Beavers v. Brown , 95 F. App'x 529 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 28, 2004
FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-10150
c/w No. 03-10319
Summary Calendar
SHERRY BURNS BEAVERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JAY BROWN, Individually; ET AL.,
Defendants,
JAY BROWN, Individually;
JAY BROWN, as Sheriff of Parker County, Texas;
ROBERT ANTHONY CORRAL, Deputy Jailer of the
Sheriff Department of Parker County, Texas;
PARKER COUNTY, TEXAS,
Defendants-Appellees.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SHERRY BURNS BEAVERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JAY BROWN, Individually; ET AL.,
Defendants,
ROBERT ANTHONY CORRAL, Individually;
ROBERT ANTHONY CORRAL, Deputy Jailer of the
Sheriff Department of Parker County, Texas,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(4:02-CV-336-A)
Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action claiming constitutional and
state law violations, Sherry Burns Beavers appeals from both a
judgment (FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)) dismissing her constitutional
claims against Sheriff Brown and Parker County and an earlier
default judgment against Deputy Corral, awarding only nominal
damages. (Notwithstanding Beavers’ premature notice of appeal, we
have jurisdiction over the judgment rendered in favor of Sheriff
Brown and Parker County. See Young v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs.
Inc., 294 F.3d 631, 634 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002).)
For the default judgment against Deputy Corral, a hearing was
held concerning damages. The district court did not clearly err in
finding that the sexual relationship between Beavers, an inmate,
and Deputy Corral was consensual. Cf. Theriot v. Parish of
Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 490 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529
U.S. 1129 (2000). We need not reach the legal issue whether this
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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consensual relationship violated the Constitution, because Deputy
Corral’s liability is not in dispute.
Beavers has pointed to no evidence overlooked by the district
court in determining she had not suffered a compensable injury;
therefore, she has not shown that the nominal damages award was
clearly erroneous. See Texas A&M Research Found. v. Magna Transp.,
Inc., 338 F.3d 394, 404 (5th Cir. 2003); Williams v. Kaufman
County, __ F.3d __, No. 02-10500, 2003 WL 22890399, *15 (5th Cir.
9 Dec. 2003).
Beavers has also failed to demonstrate that the district
court’s refusal to award exemplary damages against Deputy Corral
was an abuse of discretion. See Sockwell v. Phelps, 20 F.3d 187,
192 (5th Cir. 1994). Additionally, Beavers was not
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial on the damages issue; nor
has she demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion
in denying her request. See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2); In re
Dierschke, 975 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1992).
The district court acted within its discretion in denying
Beavers’ request for attorney’s fees, given: she produced no
evidence that any damage arose from the claimed constitutional
deprivation; and, moreover, her victory produced no “public
benefit” to justify an award of fees in spite of receiving only
nominal damages. See Hidden Oaks Ltd. v. City of Austin, 138 F.3d
1036, 1052-53 (5th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district
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court also did not abuse its discretion by not ordering Beavers to
submit a FED. R. CIV. P. 7 reply to the defendants’ qualified
immunity defense because the court dismissed Sheriff Brown and the
County on grounds other than qualified immunity. See Schultea v.
Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
Beavers’ contention that the district court erroneously
dismissed her claims against Sheriff Brown in his individual
capacity is inadequately briefed and is therefore waived.
E.g., Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
We also reject her contention that the district court’s FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(b)(6) dismissal was inappropriate. See Shipp v. McMahon, 234
F.3d 907, 911 (5th Cir. 2000) (de novo review), overruled on other
grounds by, McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 328 (5th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1232 (2003). Beavers’ complaint
failed to identify either an unconstitutional official policy or a
custom instituted by Parker County and/or Sheriff Brown that caused
the claimed constitutional deprivation. See Colle v. Brazos
County, Tex., 981 F.2d 237, 244 (5th Cir. 1993). Moreover, her
allegations of a causal connection between Sheriff Brown’s conduct
and the claimed constitutional deprivation were purely conclusional
and were therefore insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for
municipal liability. See Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police
Dep’t, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997).
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Finally, Beavers’ complaint failed to claim that Parker
County’s immunity had been waived through liability under the Texas
Tort Claims Act. See Dallas County Mental Health & Mental
Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1998). She has
shown no error on the part of the district court in dismissing her
state law claims on that basis.
AFFIRMED
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