Barfield v. Louisiana Ex Rel. Louisiana Department of Justice , 325 F. App'x 292 ( 2009 )


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  •            IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    April 3, 2009
    No. 08-30334                    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    GLORIA BARFIELD,
    Plaintiff–Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF LOUISIANA, on behalf of Louisiana Department of Justice;
    CHARLES C. FOTI, JR.; KRISTEN WIDMER,
    Defendants–Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 3:05-CV-2218
    Before GARWOOD, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Gloria Barfield appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
    Kristen Widmer and the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office in her § 1983 suit
    claiming that Widmer violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from
    unlawful or illegal arrest.         Because Widmer’s reasonable investigation of
    Barfield established probable cause to arrest her, Widmer is entitled to qualified
    immunity. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR .
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 08-30334
    I
    Gloria Barfield served as the Chief Executive Officer of the G.B. Cooley
    Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded (Cooley) in West Monroe,
    Louisiana from 2003 to 2004. In September 2003, “J.W.,” a fifteen-year resident
    of the facility who suffered from severe retardation, schizophrenia, and a seizure
    disorder, was transferred from the Cooley main campus to an off-campus
    community home in a less restrictive environment. At the community home,
    J.W. attempted suicide, attempted to jump from a moving van, stabbed himself
    in the abdomen with a knife and fork, broke windows, and broke into a
    neighbor’s home causing the neighbor to draw a gun on him.
    As a result of these incidents, the Cooley staff held several meetings from
    October 2003 through January 2004 discussing whether J.W. should be moved
    back to the Cooley main campus or whether he should stay at the community
    home. At these meetings, the staff, including Barfield, discussed the problems
    J.W. was having adjusting to the new environment and his need for one-on-one
    supervision if he remained in the community home. The staff ultimately decided
    to leave J.W. in the community home with one-on-one supervision. However,
    J.W. never received this supervision, his problems continued, and he was finally
    moved back to the main campus in January 2004.
    In September 2004, the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals
    (LDHH) conducted a survey of Cooley to determine if it was in compliance with
    federal and state standards. Though J.W.’s care was not the sole focus of the
    survey, at the survey’s completion, the LDHH determined that Cooley failed to
    meet one of the Louisiana Medicaid Program’s conditions of participation,
    “Client Protections,” by placing J.W. in an unsafe environment, not providing
    sufficient staff, and not taking corrective action in a timely manner. The LDHH
    also provided its report to the Louisiana Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU)
    of the Louisiana Department of Justice, who assigned Widmer, a special agent,
    2
    No. 08-30334
    to investigate the possible abuse and/or neglect of J.W. Widmer did not know or
    have any connection with Barfield at the time.
    As part of her investigation, Widmer: (1) reviewed the LDHH survey;
    (2) reviewed J.W.’s medical records and other records provided by Barfield and
    Cooley; (3) interviewed witnesses, including Cooley employees; (4) reviewed her
    findings with her supervisors—two assistant attorneys general who are
    experienced prosecutors; (5) prepared arrest and search warrants; and
    (6) presented the warrants to Louisiana District Judge Carl Sharp, who signed
    them after reviewing Widmer’s arrest affidavit.
    In all, six Cooley employees, including Barfield, were arrested as a result
    of Widmer’s investigation. Barfield was charged with cruelty to the infirm under
    Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:93.3. The Ouachita Parish District Attorney’s
    Office later declined to pursue the charges against Barfield after conducting its
    own investigation.
    In November 2005, Barfield filed this action under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     in a
    Louisiana state court, alleging that Widmer had violated her constitutional
    rights by intentionally filing a frivolous arrest affidavit and that the Attorney
    General was vicariously liable for Widmer’s actions. After removing the case to
    federal court, the defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting the
    defense of qualified immunity. The district court granted their motion, which
    Barfield now appeals.
    II
    This court reviews a district court’s grant of a motion for summary
    judgment on the basis of qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit de novo.1 Although
    nominally an affirmative defense, the plaintiff has the burden to negate the
    1
    Freeman v. Gore, 
    483 F.3d 404
    , 410 (5th Cir. 2007).
    3
    No. 08-30334
    assertion of qualified immunity once properly raised.2               Claims of qualified
    immunity require a two-step analysis.3 First, we generally determine whether,
    viewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to the
    plaintiff, the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.4 Only if
    such a violation occurred do we proceed to the second step, which is to determine
    whether the defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly
    established law at the time of the conduct in question.5                 “To make this
    determination, the court applies an objective standard based on the viewpoint
    of a reasonable official in light of the information then available to the defendant
    and the law that was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s actions.”6
    Accordingly,       we   first   determine     whether      Widmer    violated   Barfield’s
    constitutional rights.
    Barfield argues that Widmer violated her Fourth Amendment rights by
    causing her to be arrested without probable cause and by failing to uncover
    readily available exculpatory evidence in her investigation. Probable cause
    exists when the facts and circumstances within an officer’s personal knowledge
    are “sufficient to occasion a person of reasonable prudence to believe an offense
    has been committed.” 7 “Moreover, probable cause is to be determined on the
    basis of the facts available to the officers at the time, without reference to
    whether the evidence ultimately proved to be reliable.” 8                An officer who
    2
    Brumfield v. Hollins, 
    551 F.3d 322
    , 326 (5th Cir. 2008).
    3
    Freeman, 
    483 F.3d at 410
    .
    4
    
