Deville v. USA ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 18, 2006
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
__________________________ Clerk
No. 06-30252
Summary Calendar
__________________________
JOSEPH OLLIE DEVILLE; ET AL,
Plaintiffs,
JOSEPH OLLIE DEVILLE
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, on behalf of United States
Department of Veterans Affairs; CHG COMPANIES INC.; ARTHUR
CARL PLAUTZ, JR, Contract Doctor,
Defendants-Appellees,
HUNTER & MORTON; JOHN E. MORTON,
Intervenors-Appellees.
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(No. 1:04-CV-614)
___________________________________________________
Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
*
PER CURIAM:
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Joseph Ollie Deville appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to set aside the
settlement of his medical malpractice suit and the district court’s grant of the defendants’
motion to enforce that settlement. Deville argues that he was coerced to settle. Finding no
merit in Deville’s argument, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In an attempt to resolve this Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) lawsuit stemming
from alleged malpractice visited upon Deville during treatment at a Department of
Veterans Affairs hospital, the parties employed a mediator. At the culmination of a day-
long mediation, Deville entered into a binding settlement with the defendants: the United
States, CGH Companies, and Dr. Carl Plautz. The district court then dismissed the lawsuit,
subject to reopening if the settlement was not consummated within sixty days. Apparently
deciding that the settlement was unfavorable, Deville, acting pro se, filed a motion in letter
form seeking to set aside the settlement. Deville argued that he was coerced into settling
through the efforts of his attorney, John Morton. In particular, Deville alleged that at
various times during the mediation Deville sought to leave but Morton physically
prevented him from doing so and verbally pressured him to settle. Deville also
complained that the mediation occurred soon after he underwent invasive knee surgery
and that he was thus in constant pain throughout the mediation. Deville argued that this
combination of events effectively coerced his consent to settle. After a response from the
United States, CGH Companies, and Plautz, the district court received testimony from
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some of the individuals present at the mediation. Morton testified that he did not block
Deville’s attempted exit from the mediation room and that Deville knowingly accepted the
terms of the settlement. The mediator, Bernard McLaughlin, denied that Deville was
physically intimidated, testified that he thought Deville understood the issues being
discussed, and testified that he remembered discussing with Deville that he did not have
to agree to settle and could leave at any time. McLaughlin further testified that Deville
never protested about knee pain interfering with his ability to participate in the mediation.
McLaughlin also remembered discussing the terms of the agreement with Deville.
The district court found Morton and McLaughlin’s version of events credible and
declined to set aside the settlement. The court emphasized that Deville was free to leave
the mediation at any time and did not do so, found that events described by Deville were
“not supported by the testimony of any other party to the mediation,” and found that
Deville was a “savvy businessman” who entered into a compromise of a disputed claim
“with full knowledge of the consequences of that settlement.”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As the defendants correctly point out, the district court’s decision that Deville’s
settlement was enforceable involved factual determinations; these determinations are
reviewed for clear error. See Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc., 57 F.3d 1406, 1416 (5th Cir. 1995)
(affirming a district court’s denial of a motion to enforce a settlement as not “clearly
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The district court heard live testimony from Deville and Morton. The mediator,
Bernard McLaughlin, testified by deposition.
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erroneous” after the district court found that the settlement discussion did not result in a
meeting of the minds); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (“Findings of fact, whether based on
oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .”). The
ultimate decision to grant a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. See Bell v. Schexnayder, 36 F.3d 447, 450 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e do not believe
that the court abused its discretion in . . . enforcing the settlement agreement.”); see also
Re/Max Int’l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 271 F.3d 633, 645 (6th Cir. 2001) (reviewing for abuse
of discretion); Hayes v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., 196 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1999) (same).
III. DISCUSSION
The Fifth Circuit has not decided which law applies to govern the enforceability of
the settlement of FTCA cases: federal common law or the law of the state where the alleged
tort occurred, here, Louisiana. Another circuit has held that the law of the state where the
tort occurred applies to settlement disputes in FTCA cases. Reo v. United States Postal
Serv., 98 F.3d 73, 76 (3d Cir. 1996). This court has held in a non-FTCA case that a dispute
regarding the settlement of a claim arising under Title VII is governed by federal common
law. Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1209 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing
cases and noting that “[t]his conclusion accords with the law in other areas of federal
question jurisdiction” such as claims brought pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act, federal antitrust laws, and federal maritime law); see also Gamewell Mfg., Inc. v.
HVAC Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 112, 113–16 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying federal law to resolve
“settlement issues” raised in a patent infringement lawsuit).
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We need not decide whether this court should adopt Reo or whether it should
extend Fulgence to settlements of claims brought pursuant to the FTCA, which is a federal
law remedy that relies on the substantive law of the state where the tort occurred. See
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Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 305 (1992). Under Louisiana or federal law,
Deville’s argument has no merit. Deville contends, as he did to the district court, that the
settlement was arrived at by fraud and that this assertion is supported by his version of
events; as a corollary, Deville argues that Morton and McLaughlin’s version of events is
false. After reviewing the record and the briefs, we hold that the district court did not err
in its findings. The district court, when presented with two conflicting versions of events,
credited Morton and McLaughlin’s version. Deville has made no argument that convinces
us that the district court clearly erred in making this determination. See Perez v. United
States, 830 F.2d 54, 58–59 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming a finding of comparative negligence by
the plaintiff when conflicting evidence was presented); see also Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of the
evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”). In Morton
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Louisiana law provides for rescission of a compromise agreement for fraud or
duress. See Hoover v. Boucvalt, 747 So.2d 1227, 1230 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
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The federal law that governs whether a contract exists “uses the core principles of
the common law of contracts that are in force in most states.” Smith v. United States, 328
F.3d 760, 767 n.8 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation and alteration omitted). These core
principles can be derived from the Restatements. See Gamewell Mfg., Inc. v. HVAC
Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 112, 116 (4th Cir. 1983) (looking to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS to determine the “federal rule”). Under the common law, a contract is voidable
by the victim of duress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981).
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and McLaughlin’s version of events, Deville was not coerced to settle. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement
agreement.
AFFIRMED.
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