United States v. Torres-Lopez ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-11282
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
NICOLAS TORRES-LOPEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 2:99-CR-26-1
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July 18, 2000
Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Nicolas Torres-Lopez (Torres) appeals his conviction and
sentence on eight counts of transporting illegal aliens. See 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (B)(ii).
Torres argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion for judgment of acquittal. He contends that, even
assuming that he knew they were illegally in the United States,
the Government failed to prove that Torres’ transportation of the
eight illegal aliens was done in furtherance of the aliens’
violation of the immigration law. Because Torres failed to renew
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 99-11282
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his motion at the close of all the evidence, our review is
limited to determining whether a manifest miscarriage of justice
ensues from Torres’ conviction. See United States v. Ruiz, 860
F.2d 615, 617 (5th Cir. 1988). From our review of the evidence,
we conclude that the evidence was not so tenuous on the specific-
intent element that Torres’ conviction would amount to a
miscarriage of justice. See id.; United States v. Merkt, 764
F.2d 266, 271-72 (5th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Diaz,
936 F.2d 786, 788 (5th Cir. 1991) (listing elements of offense).
Torres argues that the district court abused its discretion
in admitting his three prior convictions as extrinsic evidence.
See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). The extrinsic evidence was relevant to
Torres’ knowledge and his intent. See United States v.
Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d 863, 871 (5th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 1375 (1999); United States v. Williams, 132
F.3d 1055, 1059 (5th Cir. 1998). The probative value of the
evidence was not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice.
See Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d at 872-73. The convictions were
not so remote in time as to undercut their probative value, and
the sufficient limiting instruction diminished the likelihood of
any unfair prejudice. To the extent that Torres argues that the
extrinsic evidence should have been excluded because of the
timing of the Government’s notice of intent to use Rule 404(b)
evidence, we find the argument unpersuasive. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in its ruling.
For the first time on appeal, Torres argues that the
Government failed to provide the necessary predicate for the
No. 99-11282
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introduction of the Rule 404(b) evidence and thus, the evidence
was irrelevant. We find no error, plain or otherwise.
Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d at 870; see Huddleston v. United
States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988).
Torres argues that the district court erred in admitting
into evidence Gov’t exhibit 1, Torres’ signed statement. Our
review of the matter detects no error in the Government’s
authentication of the document as Torres’ statement. See United
States v. Wake, 948 F.2d 1422, 1434-35 (5th Cir. 1991); Rule
901(a). His argument is aimed more toward the weight of the
evidence and not to its admissibility. See United States v.
Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1201 n.16 (5th Cir. 1981). No abuse
of discretion is evident.
AFFIRMED.