United States Ex Rel. Holmes v. Northrop Grumman Corp. , 642 F. App'x 373 ( 2016 )


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  •      Case: 15-60414      Document: 00513434876         Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/23/2016
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15-60414                         United States Court of Appeals
    Summary Calendar                                Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    March 23, 2016
    United States of America, ex rel, DONALD C. HOLMES,                        Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION, A Delaware Corporation;
    HUNTINGTON INGALLS, INCORPORATED, formerly known as Northrop
    Grumman Shipbuilding,
    Defendants - Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 1:13-CV-85
    Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and OWEN and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff-Appellant Donald Holmes brought this qui tam action as relator
    for the Government under the False Claims Act. He appeals the district court’s
    order disqualifying him from serving as a relator in the suit and dismissing the
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 15-60414      Document: 00513434876         Page: 2    Date Filed: 03/23/2016
    No. 15-60414
    case without prejudice to the Government. Because Holmes fails to raise any
    arguments warranting reversal, we AFFIRM.
    I.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    This dispute involves two underlying proceedings and a tangled array of
    related actions. And, like so many cases that have appeared in our court
    recently, Hurricane Katrina was the catalyst for the chain of events leading to
    this appeal.
    Northrop Grumman Corporation (“NGC”) 1 is a large government
    contractor that, amongst other things, operates shipyards in Mississippi and
    Louisiana. Northrop Grumman Risk Management, Inc., insured its parent
    company, NGC, for certain losses related to those shipyards.                  A separate
    company, Munich Re, then provided reinsurance for NGC’s covered losses. In
    late 2005, NGC presented a claim under its policy with Munich Re for alleged
    damages to several of its shipyards as a result of Hurricane Katrina. During
    the adjustment process, Munich Re and NGC entered into a confidentiality
    agreement that prohibited Munich Re and its agents from disclosing
    documents and information that they received from NGC.                        Munich Re
    ultimately initiated arbitration proceedings in London, England, to resolve
    coverage disputes under the Munich Re/NGC reinsurance policy (the “London
    Arbitration”). Holmes and another lawyer, Gerald Fisher, represented Munich
    Re in the London Arbitration.
    While the London Arbitration was pending, Munich Re submitted a
    request with the United States Navy for documents relating to NGC. The Navy
    agreed to release the requested documents if an enforceable protective order
    was put in place. As a result, on April 6, 2010, Munich Re—represented by
    1For simplicity purposes, we will refer to NGC and its subsidiaries as “NGC” with the
    exception of one NGC’s subsidiaries, Northrop Grunman Risk Management, Inc.
    2
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    Holmes and Fisher—filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District
    of Columbia against NGC and several of its subsidiaries seeking a protective
    order (the “Protective Order Litigation”). In the complaint, Holmes and Fisher
    stated that they sought the relevant documents “in aid of private foreign
    arbitration only” and that they were “in no way . . . attempt[ing] to usurp the
    power of the arbitration tribunal” for other purposes. The complaint included
    a proposed protective order, which prohibited the use of the requested
    documents for any purpose outside of the London Arbitration.
    On June 2, 2010, while the Protective Order Litigation was still pending,
    Holmes and Fisher filed a qui tam lawsuit against NGC and others under the
    False Claims Act (“FCA”). They alleged that NGC had defrauded the Navy by
    using government funds allocated for expenses related to Hurricane Katrina
    to cover cost overruns that had occurred before the storm. Amongst other
    things, the complaint alleged that a review of the documents that they
    anticipated receiving from the Navy would help prove their claim.            This
    complaint was filed under seal pursuant to the FCA, and the suit was later
    transferred from the District of Columbia to the Southern District of
    Mississippi.
    On June 18, 2010, the parties in the Protective Order Litigation
    stipulated to a protective order, and on June 24, 2010, the district court entered
    the proposed protective order (the “Protective Order” or “Order”).           The
    Protective Order stated that any produced documents designated “Court
    Protected Material” would “be used or disclosed solely in the [London]
    Arbitration” and would “not be used in any other proceeding or for any other
    purpose without further order of this Court.” The Protective Order further
    required the parties to return or destroy all protected materials at the
    conclusion of the London Arbitration.       Despite the express terms of the
    Protective Order, Holmes submitted documents he received from the Navy to
    3
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    the Department of Justice’s Civil Fraud Division and to the district court
    presiding over the qui tam action.
