Williamson v. Dallas Indep School ( 2000 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 99-10548
Summary Calendar
____________________
DEEN T. WILLIAMSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:96-CV-2760-T)
_________________________________________________________________
January 27, 2000
Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Deen T. Williamson, pro se, appeals the summary judgment
granted the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) on her Title
VII race discrimination and retaliation claims, including
contending that the court abused its discretion by ruling without
allowing her further discovery. (Her pending motions are DENIED.)
Williamson, a white teacher in a predominantly black
elementary school, was terminated for making inappropriate remarks
to her students, during a class discussion of the “Million Man
March” and its promoter, and later to her co-workers. While
contesting her termination through the lengthy administrative
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
process provided for under Texas law, Williamson filed this action;
she subsequently requested, and the court granted, a stay until the
administrative appeal was final. The termination decision by DISD
was upheld ultimately; having failed to properly serve an
indispensable party, her appeal to state district court was
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Williamson’s appeal in this action centers on DISD’s motion
for a stay of discovery pending a ruling on its summary judgment
motion (filed simultaneously), in which it contended that
Williamson was collaterally estopped from relitigating facts
previously determined in the administrative proceedings, and thus,
as a matter of law, could not meet her summary judgment burden. In
that motion, DISD “agree[d] to a reasonable period of time for
discovery” if the court ruled against it on the collateral estoppel
issue.
Noting Williamson’s concern about her ability to conduct
further discovery, the court, in ordering an expedited response to
the stay motion, clarified that the parties would be allowed
additional discovery if it denied summary judgment. Williamson,
then represented by counsel, withdrew her objection; and the stay
was granted.
In granting summary judgment, the court held that neither the
previous administrative proceedings, nor the state district court’s
final judgment, barred the Title VII claims; however, finding that
DISD had also raised the underlying merits, the court ruled that
Williamson’s affidavit, submitted in opposition to summary
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judgment, was insufficient to rebut DISD’s legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for termination.
Williamson contends that the court “violat[ed] the purpose of
its own order” when it went beyond the collateral estoppel issue;
however, she does not contend that she did not have notice that the
court would consider the merits.
Indeed, in her opposition to DISD’s summary judgment motion –
in which it contended that Williamson could not show pretext –
Williamson asserted that her 20-page affidavit supported her race
discrimination claims. DISD’s reply to her response further
evidenced that the merits were before the court: in it, DISD
asserted that Williamson’s affidavit was inadequate to rebut DISD’s
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.
In addition, after the summary judgment was granted,
Williamson contended, in a FED. R. CIV. P. 59 motion prepared by her
attorney, that her affidavit was sufficient summary judgment
evidence because it contained factual assertions, as well as her
own conclusions. Believing that her attorney would not timely file
that motion, Williamson, pro se, filed a motion for an extension of
time to file the Rule 59 motion, in which she asserted that she had
presented sufficient evidence to show pretext.
Noting that Williamson did not point to any specific evidence
in opposition to summary judgment, but only to “the record as a
whole”, and that her affidavit, which “gave a narrative of her
version of the relative events”, was insufficient to overcome her
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summary judgment burden, the court denied the post-summary judgment
motions.
Although Williamson did not file a FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f) motion
for a continuance, her contention that she should have been allowed
additional discovery is analogous to an appeal of a denial of a
56(f) motion. A continuance is warranted only if the movant
demonstrates why more discovery is needed, and how it will create
a material fact issue. Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp.,
170 F.3d 518, 535 (5th Cir. 1999); see United States v. Bloom, 112
F.3d 200, 205 n.17 (5th Cir. 1997). As DISD points out, the
district court docket reflects that Williamson had adequate time
for discovery – from October 1996 until June 1997, when she
requested a stay, and from July 1998, when the case was
reactivated, until February 1999, when DISD moved for a stay.
In district court, Williamson did not raise her contention that
the court should not have ruled on the merits, and neither there
nor here, has she explained what further discovery she would
undertake, how it would create a genuine issue of material fact, or
how she was prejudiced without such discovery. See Fontenot v.
Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1193-94 (5th Cir. 1986); see also
Williams v. Time Warner Operation, Inc., 98 F.3d 179, 183 (5th Cir.
1996) (refusing review of contention raised for first time on
appeal).
Reviewing the summary judgment record de novo, and in the
light most favorable to Williamson, we conclude that her conclusory
affidavit is insufficient to create a material fact issue on
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whether DISD’s reason for termination was a pretext for race
discrimination. See Grimes v. Texas Dep’t of Mental Health &
Mental Retardation, 102 F.3d 137, 139-40 (5th Cir. 1996);
Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co., 58 F.3d 144, 153 (5th Cir.
1995) (noting that “subjective belief” that discrimination has
occurred is insufficient to create jury question).
AFFIRMED
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