    Id.
    5
    
    Id. at 411
    .
    6
    
    Id.
    7
    Bigford v. Taylor, 
    834 F.2d 1213
    , 1218 (5th Cir. 1988).
    8
    
    Id.
    4
    No. 08-30334
    “reasonably but mistakenly conclude[s] that probable cause is present” is still
    entitled to qualified immunity.9
    Because Widmer performed a reasonable investigation and uncovered
    enough facts to reasonably believe Barfield violated Louisiana Revised Statutes
    § 14:93.3, we agree with the district court that Widmer had probable cause to
    seek a warrant for Barfield’s arrest for cruelty to the infirmed. Section 14:93.3
    defines “cruelty to the infirmed” as “the intentional or criminally negligent
    mistreatment or neglect by any person, including a caregiver, whereby
    unjustifiable pain, malnourishment, or suffering is caused to the infirmed, a
    disabled adult, or an aged person, including but not limited to a person who is
    a resident of a . . . mental retardation facility.” 10           Widmer’s investigation
    revealed that Barfield knew about J.W.’s violent incidents and the trouble he
    was having adjusting to the new environment. The investigation also revealed
    that Barfield refused to move him back to the main campus and failed to ensure
    that he received one-on-one supervision, both of which were steps recommended
    by J.W.’s care team. As a result, J.W. experienced more violent incidents that
    resulted in harm to himself. These facts, which Widmer documented in her
    arrest affidavit, provide enough basis for a “person of reasonable prudence” to
    believe that Barfield violated § 14:93.3.
    Barfield contends, however, that Widmer lacked probable cause because
    documents she reviewed in her investigation contained evidence indicating that
    Barfield was innocent.              First, Barfield argues that two memoranda from
    Florence Fields, a Qualified Mental Retardation Professional working with J.W.,
    showed that Barfield was led to believe that J.W. was receiving one-on-one
    supervision. Barfield contends that she could not have been criminally negligent
    9
    Mangieri v. Clifton, 
    29 F.3d 1012
    , 1017 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 
    502 U.S. 224
    , 227 (1991)).
    10
    L    A.   REV . STAT . ANN . § 14:93.3 (2008).
    5
    No. 08-30334
    if she reasonably believed that J.W. was receiving the supervision that he
    needed. However, neither of these memos undermine the reasonableness of
    Widmer’s probable cause determination.
    The first memo from Fields related to a meeting on October 8, 2003 in
    which the Cooley staff discussed J.W.’s situation and whether he should be
    moved back to the main campus. According to the memo, Barfield said that J.W.
    should remain at the community home, but initially suggested giving him one-
    on-one care. The somewhat ambiguous memo then states that Barfield later
    changed her mind:
    But by the end of the day, there was not to be an [sic] one to one
    we cannot afford one we were told. Mrs. Barfield change [sic] her
    mind due to the Program managers present assured her they had
    it taken care of one Program Manager offered a staff to assist the
    other program Manager, but that never occurred. [sic]
    This memo alone does not clearly exculpate Barfield or defeat Widmer’s
    probable cause determination. Though it suggests that Barfield was told that
    a staff member “had it taken care of,” the memo states that it never actually
    occurred.
    The second memo discusses a meeting held on November 25, 2003 after
    J.W. experienced more violent incidents. The memo indicates that Barfield
    declined to approve a one-on-one personnel assignment for J.W. without
    approval from accounting.      A handwritten addition to the note states that
    “[t]here was a meeting held to discuss the problem w/ [J.W.] at the time the
    program managers stated they would provide support. Therefore, CEO assume
    it was aright [sic].”   Barfield points to this addition as showing that, again,
    Barfield was told that J.W. was being taken care of appropriately. However, the
    handwritten note is ambiguous as to exactly what Barfield knew. It is unclear
    whether the note is referring to what Barfield was told at the October 8 meeting
    or the November 25 meeting, since the note appears to be referring to a different
    6
    No. 08-30334
    meeting from the one that is the subject of the memo.            Either way, this
    ambiguous statement is not enough to defeat Widmer’s probable cause