    On November 11, 2011, NGC and Munich Re settled the London
    Arbitration.
    On December 8, 2011, the United States officially declined to intervene
    in the qui tam suit. In previous filings, the Government explained that it had
    investigated the claims, and that, amongst other things, its decision not to
    participate “stem[med] from serious ethical and professional responsibility
    concerns arising from the particular circumstances of [the] action.” On August
    18, 2012, Fisher also withdrew from the case when Holmes filed the operative
    First Amended Complaint.
    In October 2013, Appellees filed a motion to disqualify Holmes from
    representing the United States as a qui tam relator, citing his unethical
    conduct in pursuing the claim. On June 3, 2015, the district court granted the
    motion and issued an order (1) disqualifying Holmes as a relator and (2)
    dismissing the case with prejudice as to Holmes, but without prejudice as to
    any rights of the United States. Holmes timely appealed.
    II.     STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review rulings on motions to disqualify for abuse of discretion.
    F.D.I.C. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 
    50 F.3d 1304
    , 1311 (5th Cir. 1995). Under this
    standard, we review fact-findings for clear error and review de novo the district
    court’s application of the relevant rules of attorney conduct. 
    Id.
     This same
    abuse of discretion standard applies in our review of a district court’s dismissal
    of a complaint as a result of ethical violations. See Salmeron v. Enter. Recovery
    Sys., Inc., 
    579 F.3d 787
    , 793 (7th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Quest
    Diagnostics Inc., 
    734 F.3d 154
    , 165–66 (2d Cir. 2013).
    4
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    III.       DISCUSSION
    In a thorough and detailed opinion, the district court outlined Holmes’
    numerous ethical violations committed in pursuit of this qui tam action. Citing
    the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct, the Mississippi Rules
    of Professional Conduct, and the American Bar Association’s Model Rules, 2 the
    district court persuasively explained that Holmes violated no less than four
    ethical duties.
    The court first explained that Holmes violated his duty of loyalty by
    taking a position in the qui tam suit that was contrary to the interests of his
    client, Munich Re, in the London Arbitration. See ABA Model Rule 1.7(a) (“[A]
    lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent
    conflict of interest.”).      The analysis is straightforward:              in the London
    Arbitration, Munich Re argued that it did not owe NGC compensation for
    certain losses related to Hurricane Katrina in part because the Government
    had previously paid NGC compensation for those losses; Holmes then argued
    in the qui tam action that the Government should not have paid all of NGC’s
    claimed losses from Hurricane Katrina. 3 These two positions are clearly in
    direct conflict.
    2  The district court explained that these rules apply because: (1) much of Holmes’
    conduct occurred while the case was pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of
    Columbia, (2) the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct apply to litigants practicing in
    federal court in Mississippi, and (3) the Fifth Circuit recognizes the ABA Model Rules as the
    national standard for professional conduct. See U.S. ex rel. Holmes v. Northrop Grumman
    Corp., No. 1:13CV85-HSO-RHW, 
    2015 WL 3504525
    , at *4 (S.D. Miss. June 3, 2015). There
    is no material difference for purposes of this case between the three sets of rules, and
    therefore our discussion centers on the ABA Model Rules, as they are the “national standards
    utilized by this circuit in ruling on disqualification motions.” In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 
    972 F.2d 605
    , 610 (5th Cir. 1992).
    3 Holmes argues that the qui tam action was a litigation tactic to force settlement in
    the London Arbitration and that he received informed consent from Munich Re to pursue his
    claim. Oddly, in support of the proposition that he disclosed conflicts issues with his client,
    Holmes cites to a filing by the Government in which the Government expressed serious
    “ethical and professional responsibility concerns” with Holmes’ conduct, including “a
    5
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    Perhaps most troubling of the violations was Holmes’ blatant disregard
    for the Protective Order and his related violation of his duty of candor to the
    court. There is no dispute that Holmes violated the express terms of the
    Protective Order by relaying the documents he received in the Protective Order
    Litigation to the Department of Justice and the district court in the qui tam
    action; indeed, Holmes has conceded the point. 4 He also concedes on appeal
    that he was obligated to follow the Protective Order in pursuing his qui tam
    claim. 5
    The district court also concluded that Holmes violated his duty of candor
    during the course of the Protective Order Litigation. Holmes and Fisher told
    the court in the Protective Order Litigation on April 6, 2010, that Munich Re
    was seeking documents for use solely in the London Arbitration. On June 2,
    2010, Holmes filed the qui tam suit, and told the court there that he expected
    that the documents he received from the Navy would prove NGC’s alleged
    fraud. Holmes stipulated to the Protective Order on June 18, 2010, and the
    order was entered on June 24. He then promptly disclosed the documents he
    potential conflict between [Holmes’] claims in this qui tam action and those of [his] insurance
    company client[, Munich Re,] in its arbitration with NGC.” The Government further stated
    that its communications with Munich Re did not assuage these concerns. The other evidence
    that Holmes cites for this claim is limited, and indicates that he represented to Munich Re
    that he was legally required to bring his qui tam suit (which he was not) and that there is no
    attorney-client privilege issue (which the district court did not raise).
