam III. Sinegal initially told Polk he thought her
    campaign was a good idea. During a subsequent meeting in September 2013,
    however, Sinegal acted as though Polk had failed to inform him of her
    candidacy, complaining, “you don’t know what type of position you’re putting
    me in because this man Gillam is going around telling everybody that I set you
    up to run against him.”
    Polk campaigned on the basis of her own integrity and Gillam’s lack
    thereof. She ultimately lost the primary and returned to work for Sinegal.
    Upon her return, Sinegal called Polk into his office, informing her that he had
    spoken with Human Resources and that Polk’s employment was “not working
    out.” Sinegal said that he had informed Human Resources that Polk was not
    typing memoranda or giving messages. In fact, Sinegal alleged that Polk was
    “not doing anything.” Polk asked Sinegal why he would lie to Human Resources
    and whether he was firing her for campaigning against Gillam. Sinegal
    immediately called another employee into the room to witness the meeting and
    told Polk she had two days to find another job.
    In March 2015, Polk sued Sinegal and Jefferson County under 42 U.S.C.
    § 1983 in state court. The defendants subsequently removed the case to federal
    court. Polk’s amended complaint asserts that Sinegal and Jefferson County
    violated the First Amendment by retaliating against her for speaking out
    against Gillam. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that
    the County was not liable under Monell and that Sinegal was entitled to
    qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment as to the
    County, but found that Polk had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
    Sinegal’s qualified immunity. Sinegal timely appealed that decision.
    2
    Case: 16-41521     Document: 00514386020      Page: 3   Date Filed: 03/14/2018
    No. 16-41521
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “While not a final decision, ‘the denial of a motion for summary judgment
    based upon qualified immunity is a collateral order capable of immediate
    review.’” Heaney v. Roberts, 
    846 F.3d 795
    , 800 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Kinney
    v. Weaver, 
    367 F.3d 337
    , 346 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). However, in doing so,
    we have limited appellate jurisdiction.
    A district court denying an official’s motion for summary judgment
    predicated on qualified immunity “can be thought of as making two distinct
    determinations.” 
    Kinney, 367 F.3d at 346
    . First, the district court determines
    whether “a certain course of conduct would, as a matter of law, be objectively
    unreasonable in light of clearly established law.” 
    Id. Second, the
    district court
    determines whether “a genuine issue of fact exists regarding whether the
    defendant(s) did, in fact, engage in such conduct.” 
    Id. This court
    only has
    jurisdiction to review the first type of determination. 
    Id. at 346-47.
          Because we have no jurisdiction to consider the correctness of the
    plaintiff’s version of the facts, the appealing defendant must “be prepared to
    concede the best view of the facts to the plaintiff and discuss only the legal
    issues raised by the appeal.” Winfrey v. Pikett, 
    872 F.3d 640
    , 644 (5th Cir. 2017)
    (citations omitted). So limited, this court reviews the district court’s analysis
    de novo. 
    Id. DISCUSSION Sinegal
    argues that Polk’s allegations are, as a matter of law,
    insufficient. In addition, Sinegal asserts that the district court defined “clearly
    established law” at too high a level of generality. Neither argument has merit.
    To establish a claim of First Amendment retaliation, Polk must show
    that: (1) she “suffered an adverse employment decision;” (2) her “speech
    involved a matter of public concern;” (3) her interest in speaking “outweighed
    the defendant’s interest in promoting efficiency;” and (4) her speech was a
    3
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    No. 16-41521
    “substantial or motivating factor” behind the adverse employment decision.
    See James v. Texas Collin Cnty., 
    535 F.3d 365
    , 375-76 (5th Cir. 2008).
    Only the fourth element is in dispute. 1 As the district court noted, “Polk
    alleges that her decision to run for office caused altercations between Sinegal
    and Gillam, which ultimately resulted in Sinegal’s decision to terminate Polk’s
    employment.” The court found that Polk had raised a genuine issue of fact for
    those allegations by proffering evidence that Sinegal used the allegations of
    poor work performance “as excuses to mask” his true motive in firing Polk. The
    only question for our consideration is whether such conduct, if proven, would
    be objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. See 
    Kinney, 367 F.3d at 346
    . We agree with the district court that it would.
    “This court has been unequivocal in its recognition of a First Amendment
    interest in candidacy.” Phillips v. City of Dallas, 
    781 F.3d 772
    , 778 (5th Cir.
    2015). We have recognized that right in the public employment context since
    at least 1992. See Click v. Copeland, 
    970 F.2d 106
    , 112 (5th Cir. 1992).
    Applying that clearly established precedent to this case, we agree with the
    district court that “if Polk’s version [of the facts] is accurate, and Sinegal is
    using [poor work evaluations] as excuses to mask his unconstitutional conduct,
    then qualified immunity is unavailable.”
    CONCLUSION
    There is no question that Sinegal disputes that Polk’s candidacy was the
    motivating factor in terminating her employment. However, we are limited to
    1 Sinegal disputes the district court’s conclusion that he was not contesting the third element
    of Polk’s retaliation claim. As evidence that he disputed this element, Sinegal states that his
    summary judgment motion explained that he fired Polk because she was “inefficient.” This
    argument misunderstands the third element, which involves interest balancing under
    Pickering v. Board of Education, 
    391 U.S. 563
    (1968). Sinegal never argues that an interest
    in governmental efficiency outweighed Polk’s interest in engaging in political speech; indeed,
    he argues that Polk’s termination was unrelated to her political speech.
    4
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    No. 16-41521
    determining only whether the conduct identified by the district court would, as
    a matter of law, be objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law,
    if true. Finding that it would, we AFFIRM on that limited ground.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-41521

Citation Numbers: 714 F. App'x 457

Judges: Higginbotham, Jones, Graves

Filed Date: 3/14/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024