Boyd v. USA/FMHA ( 1996 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 95-60725
Summary Calendar
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In the Matter of
HENRY BOYD, JR.,
Debtor.
HENRY BOYD, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA/FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE;
LOCKE D. BARKLEY, Trustee,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
(3:94-CV-189-S)
_________________________
June 25, 1996
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Henry Boyd, Jr., appeals the judgment of the district court
affirming, on res judicata grounds, an order of the bankruptcy
court denying his motion for formal order of approval of exemp-
tions. Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
In conjunction with a loan received from Farmers Home
Administration (“FmHA”), Boyd executed a promissory note secured by
his residence (the “property”). Boyd subsequently defaulted on the
loan, and FmHA foreclosed on the property. In March 1986, FmHA
conducted a foreclosure sale at which it was the sole bidder. Boyd
challenged the foreclosure in district court, and FmHA counter-
claimed for eviction. The district court dismissed Boyd’s
complaint and granted the eviction. In November 1988, we affirmed.
Boyd v. United States, 861 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Boyd I”).
On December 16, 1988, Boyd filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy
petition and plan, listing FmHA as the only creditor. The plan
claimed the property as an exempt asset and provided for monthly
mortgage payments to FmHA. No objection or claim was made by FmHA,
and the bankruptcy court confirmed the plan on February 24, 1989.
On February 27, 1989, FmHA filed a motion for abandonment and
for relief from the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court granted
FmHA’s motion. In re Boyd, 107 B.R. 541 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1989).
Boyd was evicted, and the district court affirmed the bankruptcy
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court’s order.
FmHA filed an adversary proceeding to recover rent, and Boyd
counterclaimed that the foreclosure should be set aside. The
bankruptcy court dismissed Boyd’s counterclaim and entered summary
judgment, awarding rent to FmHA. Later, Boyd filed a motion to
hold FmHA in contempt for violating the automatic stay. The
bankruptcy court dismissed his motion.
Boyd then appealed the following orders to this court: (1) the
order striking his counterclaim; (2) the order denying his motion
for reconsideration of the counterclaim; (3) the summary judgment
order awarding rent to FmHA; (4) the order dismissing his contempt
motion; and (5) the order overruling his objection to the dismissal
of his contempt motion. We affirmed. Boyd v. United States,
11 F.3d 59 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 2103 (1994)
(“Boyd II”).
Boyd then filed a number of motions with the bankruptcy court,
which the court denied. The district court affirmed, noting that
the issues on appeal were barred by the doctrine of res judicata
because they were attempts to relitigate the issues decided by
Boyd’s previous appeal, namely whether FmHA was bound by the
bankruptcy plan because the confirmation order was entered by the
bankruptcy court without objection.
II.
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Boyd’s only argument in this appeal is that Celotex Corp. v.
Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1493 (1995), decided after Boyd II, reversed
the decisions in his prior appeals. Because Boyd was not a party
to Celotex, and the case did not explicitly or implicitly reverse
Boyd I or Boyd II,1 Boyd’s argument is that a final judgment does
not have a res judicata effect if a later decision somehow calls
into doubt the court’s reasoning. Boyd’s argument is fundamentally
at odds with the doctrine of res judicata; a judgment based on a
legal principle subsequently overruled in another case is still
entitled to res judicata effect. Federated Dep’t Stores v. Moitie,
452 U.S. 394, 398-99 (1981); Erspan v. Badgett, 659 F.2d 26, 27-28
(5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982);
18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4429 (1981).
Simply put, the doctrine of res judicata provides that
when a final judgment has been entered on the merits of
a case, “[i]t is a finality as to the claim or demand in
controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with
them, not only as to every matter which was offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as
to any other admissible matter which might have been
1
Boyd assets that Celotex addressed the precise issues presented in Boyd
II. This court’s decision in Boyd II is not inconsistent with Celotex. In
Celotex, the Court held that a judgment creditor was obligated to obey a
bankruptcy court’s injunction prohibiting it from executing against the debtor’s
surety on supersedeas bond posted by debtor where the judgment that occasioned
the bond had become final. 115 S. Ct. at 1496. The court noted that the proper
way to challenge an injunction is with the issuing court. Id. at 1498.
Boyd has failed to explain how Celotex applies to a case where a bankruptcy
court granted a creditor relief from a stay and allowed the creditor to challenge
its confirmation order. The Court’s decision that a creditor may not
collaterally attack an injunction in a different court does not support the
contention that a creditor may not directly attack a confirmation order in the
court where it was issued.
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offered for that purpose.” The final “judgment puts an
end to the cause of action, which cannot again be brought
into litigation between the parties upon any ground
whatever.”
Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129-30 (1983) (citations
omitted).
AFFIRMED. All outstanding motions are DENIED.
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