United States v. Lachney , 119 F. App'x 640 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                 January 6, 2005
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 04-30490
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ELANDER MARK LACHNEY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 3:03-CR-179-ALL
    --------------------
    Before DAVIS, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Elander Mark Lachney appeals the sentences imposed by the
    district court following entry of his guilty pleas to charges of
    bank fraud (Count One), illegal use of means of identification of
    another to commit bank fraud (Count Two), and illegal use of a
    social security number (Count Three).   The district court
    sentenced Lachney, inter alia, to concurrent terms of 115 months
    of imprisonment on Counts One and Two and to a concurrent term of
    sixty months of imprisonment on Count Three.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 04-30490
    -2-
    For the first time on appeal, Lachney contends that he was
    sentenced in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by
    jury.   Lachney relies on Blakely v. Washington, 
    124 S. Ct. 2531
    (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000) as
    support for his position.   As Lachney concedes, his argument is
    foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Pineiro, 
    377 F.3d 464
    , 465-66   (5th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed (July 14,
    2004) (No. 04-5263); cf. Wicker v. McCotter, 
    798 F.2d 155
    , 157-58
    (5th Cir. 1986).
    Lachney also contends for the first time on appeal that the
    district court reversibly erred when it departed upward from
    offense level seventeen to offense level twenty-three.   He
    asserts that the district court used impermissible factors to
    justify the upward departure.   He asserts in addition that the
    district court double-counted when it used his prior convictions
    and the fact that he had relocated and continued committing
    offenses in other jurisdictions as justification for the upward
    departure.    Lachney does not challenge the upward departure from
    criminal history category IV to category VI.
    Because Lachney did not object to the district court’s
    finding that the appropriate guideline range was 92 to 115 months
    of imprisonment, we review for plain error.    See United States v.
    Ravitch, 
    128 F.3d 865
    , 869 (5th Cir. 1997).    To demonstrate plain
    error, Lachney must show clear or obvious error that affects his
    substantial rights; in such case, we may exercise our discretion
    No. 04-30490
    -3-
    to correct a forfeited error that seriously affects the fairness,
    integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.      See
    Ravitch, 
    128 F.3d at
    869 (citing United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 730-36 (1993); United States v. Calverley, 
    37 F.3d 160
    ,
    162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
    The record shows, contrary to Lachney’s argument, that the
    district court did not rely on Lachney’s prior arrests, his
    lifestyle of drug use, and his lack of education and training as
    justification for the upward departure.   The district court cited
    Lachney’s prior convictions that did not contribute points toward
    his criminal history score; Lachney’s failure to adhere to
    conditions of probation, parole, or supervised release; Lachney’s
    commission of offenses while on periods of release; Lachney’s
    propensity toward recidivism; and Lachney’s threat to the safety
    of the community, all of which are permissible bases for an
    upward departure.   See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(4)(B); U.S.S.G.
    § 4A1.3(a)(2) & comment. (n.2.).
    The record refutes Lachney’s argument that the district
    court double-counted by using his prior convictions and his
    relocation and continued commission of offenses in other
    jurisdictions as grounds for the upward departure in his offense
    level.   The district court explained that it was departing beyond
    criminal history category VI because Lachney committed crimes
    while on probation, parole, or supervision; his offenses were
    becoming violent; his record showed that he would continue to
    No. 04-30490
    -4-
    commit crimes; and he presented a danger to the community.
    Furthermore, Lachney has not cited a guideline provision that
    forbids the alleged double-counting.    See United States v.
    Harrington, 
    82 F.3d 83
    , 89 n.6 (5th Cir. 1996) (double-counting
    is not prohibited unless guideline forbids it).   Lachney has not
    shown error, much less plain error.    See Ravitch, 
    128 F.3d at 869
    .   Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.