In Re: Deepwater Horizon ( 2018 )


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  •     Case: 17-30475      Document: 00514364341              Page: 1       Date Filed: 02/27/2018
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 17-30475                               United States Court of Appeals
    Summary Calendar                                      Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    February 27, 2018
    In Re: Deepwater Horizon                            Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    ------------------------------------------------------
    EDUARDO PINEIRO PEREZ, Individually, doing business as La Sociedad
    Cooperativa de Produccion Pesquera La Rivera De Tampico de Alto S. C. de
    R.L,
    Plaintiff–Appellant
    v.
    BP, P.L.C.; BP PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA, INCORPORATED; BP
    AMERICA, INCORPORATED; BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION,
    INCORPORATED; TRANSOCEAN, LIMITED; TRANSOCEAN
    DEEPWATER, INCORPORATED; TRANSOCEAN HOLDINGS,
    INCORPORATED; TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE DEEPWATER DRILLING,
    INCORPORATED; HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES,
    INCORPORATED; SPERRY DRILLING SERVICES; BP AMERICA
    PRODUCTION COMPANY,
    Defendants–Appellees
    -------------------------------------------------------
    CLAUDIO GONZALEZ DEL ANGEL, Individually, doing business as
    Permisionario Claudio Gonzalez Del Angel,
    Plaintiff–Appellant
    v.
    Case: 17-30475     Document: 00514364341              Page: 2      Date Filed: 02/27/2018
    No. 17-30475
    BP, P.L.C.; BP AMERICA, INCORPORATED; BP PRODUCTS NORTH
    AMERICA, INCORPORATED; BP AMERICA PRODUCTION COMPANY;
    BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INCORPORATED; TRANSOCEAN,
    LIMITED; TRANSOCEAN HOLDINGS, INCORPORATED; TRANSOCEAN
    DEEPWATER, INCORPORATED; TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE
    DEEPWATER DRILLING, INCORPORATED; HALLIBURTON ENERGY
    SERVICES, INCORPORATED; SPERRY DRILLING SERVICES,
    Defendants–Appellees
    -------------------------------------------------------------
    FELIPE BARRIOS ANZURES, Individually, doing business as Compro Venta
    de Felipe Barrios,
    Plaintiff–Appellant
    v.
    BP, P.L.C.; BP AMERICA, INCORPORATED; BP PRODUCTS NORTH
    AMERICA, INCORPORATED; BP AMERICA PRODUCTION COMPANY;
    BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INCORPORATED; TRANSOCEAN,
    LIMITED; TRANSOCEAN HOLDINGS, INCORPORATED; TRANSOCEAN
    DEEPWATER, INCORPORATED; TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE
    DEEPWATER DRILLING, INCORPORATED; HALLIBURTON ENERGY
    SERVICES, INCORPORATED; SPERRY DRILLING SERVICES,
    Defendants–Appellees
    ----------------------------------------------------------------
    ARTEMIO ARAN BLANCO, doing business as Grupo Pescadores Libres
    Artemio Aran,
    Plaintiff–Appellant
    v.
    2
    Case: 17-30475      Document: 00514364341         Page: 3    Date Filed: 02/27/2018
    No. 17-30475
    BP, P.L.C.; BP AMERICA, INCORPORATED; BP PRODUCTS NORTH
    AMERICA, INCORPORATED; BP AMERICA PRODUCTION COMPANY;
    BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INCORPORATED; TRANSOCEAN,
    LIMITED; TRANSOCEAN HOLDINGS, INCORPORATED; TRANSOCEAN
    DEEPWATER, INCORPORATED; TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE
    DEEPWATER DRILLING, INCORPORATED; HALLIBURTON ENERGY
    SERVICES, INCORPORATED; SPERRY DRILLING SERVICES,
    Defendants–Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:10-MD-2179
    USDC No. 2:16-CV-4122
    USDC No. 2:16-CV-4123
    USDC No. 2:16-CV-4124
    USDC No. 2:16-CV-4151
    Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    This appeal emerges from the Deepwater Horizon multi-district
    litigation (“MDL 2179”). The Appellants are cooperatives of fishermen and
    their members, residing in or doing business in numerous Mexican States.
    Appellants assert that the district court abused its discretion by forcing them
    to comply with a pretrial order—PTO 60, a case management order. PTO 60
    barred certain remaining plaintiffs from continuing to bring multi-plaintiff
    complaints, including class actions. Despite the dictate of PTO 60, Appellants
    proceeded to file four putative class actions—involving nearly 24,000 class
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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    members—seeking damages. The district court rejected these attempts and
    ordered the Appellants to file single-plaintiff complaints. When the Appellants
    failed to comply—even after being given numerous opportunities to do so—the
    district court dismissed their claims with prejudice.
