Cannon v. Howard ( 2000 )


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  •                 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _____________________
    No. 99-11424
    Summary Calendar
    _____________________
    JAMES EARL CANNON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    W. HOWARD, Warden, in her
    Individual Capacity;
    C. HURST, Hospital Administrator,
    in his Individual Capacity,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 5:99-CV-266-C
    _________________________________________________________________
    June 30, 2000
    Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    James Earl Cannon, Texas prisoner # 607764, appeals the
    district court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint against
    W. Howard and C. Hurst as frivolous.     He asserts that he should
    have been given the opportunity to provide additional information
    to the court.   A dismissal of an in forma pauperis (IFP) complaint
    as frivolous pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(i) is reviewed
    for abuse of discretion.    Siglar v. Hightower, 
    112 F.3d 191
    , 193
    (5th Cir. 1997).      Because the district court did not request
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    additional information from Cannon to clarify his complaint, the
    appellate court must determine whether Cannon’s allegations, if
    developed further, “might have presented a nonfrivolous section
    1983 claim.”     Eason v. Thaler, 
    14 F.3d 8
    , 9 (5th Cir. 1994).
    Cannon      asserts        that     the       district     court      improperly
    characterized his claims against Howard as interference with access
    to the courts.     He maintains that he was denied due process because
    he had no notice that Howard could dismiss his prisoner grievance
    after Cannon refused to grant an extension of time for the prison
    to file a response.        Cannon was aware of the consequences of his
    refusal to grant the extension through the extension request, and
    his due process rights were not violated.
    Cannon     also   asserts         that      Howard    misused   her    power   by
    dismissing his grievance.              To the extent he asserts that he was
    denied access to the prison grievance procedure, this could be a
    cognizable § 1983 claim.          Jackson v. Cain, 
    864 F.2d 1235
    , 1248-49
    (5th Cir. 1989).          However, Cannon’s own refusal to grant the
    extension     prevented    him       from       proceeding    with   the    grievance
    proceedings, not Howard’s interference.                   To the extent he asserts
    that Howard violated prison policies, such an alleged violation
    does not    give   rise    to    a     constitutional        violation     by   itself.
    Hernandez v. Estelle, 
    788 F.2d 1154
    , 1158 (5th Cir. 1986).                       To the
    extent Cannon argues that Howard had no authority to create such a
    policy, he has provided no support for this belief.
    2
    Cannon     also    contends    that       Howard’s    extension   request
    constituted a “threat” and that the dismissal penalized him for
    filing a grievance.      The language of the extension request and the
    circumstances    under    which    Cannon    was   requested   to   accept   an
    extension in no way constitute a threat. Although prison officials
    may not retaliate against a prisoner for using a prison grievance
    procedure, see Jackson, 
    864 F.2d at 1248-49
    , Howard’s dismissal of
    Cannon’s grievance was not a punishment or retaliation for Cannon’s
    initial filing of a grievance.
    Cannon   also     asserts    that   the    district   court    abused   its
    discretion in dismissing his complaint against Hurst with prejudice
    under Parratt v. Taylor, 
    451 U.S. 527
    , 541-44 (1981), overruled in
    part not relevant here, Daniels v. Williams, 
    474 U.S. 327
     (1986).
    He contends that Hurst’s actions were intentional and that Hurst
    converted money from Cannon’s prison account.                  An intentional
    taking of property may also survive a due process challenge if an
    adequate postdeprivation remedy exists. Hudson v. Palmer, 
    468 U.S. 517
    , 533 (1984); Sheppard v. Louisiana Bd. of Parole, 
    873 F.2d 761
    ,
    763 (5th Cir. 1989).         Cannon has cited no authority for the
    assertion that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine does not apply to the
    taking of money as well as personal property.
    Cannon has not shown that the district court abused its
    discretion by dismissing his civil rights complaint as frivolous.
    The district court’s dismissal is
    A F F I R M E D.
    3
    4