    determination, given the other evidence Widmer considered.
    In addition to the two memos from Fields, Barfield points to the minutes
    from two management meetings from November 25, 2003 and December 2, 2003
    that she claims prove that she was not negligent because she was told that J.W.
    was receiving the appropriate care. The November 25 meeting minutes stated
    that “[s]everal staff agreed that there is a need [for one-on-one staffing] and that
    one staff [sic] is working with J.W.” The December 2 meeting minutes stated
    that “Ida acknowledged that J.W. requires constant care, which he does have
    now.” Though the minutes from these meetings suggest that Barfield was told
    that J.W. was receiving adequate care, there is no showing in the record that
    Widmer had seen or knew about these minutes. Thus, these minutes do not
    undermine the reasonableness of Widmer’s probable cause determination based
    on the evidence uncovered in her investigation.
    Barfield also argues that Widmer should have known, based on Cooley’s
    transfer policy, that the admissions team, not Barfield, transferred J.W. to the
    community home. The transfer policy states that, for a decision to discharge or
    transfer a client, an interdisciplinary team would conference to develop a
    recommendation as to whether the client should be discharged or transferred.
    The “admission, transfer, discharge committee” would then decide whether to
    approve that decision. Widmer’s investigation, which included interviews with
    individuals closely involved in J.W.’s care, indicated that, contrary to Cooley’s
    policies, Barfield held the ultimate power to approve J.W.’s transfer back to the
    main campus but refused to do so. Widmer was reasonable in relying on this
    information and the existence of the transfer policy does not undermine the
    probable cause determination.
    7
    No. 08-30334
    Finally, Barfield argues that Widmer’s failure to uncover exculpatory
    evidence that was readily available to her violated Barfield’s constitutional
    rights. Barfield cites two cases, Evett v. Deep East Texas Regional Narcotics
    Trafficking Task Force11 and Vance v. Nunnery,12 arguing that an investigating
    officer must obtain readily available exculpatory evidence and provide it in her
    arrest affidavit. Barfield asserts that Widmer failed to interview more than five
    individuals in her investigation and should have interviewed a majority of the
    members of J.W.’s admissions team—who would have revealed that decisions
    relating to J.W. were made by a team of professionals rather than just Barfield.
    However, Evett and Vance do not require that an officer perform a perfect
    investigation that uncovers all readily available exculpatory evidence. Rather,
    they stand for the basic premise that an officer must have probable cause to
    make an arrest based on an investigation that was reasonable under the
    circumstances.13 Widmer had probable cause to seek a warrant for Barfield’s
    arrest based on her reasonable investigation. Widmer did not know Barfield
    prior to the investigation and there is no indication that she bore any malice
    towards Barfield. In her investigation, she reviewed the LDHH survey and its
    supporting documentation as well as documentation about J.W. and Cooley’s
    policies and procedures. She also interviewed a number of witnesses, including
    J.W.’s aunt, current and former employees of Cooley, J.W.’s psychological
    associate, and one of J.W.’s Qualified Mental Retardation Professionals. After
    completing her investigation, Widmer reviewed her findings with two
    11
    
    330 F.3d 681
     (5th Cir. 2003).
    12
    
    137 F.3d 270
     (5th Cir. 1998).
    13
    See Vance, 
    137 F.3d at 276-77
     (holding that an officer lacked probable cause to arrest
    a suspect for a burglary that he had no evidence actually occurred and that a reasonable officer
    would have continued his investigation); Evett, 
    330 F.3d at 689
     (holding that an officer lacked
    probable cause when he based the arrest on a “feeling” formed after receiving information from
    an “unsubstantiated source”).
    8
    No. 08-30334
    experienced assistant attorneys general before preparing the arrest and search
    warrant affidavits that were presented to Judge Sharp.      These steps were
    reasonable under the circumstances.
    *        *         *
    We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
    9