    The Appellants then moved for a motion for reconsideration of the
    dismissal. They argued that PTO 60 violated the Supreme Court’s decision in
    Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    559 U.S. 393
    (2010).
    There, the Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 “entitl[es] a
    plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria [of Rule 23] to pursue his claim
    as a class action.” 
    Id. at 398.
    According to Appellants, Shady Grove gave them
    “the absolute right to file the class claims.” Appellees argued that Shady Grove
    is inapposite; it dealt with a New York state law that modified Rule 23’s
    application, and the holding did not “suggest that a plaintiff’s right to pursue
    certification of a class action consistent with Rule 23 somehow shields it from
    dismissal of its claims on other grounds, such as failure to comply with pretrial
    orders.” The district court agreed with the Appellees and denied the motion
    “for essentially the reasons provided by BP.”
    We review the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. See Garcia
    v. Woman’s Hosp. of Tex., 
    143 F.3d 227
    , 229 (5th Cir. 1998). The court has
    broad discretion and inherent authority to manage its docket; that discretion
    includes the power to dismiss a case for a party’s failure to obey the court’s
    orders. See Sims v. ANR Freight System, Inc., 
    77 F.3d 846
    , 849 (5th Cir. 1996);
    Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc., 
    57 F.3d 1406
    , 1417 (5th Cir. 1995). “A district court
    abuses its discretion if it: (1) relies on clearly erroneous factual findings;
    (2) relies on erroneous conclusions of law; or (3) misapplies the law to the facts.”
    In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 
    545 F.3d 304
    , 310 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting
    McClure v. Ashcroft, 
    335 F.3d 404
    , 408 (5th Cir. 2003)). We conclude that the
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    district court did not abuse its discretion and, therefore, AFFIRM the district
    court’s dismissal.
    The Appellants’ sole argument on appeal is that they were entitled to
    pursue their claims as a class action—notwithstanding the trial court’s case
    management order to the contrary. 1 The Appellants again rely on Shady Grove,
    but their reliance is misplaced. That case involved a diversity class-action suit
    filed in federal court that the district court dismissed because of a New York
    statute that substantively limited the availability of the class-action device in
    those circumstances. Shady 
    Grove, 559 U.S. at 397
    . The Second Circuit
    affirmed. 
    Id. at 398.
    The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that a state may
    not statutorily limit the availability of pursuing a class action under Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in diversity jurisdiction cases. 
    Id. at 398–401.
    Shady
    Grove did not, as the Appellees argue, “involve the exercise of a judge’s case-
    management discretion.”
    Here, PTO 60 is a case-management order that the district court issued
    years into a highly complex MDL. After allowing plaintiffs to file multi-plaintiff
    complaints for years, the court eventually sought to limit those sorts of filings.
    Indeed, multiple multi-plaintiff complaints proceeded as part of the multi-
    district litigation, and there were multiple class action settlements. PTO 60
    1 The Appellees give us reason to believe that the Appellants waived the argument
    that PTO 60 contradicts the Supreme Court’s holding in Shady Grove. Most concerning, the
    Appellants initially indicated to the district court that they planned to comply with PTO 60.
    They requested—and the district court granted—an extension for them to do so. However,
    they eventually reversed course and decided not to comply. Once this deadline (and other
    opportunities to comply with PTO 60) passed, the district court dismissed their claims. Only
    in the motion for reconsideration did the Appellants raise the argument that PTO 60
    contradicted Shady Grove. As the Appellees argue, it appears that the Appellants “either
    deliberately held in reserve or failed to even generate [this argument] until after they had
    already lost.” Waiver rules matter, even in complex cases. See Stern v. Marshall, 
    564 U.S. 462
    , 481–82 (2011). Litigants may waive an argument—even one invoking a Constitutional
    or statutory right— by failing to timely assert the right or by belatedly raising the argument,
    “sandbagging” the court. See 
    id. at 482.
    However, out of an abundance of caution, we consider
    Appellants’ argument that PTO 60 contradicts Shady Grove.
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    does not impose a substantive limit on the ability of a plaintiff to pursue a class
    action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Instead, PTO 60 is a
    procedural case management order that dictates the continued availability of
    the class device in a complex MDL. We do not read Shady Grove to be so broad
    as to restrict a district court’s ability to manage its docket by restricting the
    continued availability of a multi-plaintiff device, years into a complex MDL.
    Notably, the Appellants fail to identify a case in which a court has read Shady
    Grove in that fashion. Therefore, we conclude that the district court acted
    within its discretion to dismiss the Appellants’ claims, see 
    Woodson, 57 F.3d at 1417
    , and we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal.
    6