Chun Yang v. Jefferson Sessions, III ( 2018 )


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  •      Case: 17-60755      Document: 00514655999         Page: 1    Date Filed: 09/25/2018
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 17-60755                        September 25, 2018
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    CHUN LIN YANG,
    Petitioner
    v.
    JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    BIA No. A097 645 703
    Before KING, SOUTHWICK, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Chun Lin Yang, a native and citizen of China, petitions this court for
    review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her
    third motion to reopen. She argues that the BIA abused its discretion in
    denying the motion and erred in concluding that she had not demonstrated
    changed country conditions in China. Yang further argues that the BIA erred
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 17-60755     Document: 00514655999     Page: 2   Date Filed: 09/25/2018
    No. 17-60755
    in determining that she had not made a showing of prima facie eligibility for
    relief from removal.
    This court has jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to reopen
    based on changed country conditions. See Panjwani v. Gonzales, 
    401 F.3d 626
    ,
    632 (5th Cir. 2005). Review is under a highly deferential abuse of discretion
    standard, and the decision will be upheld as long as it is “not capricious,
    racially invidious, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so
    aberrational that it is arbitrary rather than the result of any perceptible
    rational approach.” Manzano-Garcia v. Gonzales, 
    413 F.3d 462
    , 469 (5th Cir.
    2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    The BIA has the authority to reopen deportation proceedings beyond the
    90-day limitation period if the request for relief is “based on changed
    circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which
    deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not
    available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous
    hearing.”    
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(3)(ii).   To establish the requisite changed
    country conditions, Yang had to present evidence that compared, in a
    meaningful way, conditions in China in September 2006, when her removal
    hearing was held, with conditions in May 2017, when she filed her motion to
    reopen.     See Ramos-Lopez v. Lynch, 
    823 F.3d 1024
    , 1026 (5th Cir. 2016);
    Panjwani, 
    401 F.3d at 633
    .
    Neither Yang’s motion to reopen nor her petition for review compares, in
    any meaningful way, the conditions in China at the time of her removal
    hearing in September 2006 with conditions in May 2017, at the time she sought
    reopening, with respect to her assertion that she will be punished by China for
    having used a smuggler to leave the country illegally and for having applied
    for asylum in the United States.        See Ramos-Lopez, 823 F.3d at 1026;
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    No. 17-60755
    Panjwani, 
    401 F.3d at 633
    . Inasmuch as Yang now seeks to assert explicitly
    that she will be treated as the equivalent of a political dissident and subjected
    to mistreatment upon her return as a result, this court lacks jurisdiction to
    consider the argument. See Omari v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 314
    , 320-21 (5th Cir.
    2009).
    A review of the record confirms that substantial evidence supports the
    BIA’s finding that Yang’s evidence did not demonstrate a material change in
    country conditions in China warranting reopening, and Yang thus fails to show
    that the BIA’s decision was abuse of discretion. See Panjawani, 
    401 F.3d at 632
    ; see also Manzano-Garcia, 
    413 F.3d at 469
    . Because Yang does not show
    that the BIA abused its discretion in determining that she failed to show
    materially changed country conditions in China, this court need not examine
    her remaining arguments challenging the BIA’s conclusion that she had not
    made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief from removal. See Ramos-
    Lopez, 823 F.3d at 1026; Ogbemudia v. INS, 
    988 F.2d 595
    , 601 (5th Cir. 1993).
    Accordingly, the petition for review is DENIED.
    3