    4 In fact, Holmes filed a motion with the U.S. District Court for the District of
    Columbia to correct his violation of the Protective Order. In particular, he asked the court
    for a modification of the Order to allow him to use the protected documents in the qui tam
    suit and to sanction him in the amount of $1,000 for his violation. The district court denied
    the motion, finding “no reason—let alone good cause—to change the terms of the original
    protective order.” Munchener Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft in Munchen
    v. Northrop Grumman Risk Mgmt. Inc., No. 10-551 (JEB), 
    2015 WL 8483241
    , at *6 (D.D.C.
    Dec. 9, 2015).
    5 The district court similarly found that Holmes’ disclosures included Munich Re’s
    confidential information—obtained during the course of his representation—in violation of
    his duty of confidentiality. See ABA Model Rule 1.6(a) (“A lawyer shall not reveal information
    relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent . . . .”).
    6
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    received pursuant to the Protective Order to third parties in direct
    contravention of the terms of the Order and his representations to the court in
    the Protective Order Litigation.           Later, in the operative First Amended
    Complaint, Holmes stated that he had “gained access to documents and
    information showing that the U.S. Government has been defrauded,” including
    “documentation submitted by Northrop Grumman to the Navy.” Based on this
    timeline, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Holmes violated
    his duty of candor in his representations to the court in the Protective Order
    Litigation. 6 See ABA Model Rule 3.3(a) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . .
    make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false
    statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the
    lawyer.”); see also ABA Model Rules 4.1(a), 8.4(c). This timeline also supports
    the court’s finding that Holmes knowingly violated the Protective Order.
    The district court concluded that (1) “based on the totality of the ethical
    violations committed by Holmes surrounding this qui tam case, Holmes should
    be disqualified from serving as relator in this case,” and (2) “merely
    disqualifying Holmes from serving as relator without dismissing the case
    would greatly prejudice Northrop Grumman because the case would be tried
    on a record developed primarily through the fruits of Holmes’ unethical
    conduct.” Citing Quest Diagnostics, 734 F.3d at 167, the district court noted
    that its dismissal of the complaint was further justified by the fact that neither
    the United States, as the real party in interest, nor any other relator was
    foreclosed from bringing the claims.
    6 Holmes claims that he was “extremely candid” with the court “about documents,
    where they came from, and the fact that he needed further guidance from the District Court
    as to how to deal with them.” In support he cites filings made with the district court in the
    qui tam suit. This argument is, at best, misguided: he violated his duty of candor to the
    court in the Protective Order Litigation in an apparent effort to gain access to the relevant
    documents—his disclosures in the qui tam suit are therefore irrelevant.
    7
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    District courts are afforded discretion in penalizing ethical violations,
    including disqualifying a relator and dismissing his suit in a qui tam action,
    see id. at 165–69 (affirming the disqualification of relator and the dismissal of
    the complaint in qui tam suit for ethical violations); Salmeron, 
    579 F.3d at 798
    (similar), and Holmes has failed to raise any competent argument as to how
    the district court abused its discretion here. In his briefing before the district
    court, Holmes challenged his disqualification largely based on his assertion
    that ethics rules and confidentiality duties are inapplicable in FCA cases. He
    now acknowledges on appeal that he is obligated to abide by his ethical
    obligations as a lawyer—even in FCA cases—and that he was and is bound by
    the terms of the Protective Order. 7
    In addition to conceding these points of law, his brief on appeal fails to
    muster a cognizable argument to bolster his position, as it lacks any
    meaningful citation to legal authority, 8 and contains only sparse reference to
    the record on appeal. 9 This failure is inexcusable given that Holmes is an
    experienced attorney and has already been warned by the district court in this
    7  See Quest Diagnostics Inc., 734 F.3d at 163 (citing Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,
    
    544 U.S. 431
    , 449 (2005), and holding that nothing in the FCA evinces a clear legislative
    intent to preempt state statutes and rules that regulate attorneys’ disclosure of client
    confidences); Holden v. Simpson Paper Co., 48 F. App’x 917, 
    2002 WL 31115137
    , at *2 (5th
    Cir. Sept. 18, 2002) (“Deliberately disobeying court orders demonstrates sufficient bad faith
    to justify a district court’s sanction under its inherent powers.”).
