Lamar v. Coffield ( 2000 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 99-20467
ALLEN L LAMAR; ET AL,
Plaintiffs,
VERSUS
H H COFFIELD, Former Chairman, Texas Board of Corrections; WALTER
L PFLUGER, member of Board of Corrections; JAMES M WINDHAM, member,
Board of Corrections; LESTER BOYD, member, Board of Corrections;
WALTER M MISCHER, member, Board of Corrections; DAVID D ALLEN,
member, Board of Corrections; W ERVIN JAMES, Member, Board of
Corrections; FRED W SHIELD, member, Board of Corrections; L H TRUE,
member, Board of Corrections; GEORGE J BETO, DR, Director of the
Texas Department of Corrections,
Defendants - Appellees,
VERSUS
DARREN RENE WILLIAMS,
Movant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas, Houston
(72-CV-1393)
June 2, 2000
Before DAVIS, DUHÉ and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:*
Texas prisoner Darren Williams appeals from the district
court’s denial of his motion to terminate prospective relief in a
civil class action with respect to prison conditions.
In October 1972, Texas prison system inmates Allen Lamar and
Lorenzo Davis filed this pro se civil rights action against the
state for “violations of their rights to be free from the arbitrary
infliction of racially segregated facilities.” Lamar v. Coffield,
951 F.Supp. 629, 630 (S.D. Tex. 1996). On February 16, 1977, the
district court for the Southern District of Texas entered an Order
certifying the case as a class action and naming three separate
classes composed of all past, present and future inmates of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. The
three classes consist of black inmates who are plaintiffs or
plaintiff-intervenors, Hispanic inmates who are plaintiffs or
plaintiff-intervenors and a mixed group of white, black and
Hispanic defendant-intervenors. In 1977, the district court
enjoined the state permanently from racially segregating inmate
housing and other facilities “unless an objective assessment showed
that integration for a particular prisoner would pose a high
likelihood of danger to him or others.” Id.On January 29, 1999, Texas prisoner Darren Williams filed in
*
Pursuant to 5th CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5th CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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the district court a motion to terminate prospective relief in this
civil class action with respect to prison conditions under 18
U.S.C. § 3626(b), which, in pertinent part, provides:
(b) Termination of relief.--
(1) Termination of prospective relief.–(A) In any
civil action with respect to prison conditions in which
prospective relief is ordered, such relief shall be
terminable upon the motion of any party or intervener–...
Williams alleged that he is a plaintiff-intervenor and a
member of the Plaintiff class. The district court summarily denied
Williams’s motion on April 27, 1999 without assigning reasons. The
record discloses that Williams is neither a named class member nor
an intervenor in this class action. In previous cases we have held
that we have no jurisdiction to consider an appeal by a class
member who has not attempted to intervene as a named party. See
Cook v. Powell Buick, Inc., 155 F.3d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1998);
Searcy v. Philips Electronics N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 156-57
(5th Cir. 1997); Loran v. Furr’s/Bishop’s, Inc., 988 F.2d 554 (5th
Cir. 1993); Walker v. City of Mesquite, 858 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th
Cir. 1988)(“[T]he better practice...is for nonnamed class members
to file a motion to intervene and then, upon the denial of that
motion, appeal to this Court.”) (citing Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S.
301 (1988)). Thus, we are constrained to dismiss the instant
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
DISMISSED.
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