Lara Canales v. Garland ( 2023 )

Case: 19-60827 Document: 00516616439 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/19/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
January 19, 2023
No. 19-60827 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Karla Yadira Lara Canales,
Petitioner,
versus
Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A099 528 344
Before Jolly, Dennis, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
E. Grady Jolly, Circuit Judge:*
This appeal arises from the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA)
denial of Karla Yadira Lara Canales’s motion to reopen her removal
proceedings. The BIA denied her motion to reopen as untimely, leaving the
order of removal in place. We now VACATE the BIA’s denial of Lara
Canales’s motion to reopen and REMAND so that the BIA may properly
consider whether Lara Canales is entitled to equitable tolling.
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 19-60827 Document: 00516616439 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/19/2023
No. 19-60827
I.
The Attorney General may allow otherwise-removable aliens to
remain if they have accrued 10 years of continuous physical presence in the
United States—a discretionary form of relief otherwise known as
“cancellation of removal.” Under the statutory “stop-time rule,” the period
of continuous presence terminates when either of two events occurs: (1) an
alien is served with a notice to appear (NTA), or (2) an alien commits an
enumerated criminal offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).
If the BIA orders an alien removed, that alien may file a motion to
reopen the removal proceedings. This form of procedural relief allows aliens
to ask the BIA to reconsider its removal decision “in light of newly
discovered evidence or a change in circumstances since the hearing.” Lugo-
Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337, 339 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Dada v.
Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 12 (2008)). These motions, however, must be filed no
later than 90 days after the entry of a final administrative decision. Id. (citing
8 U.S.C.§ 1229a(c)(7)).
The BIA issued its final administrative decision when it ordered Lara
Canales to be removed in August 2006. 1 As is often the case, Lara Canales
was not removed. In the meantime, the law changed when the Supreme
Court decided Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). In Pereira, the Court
held that a “putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific time
or place of the [alien]’s removal proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under
section 1229(a),’ and so does not trigger the stop-time rule.” 138 S. Ct. at
2113–14. Less than 90 days after the Pereira decision, Lara Canales filed a
motion to reopen, arguing that because her 2006 NTA was defective, she had
accrued the necessary period of continuous presence to be eligible for
1
This removal order arose from a reversal of the immigration judge’s initial
determination that Lara Canales was entitled to asylum.
2
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No. 19-60827
cancellation of removal. Stated differently, because her NTA failed to specify
the time and date that her removal proceedings would take place, it did not
trigger the stop-time rule. And although she conceded that her motion to
reopen was filed more than 90 days after the entry of her removal order in
2006, Lara Canales argued she was entitled to equitable tolling of the
limitations period based on the extraordinary circumstance of a change in
law—that is, the Pereira decision.
Nevertheless, the BIA denied her motion to reopen as untimely,
explaining that no statutory or regulatory exception to the general limitations
period applied. The BIA further noted that, notwithstanding Pereira, Lara
Canales would still be ineligible for cancellation of removal because of two
alternative events that triggered the stop-time rule: (1) subsequent service of
her notice of hearing that “perfected” any defects in the NTA and (2) the
entry of her final administrative decision in 2006.
Lara Canales now appeals. She argues, inter alia, that (1) she is eligible
for cancellation of removal because her defective NTA did not trigger the
stop-time rule, and (2) her motion to reopen is not barred as untimely because
she was entitled to equitable tolling. 2 Here, the BIA’s conclusion that Lara
Canales was not entitled to equitable tolling implicitly rests on its finding that
Lara Canales was not newly eligible to seek cancellation of removal as a result
of the Pereira decision. Thus, to address Lara Canales’s equitable tolling
argument, we must answer an underlying question: Whether the BIA erred
in concluding that there was no extraordinary circumstance that might
warrant tolling of the limitations period.
2
Lara Canales argues that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction over her
removal proceedings. Lara Canales’s jurisdictional argument is squarely foreclosed by our
decision in Pierre-Paul v. Barr—a decision in which this court held that Pereira had no effect
on the immigration court’s jurisdiction over removal proceedings. 930 F.3d 684, 689–90
(5th Cir. 2019), abrogated on other grounds by Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021).
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II.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen under the “highly
deferential” abuse of discretion standard. Lugo-Resendez, 831 F.3d at 340(quoting Barrios-Cantarero v. Holder, 772 F.3d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 2014) (per
curiam)). Such an abuse of discretion occurs if the BIA’s decision “is
capricious, irrational, utterly without foundation in the evidence, based on
legally erroneous interpretations of statutes or regulations, or based on
unexplained departures from regulations or established policies.” Id.(quoting Barrios-Cantarero, 772 F.3d at 1021).
III.