    8 In his brief, Holmes’ legal citations are limited to the following: one case (in the
    standard of review section); Rule 12(b)(6) (in the standard of review section); the FCA (twice,
    in the jurisdiction section); and 
    18 U.S.C. § 4
     (in the facts section). He also includes cross-
    references to portions of motions that he filed in district court; however, we have previously
    held that “an appellant may not incorporate by reference arguments made in the district
    court.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 
    704 F.3d 413
    , 431 n.6 (5th Cir.
    2013).
    9 Holmes’ only meaningful citations to the record are discussed in footnotes 3 & 6,
    supra.
    8
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    litigation about his failure to properly brief matters. 10 We therefore decline
    the invitation to dig through Holmes’ bald assertions and marshal an
    argument on his behalf; as we have previously stated, “[j]udges are not like
    pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” de la O v. Hous. Auth. of City of El
    Paso, 
    417 F.3d 495
    , 501 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 
    927 F.2d 955
    , 956 (7th Cir. 1991)). 11
    Holmes’ remaining argument on appeal is that the district court did not
    afford him an evidentiary hearing on NGC’s disqualification motion; however,
    Holmes did not raise any evidentiary issues before the district court and there
    is no indication that he ever requested an evidentiary hearing on the
    disqualification motion. And, sure enough, he fails to cite any legal authority
    on appeal supporting the position that he is entitled to a hearing. We therefore
    find no reason to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in not
    holding an evidentiary hearing on NGC’s motion to disqualify.                       See In re
    Eckstein Marine Serv. L.L.C., 
    672 F.3d 310
    , 319 (5th Cir. 2012) (stating that a
    10    Holmes is an experienced lawyer, having spent over forty-seven years as a
    practicing attorney, including as a partner in one of this country’s largest law firms. The
    district court therefore warned Holmes that, although he is appearing pro se, he “is not
    automatically subject to the very liberal standards afforded to a non-attorney pro se plaintiff
    because an attorney is presumed to have a knowledge of the legal system and need less
    protections from the court.” See Richards v. Duke Univ., 
    480 F. Supp. 2d 222
    , 234 (D.D.C.
    2007); Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 
    258 F.3d 62
    , 82 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that “pro se
    attorneys . . . typically cannot claim the special consideration which the courts customarily
    grant to pro se parties.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Later, the district court issued
    an Order on Miscellaneous Relief, admonishing Holmes and stating: “in what appears to be
    a recurring practice of the relators in this case, they cite no case law, statute, or other legal
    authority indicating this Court’s power to grant such relief, nor does the Court discern any
    legal basis for doing so.” The court then specifically ordered that “the relators shall refrain
    from filing any further motions in this case without citations to supporting legal authority.”
    11 See also United States v. Scroggins, 
    599 F.3d 433
    , 446–47 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A party
    that asserts an argument on appeal, but fails to adequately brief it, is deemed to have waived
    it. . . . [A]mong other requirements to properly raise an argument, a party must ordinarily
    identify the relevant legal standards and any relevant Fifth Circuit cases.” (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted)).
    9
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    district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for abuse of
    discretion); see also United States v. Skilling, 
    554 F.3d 529
    , 568 n.63 (5th Cir.
    2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 
    561 U.S. 358
     (2010)
    (holding that appellant waived his argument that he was entitled to an
    evidentiary hearing because the appellant failed to brief the following issues:
    “When is a district court obligated to hold an evidentiary hearing? What is the
    standard of review? Are there any relevant Fifth Circuit cases?”).
    IV.       CONCLUSION
    Given Holmes’ failure to challenge the district court’s careful and well-
    reasoned opinion in any meaningful way, we AFFIRM.
    10