As we have earlier indicated, a motion to reopen under 8
U.S.C.§ 1229a(c)(7) must “be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a
final administrative order.” This deadline, however, is subject to equitable
tolling. Lugo-Resendez, 831 F.3d at 344. Equitable tolling requires that a
petitioner establish, “(1) that [s]he has been pursuing [her] rights diligently,
and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in [her] way and
prevented timely filing.” Id. (quoting Menominee Indian Tribe v. United
States, 577 U.S. 250, 255 (2016)).
This court has recognized that changes in law may constitute an
extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling of the deadline for
seeking statutory reopening. Id. at 343–44. For example, in Lugo-Resendez,
this court was presented with an equitable tolling claim based on a change in
law where an alien’s conviction no longer rendered him deportable. Id.Although the court declined to determine if the deadline should have been
tolled, it remanded the alien’s claim so that the BIA could properly consider
whether the alien was entitled to equitable tolling based on the change in law.
Id. at 344.
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Here, Lara Canales concedes that her motion was filed outside the
90-day deadline, but contends that she is entitled to equitable tolling because
(1) the Pereira decision was an extraordinary circumstance that rendered her
newly eligible to seek cancellation of removal and (2) she diligently pursued
her rights by filing her motion to reopen within 90 days of the Pereira
decision. In rejecting Lara Canales’s equitable tolling arguments, the full
extent of the BIA’s analysis was that she “has not shown that any of the
statutory or regulatory exceptions to the general time limitations on motions
to reopen apply to her case.” 3
Usually, we defer “to the BIA’s interpretation of immigration
regulations if th[e] interpretation is reasonable.” Barrios-Cantarero, 772 F.3d
at 1021 (citing Hernandez-Castillo v. Moore, 436 F.3d 516, 519 (5th Cir.
2006)). But in this case, it is not.
The BIA reasoned that Lara Canales’s continuous physical presence
had stopped accruing after the service of her defective NTA because it was
subsequently “cured” by her notice of hearing. Alternatively, the BIA
reasoned that Lara Canales had not been present in the United States for 10
years at the time of her removal order because the issuance of her final
administrative order in 2006 triggered the stop-time rule.
We begin our review by observing that Pereira made clear that a
defective NTA will not stop the running of the 10-year continuous time
period. See 138 S. Ct. at 2113–14 (holding that a putative NTA that fails to
designate the specific time or place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings
3
We additionally hold that the single sentence from the BIA, devoid of any analysis,
is insufficient for us to conclude that the BIA appropriately considered Lara Canales’s
equitable tolling argument. See Sylejmani v. Sessions, 729 F. App’x 317, 321 (5th Cir. 2018)
(per curiam) (holding the BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen as
untimely filed when the BIA did not provide a reasoned explanation for its denial and
provided only conclusory statements that the motion was untimely).
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does not trigger the stop-time rule). Further, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Niz-Chavez v. Garland forecloses the BIA’s conclusion that the notice of
hearing Lara Canales received later “perfected” the deficient NTA. See 141
S. Ct. 1474, 1486 (2021) (holding that to trigger the stop-time rule, a NTA
must come in the form of a single document). Thus, the BIA erroneously
determined that Lara Canales was ineligible for cancellation of removal on
the basis that her NTA combined with her subsequent notice of hearing was
adequate to trigger the stop-time rule.
The BIA’s alternative basis for holding that Lara Canales had not been
present in the United States for the requisite 10-year period is also legal error.
As the BIA noted, the final removal order was entered in 2006—around one
year after Lara Canales came to the United States. The BIA cited its own
decision in Matter of Garcia, 24 I. & N. Dec. 179, 181 (BIA 2007), as authority
for the proposition that “continuous physical presence only continues to
accrue until the entry of a final administrative decision.” But this ruling, too,
is error: a final order of removal does not trigger the stop-time rule and
terminate continuous physical presence. Parada v. Garland, 48 F.4th 374, 377
(5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam). This court recently held that the text of the
stop-time rule is clear: the clock only stops when an alien is served with a
proper NTA under section 1229(a) or when an alien has committed an
enumerated offense under section 1229b(d)(1). See id. Neither of the two
triggering events occurred here.
Accordingly, each of the BIA’s bases for determining that Lara
Canales had not accrued the continuous physical presence required for
eligibility of cancellation of removal was legal error. We now hold that Lara
Canales is statutorily eligible to seek cancellation of removal. However, this
holding does not automatically entitle Lara Canales to have her motion to
reopen heard on the merits. The BIA must, upon remand, engage in the fact-
intensive determination of whether the 90-day deadline on motions to reopen
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should be tolled because of the extraordinary circumstance presented by
Pereira. If the BIA determines Lara Canales satisfies the requirements for
equitable tolling, she may then present her motion for a determination on its
merits.
We therefore VACATE the BIA’s denial of Lara Canales’s motion
to reopen and REMAND this case for further consideration not inconsistent
with this opinion.
VACATED and REMANDED.
7